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the underlying labour market outcomes 
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both pilot and comparison districts over the 
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the lone parent pilots, nor the Employment 
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Flow sample Lone parents who become potentially eligible 
for IWC after its first day of operation in their 
Jobcentre Plus district.
Linear time trend A time trend where the dependent 
variable increases or decreases over time at 
a constant rate. 
P14 The name of a form completed by employers 
and sent to Her Majesty’s Revenue Customs 
(HMRC) giving details of the earnings of each 
employee and of the tax that has been deducted.
Phase A set of Jobcentre Plus districts which began 
operating the lone parent pilots (LPPs) or IWC 
on the same date. There were four phases.
xvi
Pilot district A Jobcentre Plus district operating one of 
the LPPs. 
Potentially eligible Describes a lone parent who has been claiming 
Income Support (IS) or Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA) for at least 12 months, and who would 
therefore be entitled to claim IWC if they left 
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for IWC on its first day of operation in their 
Jobcentre Plus district.
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1Key findings
Key findings
Background 
Since April 2004, a set of Government policies designed to help lone parents into 
work have been piloted in various combinations in selected Jobcentre Plus districts 
in Great Britain. The five policies are In-Work Credit (IWC), Work Search Premium 
(WSP), Extended Schools Childcare and Childcare Tasters (ESC), Quarterly Work 
Focused Interviews (QWFI) for lone parents whose youngest child is aged 12 or over 
in Local Education Authorities (LEAs) in which an ESC pilot is operating (Extended 
Schools Quarterly Work Focused Interviews (ESQWFIs)) and New Deal Plus for 
Lone Parents (ND+fLP), hereafter collectively referred to as ‘the lone parent pilots’ 
(LPPs or ‘the pilots’). The pilots operated in four sets of Jobcentre Plus districts 
(hereafter referred to as phases) starting in April 2004 (Phase 1), October 2004 
(Phase 2), April 2005 (Phase 3) and October 2005 (Phase 4). Data was available 
up to 31 March 2007, covering the first 18 months (Phase 4 districts) to the first 
36 months (Phase 1 districts) of the pilots’ operation. IWC was rolled out to the 
whole of Great Britain in April 2008, after the period covered by this report.
This report estimates the impact of the LPPs on the benefit and work outcomes of 
lone parents who had been receiving Income Support (IS) or Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA). Lone parents who were eligible for the LPPs because they had been claiming 
Incapacity Benefit (IB), Carer’s Allowance or Severe Disability Allowance (SDA) were 
not included in this analysis. It makes use of two empirical methods – difference-
in-differences (DiD) and a duration (or survivor) model – both of which use lone 
parents in Jobcentre Plus districts not operating an LPP as a comparison group.
The report provides estimates of the overall impact of the LPPs, including the 
impact of ESQWFIs and ND+fLP. Much of the analysis focuses on those lone 
parents who were ‘potentially eligible’ for IWC: this refers to lone parents in pilot 
districts who had been receiving IS or JSA for at least 12 months, and so would 
have been eligible to claim IWC had they left IS/JSA and started a job of 16 or 
more hours per week. If they had entered work of 16 or more hours, such lone 
parents could have been paid IWC of £40 per week while they were in work, for 
a maximum of 12 months. Formally, then, this report estimates the impact of the 
LPPs on lone parents who were potentially eligible for IWC.
2Results
It is not possible to estimate accurately the take-up rate of IWC amongst those 
lone parents who met all the eligibility criteria, as the available administrative data 
does not record accurately whether a lone parent is in work of 16 or more hours. 
However, by 31 March 2007, just under ten per cent of all potentially eligible lone 
parents had received IWC and just under 33 per cent of all potentially eligible lone 
parents who left IS had received IWC; the other 67 per cent who left IS may have 
left because they were no longer a lone parent or left to claim IB or left to work 
fewer than 16 hours a week or were unaware of IWC. Compared with potentially 
eligible lone parents who did not receive IWC, IWC recipients are less likely to have 
a child under the age of three, have fewer children on average, are more likely to 
have been on New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and are less likely to be disabled. 
However, IWC recipients do not differ substantially from other potentially eligible 
lone parents in their work histories.
Just under 70 per cent of lone parents who received IWC did so for the full 
12 months. These lone parents were very likely to remain in work, and very unlikely 
to re-claim out-of-work benefits, after their IWC claim had finished. However, the 
30 per cent of IWC recipients who did not receive IWC for the full 12 months were 
highly likely to stop work and return to benefit when they stopped receiving IWC. 
IWC recipients who claimed for the full 12 months are more likely to have an older 
child, more likely to have been on NDLP and less likely to be disabled than IWC 
recipients who claimed for less than six months. 
The main aim of this impact assessment is to estimate how many lone parents 
stopped receiving out-of-work benefits and started work purely as a result of the 
LPPs, and how long these effects lasted. Such estimates of additionality can be 
expressed in two ways: as a proportion of all potentially eligible lone parents or 
as a proportion of those potentially eligible lone parents who left IS. Overall, 
the LPPs had positive impacts that increased the proportion of potentially eligible 
lone parents who were in work and reduced the number who were receiving an 
out-of-work benefit. The main estimates are that 1.6 percentage points (ppts) 
more potentially eligible lone parents were no longer receiving an out-of-work 
benefit after 12 months’ exposure to the pilots (from a base of 16.6 per cent). 
Based on Phases 1 and 2 (which cover a longer period than the other phases), 
it is estimated that 2.0 ppts more lone parents were no longer receiving an out-
of-work benefit after 24 months’ exposure (from a base of 23.9 per cent). The 
equivalent estimates for being in work are 1.0 ppts from a base of 13.3 per cent 
and 1.4 ppts from a base of 15.3 per cent. The size of these impacts is similar to 
the estimated impacts of NDLP and Work Focused Interviews (WFIs) on all lone 
parents on IS, as reported in Cebulla et	al. (2008).1
1 Cebulla, A. and Flore, G. with Greenberg, D. (2008). The	 New	
Deal	 for	 Lone	 Parents,	 Lone	 Parent	 Work	 Focused	 Interviews	
and	 Working	 Families’	 Tax	 Credit:	 A	 review	 of	 impacts. The 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) Research Report No. 484, 
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-2008/rrep484.pdf
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There is no robust evidence that the impact of the LPPs was any greater in pilot 
districts where ND+fLP was in place, or for lone parents subject to ESQWFIs. There 
is some evidence that the LPPs had a greater impact on lone parents who had 
previously been on NDLP than those who had not, particularly those who were 
potentially eligible for IWC when it first became available (known as the stock 
sample). It is not possible to tell whether this is genuinely caused by NDLP – which 
might happen if, for example, lone parents on NDLP were more likely to find out 
about IWC – or whether it is because lone parents who join NDLP are more work-
ready and therefore, more likely to respond to an increased incentive to work, 
than those who do not, or whether there is some sort of beneficial interaction 
between the two policies.
IWC recipients do not seem to have been encouraged to remain in work and 
off benefit for much longer than they would have done in the absence of the 
pilots, so by far the most important impact of IWC has been to encourage more 
potentially eligible lone parents to leave out-of-work benefits and start work: only 
nine per cent of the overall impact of the LPPs a year after first receiving IWC was 
attributable to a retention impact. 
The fact that the impact estimates are small relative to the number of IWC 
recipients implies that, two years after first receiving IWC, only one out of every 
five IWC recipients is not receiving IS thanks to the LPPs: the remaining four in five 
have either returned to claiming IS, or would have left IS and started work without 
the LPPs. This estimate of ‘deadweight’ is similar to that implied by previous 
evaluations of the Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), another in-work financial 
incentive programme and the NDLP.
There is evidence that lone parents in LPP districts who have been on IS for less 
than 12 months – and who are, therefore, not yet potentially eligible for IWC – 
stayed on IS for longer after the LPPs began. If these effects are caused by the 
LPPs – perhaps through anticipation effects – then the headline results presented 
earlier will slightly overstate the true impact of the LPPs on all lone parents. If, 
though, the effects instead reflect a deterioration of the underlying state of the 
labour market in the districts operating the LPPs relative to other districts, then 
the headline results will slightly understate the overall impact of the LPPs. The 
data available to the research team was insufficient to distinguish between these 
hypotheses. It would be possible to learn more through qualitative research with 
lone parents in their first year of receipt of IS. In theory, if there were anticipation 
effects, then an estimate of the overall impact of IWC that allowed for such effects 
should be smaller (less positive) than the headline estimate reported earlier; in 
fact, when such an estimate was produced, it was very similar to the headline 
estimate reported earlier.
4These estimates supersede those in Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
Research Report No. 415 (RR 415).2 In general, the estimated impact of the LPPs 
in this report is higher than that in RR 415. This is partly because the impact of the 
LPPs seems to rise over time, and partly because the empirical strategy has been 
refined slightly to account for inaccuracies in the administrative data and for the 
differing start dates of the four phases. 
2 Brewer, M., Browne, J., Crawford, C. and Knight, G. (2007). The	lone	parent	
pilots	 after	 12	 to	 24	 months:	 an	 impact	 assessment	 of	 In-Work	 Credit,	
Work	 Search	 Premium,	 Extended	 Schools	 Childcare,	 Quarterly	 Work	
Focused	 Interviews	 and	 New	 Deal	 Plus	 for	 Lone	 Parents. DWP Research 
Report No. 415, http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-2008/
rrep415.pdf
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Summary
Overview
This is the second published report from a project designed to estimate the labour 
market impact of a set of five Government policies designed to help lone parents 
into work. These policies are being piloted in different combinations in Jobcentre 
Plus districts in Great Britain. The five policies in question are In-Work Credit 
(IWC), Work Search Premium (WSP), Extended Schools Childcare and Childcare 
Tasters (ESC), Quarterly Work Focused Interviews (QWFIs) for lone parents whose 
youngest child is aged 12 or over in Local Education Authorities (LEAs) in which 
an ESC pilot is operating (Extended Schools Quarterly Work Focused Interviews 
(ESQWFI)) and New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP). These are collectively 
referred to as ‘the lone parent pilots’ (LPPs or ‘the pilots’). 
The pilots were introduced in four phases: Phase 1 (April 2004), Phase 2 (October 
2004), Phase 3 (April 2005) and Phase 4 (October 2005) in certain Jobcentre 
Plus districts. Phase 2 included districts throughout Great Britain but the other 
phases included districts from England only. Separately commissioned qualitative 
evaluations of the LPPs and of ND+fLP were published in spring 2007 (Hosain 
and Breen, 2007; Jenkins, 2008). This report assesses the quantitative impact of 
the LPPs up to 31 March 2007, covering the first 36 months of operation of the 
pilots in Phase 1, 30 months in Phase 2, 24 months in Phase 3 and 18 months in 
Phase 4. ESC stopped in March 2006 and WSP stopped in September 2006 but 
the ND+fLP and IWC were continued, and IWC was rolled out nationwide in April 
2008, outside the period covered by this report. 
The report provides estimates of the overall impact of the LPPs. Much of the 
analysis focuses on those lone parents who were ‘potentially eligible’ for IWC: this 
refers to lone parents in pilot districts who had been receiving Income Support (IS) 
or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least 12 months and so would have been 
eligible to claim IWC had they left IS/JSA and started a job of 16 or more hours 
per week. If they had entered work of 16 or more hours, such lone parents could 
have been paid IWC of £40 per week while they were in work, for a maximum of 
12 months. Formally, then, this report calculates the impact of the LPPs on lone 
parents who were potentially eligible for IWC.
6Methodology 
The main aim of this impact assessment is to estimate how many lone parents 
stopped receiving out-of-work benefits and started work as a result of the LPPs, 
and how long these effects lasted. The report also features descriptive analysis of 
the labour market outcomes and background characteristics of IWC recipients. The 
population of interest is limited to lone parents who at one stage claimed IS or JSA 
and who live in the pilot districts. Lone parents who were potentially eligible for 
the LPPs because they had been claiming Incapacity Benefit (IB), Carer’s Allowance 
or Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA) were not included in this analysis.
The main empirical method used to produce estimates of the impact of the LPPs 
is a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator. This tries to learn about the impact 
of the LPPs by comparing the behaviour of lone parents living in pilot districts 
with the behaviour of lone parents living in Jobcentre Plus districts that were not 
affected by the LPPs (known as comparison districts). A DiD estimator assumes 
that changes in the observed labour market outcomes of lone parents in the 
comparison districts can act as a reliable guide to the changes in outcomes that 
would have been experienced by those in the pilot districts had there been no 
LPPs. This is often known as the ‘common trends’ assumption. If the assumption 
is not true, the analysis would attribute impacts to the LPPs that are really just 
different trends in the economic conditions in pilot and comparison areas. The 
‘common trends’ assumption is fundamentally untestable after the LPPs have 
been introduced but this report looked for supportive graphical and statistical 
evidence immediately before the introduction of the pilots; this showed that there 
are significant differences in outcomes between the pilot and comparison districts 
before the LPPs began, but these differences are largely constant over time. There 
is, therefore, no evidence from this that the ‘common trends’ assumption fails 
during the period before the LPPs as a whole, nor immediately before the LPPs 
began, giving confidence in the DiD estimator. 
The main impact estimated is that of the LPPs as a whole on lone parents who 
are potentially eligible for IWC (in the evaluation literature, this corresponds to 
estimating the impact of the ‘intention to treat’ of the LPPs). The DiD estimator 
provides estimates of the impact of the LPPs on the probability that a potentially 
eligible lone parent is, after being potentially eligible for IWC for some period, 
not receiving an out-of-work benefit (defined as IS, JSA or IB) and the probability 
that they are in work. These capture the impact of the LPPs both on encouraging 
potentially eligible lone parents to leave benefit for work and on encouraging 
those that do so to remain in work and off out-of-work benefits. Two methods are 
then used to try to separate these two impacts for IWC recipients:
• The first involves applying the conventional DiD approach to those lone parents 
who leave IS for work in order to estimate directly the extent to which the 
LPPs encourage those who do leave benefit for work to remain off out-of-work 
benefits and in work.
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• The second is to use a duration (or survivor) model, which models all transitions 
onto and off benefit and onto and off IWC. Such models are typically only 
valid under a more restrictive set of circumstances than the conventional DiD 
estimator but if these stronger assumptions are true, the model provides a more 
detailed understanding of the impact of IWC, enabling the two effects of IWC 
– encouraging potentially eligible lone parents to leave benefit for work and 
encouraging those that do so to remain in work – to be untangled. In principle, 
a duration model can be used to estimate the overall impact of the LPPs, as well 
as their impact on retention. However, constraints on the size of the sample that 
could be used in the duration model mean that the preferred estimates of the 
overall impact of the LPPs are based on the DiD approach.
These methods are each valid in different situations and so it is informative to 
consider them both. 
Data 
This evaluation used administrative data held by the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) – the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS), the Income 
Support History file (IS History file) and the National Benefits Database (NBD) – 
which collectively provide information on benefit receipt and employment spells 
up to 31 March 2007. The data sources were used to construct a sample for 
analysis consisting of all ‘potentially eligible’ lone parents in Great Britain, i.e. 
all lone parents who claimed IS/JSA for 12 months continuously at some point 
between 1 April 2001 and 31 March 2007. 
The sample of potentially eligible lone parents was split into two groups:
• the flow sample, which includes lone parents who became potentially eligible 
for IWC at some point after its start date;
• the stock sample, which includes lone parents who were potentially eligible for 
IWC from the day it was introduced, because they had already been on IS/JSA 
for at least 12 months. 
The impact of the LPPs was estimated separately for the flow and stock samples. 
The more interesting estimates are those of the impact of the LPPs on the flow 
sample, because that determines how effective the pilots will be in the long run. 
The outcome measures are whether an individual is not claiming an out-of-
work benefit (defined here as IS, IB or JSA) according to the DWP databases 
and whether an individual is in work according to the WPLS. The employment 
records in the WPLS are based on employers’ returns to Her Majesty’s Revenue & 
Customs (HMRC) about individuals they are employing who are earning enough 
to be liable for income tax or National Insurance. The WPLS may, therefore not 
capture individuals who are in work but earning below the personal threshold, nor 
other spells of work that have not been declared to HMRC. For this reason, the 
data may underestimate the amount of time spent in work. However, the way in 
8which uncertain start and end dates of employment spells are recorded may lead 
to an overestimate of the amount of time spent in work if all dates in the WPLS 
are taken at face value. Steps were taken to minimise the impact of uncertain start 
and end dates. Reassuringly, the estimated impact of the LPPs on work outcomes 
was broadly consistent with, though not always identical to, the impact on benefit 
outcomes. The WPLS does not record the hours worked by individuals. 
A large number of individual and local-area characteristics that may affect labour 
market outcomes were also included in the model as controls, including detailed 
work and benefit outcomes for the a period before lone parents became potentially 
eligible for IWC, personal characteristics (e.g. disability status, number and age of 
children and so on) recorded in the administrative datasets, and local-area data 
from a variety of sources, including the 2001 Census and data from the Office 
for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) on registered 
childcare providers.
Take-up of IWC
A broad measure of take-up of IWC is the number of lone parents who have 
received IWC as a proportion of those who have ever been potentially eligible. 
This also provides a theoretical upper bound to the additional impact of IWC. By 
31 March 2007, just under ten per cent of all potentially eligible lone parents had 
received IWC, and just under 33 per cent of all potentially eligible lone parents who 
left IS had received IWC. Take-up rates were higher in Phases 2 and 4 than Phases 
1 and 3: this could reflect differences in local labour markets, differences in the 
characteristics of lone parents in the districts in the various phases or differential 
awareness of IWC among lone parents. 
Characteristics of IWC recipients
IWC recipients are 56 ppts more likely to have ever been on New Deal for Lone 
Parents (NDLP) than other lone parents who leave IS after at least 12 months in 
the pilot districts (i.e. than other potentially eligible lone parents), although this 
may be because of the conditions attached to IWC receipt when the pilots were 
first introduced, and seven ppts less likely to have ever been disabled. They are 
less likely to have a child under the age of three and they tend to have fewer 
children, on average, than other potentially eligible lone parents who left IS. 
Previous research has identified these as factors associated with shorter periods 
on IS and more frequent moves into work (Yeo, 2007; D’Souza et	al., 2008; La 
Valle et	al., 2008). However, these two groups do not differ substantially in terms 
of the proportion of time spent in work in the 30 months before leaving IS.
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Just under 70 per cent of lone parents who claimed IWC received it for the 
maximum 12 months and 16 per cent of IWC claims lasted less than six months. IWC 
recipients who claim for at least 11 months are more likely to have characteristics 
known (from previous research) to be associated with shorter spells of IS and more 
frequent transitions into work than those who claim for less than six months. For 
example, IWC recipients whose claim lasts at least 11 months are more likely to 
have an older child than IWC recipients whose claim lasts less than six months.
As IWC is a time-limited payment, an important issue is what happens to lone 
parents when payments of IWC stop. For lone parents who receive IWC for at 
least 11 months, there are very few changes, on average, to key labour market 
outcomes when IWC payments stop: over 80 per cent are still not receiving an 
out-of-work benefit one year after they stopped receiving IWC and more than 
60 per cent are still in work.
However, the picture is different for those lone parents who do not receive IWC 
for the full 12 months: amongst those who receive IWC for less than six months, 
63 per cent are receiving an out-of-work benefit one year after starting an IWC 
claim and only 26 per cent are in work. For those who receive IWC for more than 
six but less than 11 months, 49 per cent are receiving an out-of-work benefit one 
year after starting an IWC claim and 35 per cent are in work. Amongst all lone 
parents who received IWC for less than the full 12 months, 56 per cent were 
receiving an out-of-work benefit one year after starting an IWC claim and 31 per 
cent were in work.
These findings strongly suggest that there are higher levels of job retention for 
the majority of IWC recipients who are able to maintain an IWC claim for the 
full 12 months. Furthermore, they suggest that the majority of those who do not 
complete an IWC claim stop receiving IWC because they are no longer working 
and have returned to benefits.
Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the lone 
parent pilots: headline results
The main aim of this impact assessment is to estimate how many potentially 
eligible lone parents left benefit and started work purely as a result of the LPPs. 
The estimates suggest that, on average, the pilots led to statistically significant 
improvements in work and benefit outcomes. 
Figure 1 shows the average benefit and work outcomes of potentially eligible lone 
parents in the flow sample and how they change with the length of time that a 
lone parent is potentially eligible for IWC. The figure also shows estimates of the 
outcomes that would have occurred had the LPPs not been operating; the gap 
between the dotted and solid lines of the same colour, therefore, represents the 
additional or net impact of the LPPs (see also Table 1 later). 
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Figure 1 Percentage of potentially eligible lone parents in the  
 flow sample who are off benefit and in work, and  
 estimated percentage off benefit and in work in the  
 absence of the LPPs
For example, 12 months after first becoming potentially eligible for IWC, just 
under a fifth (18.2 per cent) of potentially eligible lone parents were no longer 
receiving an out-of-work benefit, with 1.6 ppts of that 18.2 per cent attributable 
to the LPPs. Twelve months after first becoming potentially eligible for IWC, a 
seventh (14.3 per cent) of potentially eligible lone parents were in work according 
to the WPLS, with the LPPs responsible for 1.0 ppts of this 14.3 per cent. This 
highlights that, even with the additional impact of the LPPs, potentially eligible 
lone parents can remain on IS for long periods.
It is also valid to express the additional impact of the LPPs as a proportion of those 
potentially eligible lone parents who are in work or no longer receiving an 
out-of-work benefit. This is sometimes known as the additionality rate. These 
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numbers are reported in Table 1. They show that, for example, 8.8 per cent of the 
potentially eligible lone parents no longer receiving an out-of-work benefit after 
12 months’ exposure to the LPPs is attributable to the LPPs; the equivalent figure 
for work outcomes is 7.0 per cent. 
The additional impact of the LPPs, expressed as a proportion of all potentially 
eligible lone parents, rises over time (measured relative to when they first became 
potentially eligible for IWC), as shown by the distance between the solid and 
dashed lines of the same colour in Figure 1. For example, after 24 months’ 
exposure to the LPPs, a quarter (25.9 per cent) of potentially eligible lone parents 
were no longer on benefit and 2.0 ppts of this is attributable to the LPPs. For 
work outcomes, the equivalent figures are 16.7 per cent and 1.4 ppts. These are 
larger impacts than those after 12 months’ exposure to the LPPs but it is not at 
all surprising that the impact of the LPPs rises the longer a lone parent is exposed 
to their policies and services. However, there is much less change over time in the 
additionality rate (see Table 1). This means that the additional impact of the LPPs 
on all potentially eligible lone parents rises with the length of time during which 
a lone parent is exposed to the LPPs, but their additionality rate is fairly constant. 
Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the lone 
parent pilots: variation across different types of lone parents, 
between the phases, by calendar time and by different 
combinations of policies offered as part of the LPPs 
The headline results presented above were for the flow sample as a whole, meaning 
that the estimates pooled all the phases together and, within a phase, also pooled 
lone parents who became potentially eligible for IWC at different points in time. 
The additional impact of the LPPs was estimated separately for the stock sample 
(those lone parents who were potentially eligible for the LPPs on the day they were 
introduced). The key difference between the flow and stock samples is that lone 
parents in the stock sample tend to have been receiving out-of-work benefits for 
far longer. The impact of the LPPs on the flow sample is more interesting than the 
impact of the LPPs on the stock sample, as it determines the impact of the LPPs in 
the long run. In general, the additional impact on the stock was smaller than that 
on the flow. After 12 months of being potentially eligible for the LPPs, 12.3 per 
cent of the stock sample was no longer receiving an out-of-work benefit, 0.5 ppts 
of which is attributable to the LPPs. After 24 months, the equivalent figures are 
18.4 per cent and 1.6 ppts. The implied additionality rate for those not on benefit 
is 3.7 per cent after 12 months’ exposure and 9.0 per cent after 24 months. The 
impact on work outcomes was very similar. The estimated impacts on benefit 
outcomes in Phases 1 and 4 after 12 months were not statistically significant but 
all those on all outcomes at 24 months were statistically significant.
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There are no robust differences in the impact of the LPPs across the four phases. 
For benefit outcomes, the impact of the LPPs is greater in Phases 2 and 4 than it 
is in Phases 1 and 3 (both dominated by London). For work outcomes, the impact 
of the LPPs is greater in Phases 1 and 3 (both dominated by London) than it is in 
Phases 2 and 4. However, the variation across phases in the estimated impacts for 
the benefit outcomes is almost never statistically significant. Estimates from the 
stock sample suggest that the impact of the pilots is greater for lone parents in 
Phase 2 and 3 districts than it is for lone parents in Phase 1 or Phase 4 districts. 
These differences exist after the analysis has controlled for many characteristics of 
lone parents and the areas in which they live, but they are small. 
Figure 1 showed how the impact of the LPPs changes with the length of time for 
which a lone parent is exposed to the LPPs but it is also possible that the impact of 
the LPPs is different for lone parents who became potentially eligible at different 
dates. This was investigated by estimating separate impacts for each ‘cohort’ of 
potentially eligible lone parents, where a cohort is defined as those lone parents 
who became potentially eligible for IWC in the same six-month window. For all 
phases, the estimated impact of the LPPs increases for each successive cohort, 
such that the LPPs seem to have had the largest impact on those lone parents who 
became potentially eligible between 1 October 2005 and 31 March 2006 (where 
outcomes are measured 12 months later, between 1 October 2006 and 31 March 
2007). However, this finding is only statistically significant for work outcomes. 
This report has found no robust evidence of variation in the impact of the LPPs 
according to the combinations of policies that were on offer. Specifically, the 
results do not suggest that the impact of the LPPs was any greater in pilot districts 
where ND+fLP was in place, nor for lone parents subject to ESQWFIs, than in pilot 
districts where only IWC was in place. For ESQWFIs, this is because few potentially 
eligible lone parents would have been subject to them, so the estimated impacts 
are very imprecise. For ND+fLP, the estimated impacts are more precise but are 
either very similar to the impacts in non-ND+fLP districts or weaker than in non-
ND+fLP districts.
There were very strong impacts of the LPPs among lone parents who had previously 
been on NDLP. It is not possible to tell whether this difference is genuinely caused 
by NDLP – which might happen if, for example, lone parents on NDLP were more 
likely to find out about IWC – or whether it is because the sort of lone parents 
who join NDLP are more work-ready and therefore, more likely to respond to an 
increased incentive to work, than those who do not, or whether there is some 
sort of beneficial interaction between the two policies (it was also the case that, 
between April 2004 and October 2004 in the Phase 1 districts, it was a requirement 
for lone parents who wanted to receive IWC to have been on NDLP when they 
left IS).
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Summary of key results
Table 1 summarises the main impact estimates for those outcomes for which 
estimates are available for all phases.
Table 1 Summary of impacts of the lone parent pilots 
Percentage	
points
After	12	months’	exposure	to	LPPs After	24	months’	exposure	to	LPPs
Impact	on	number	
no	longer	receiving	
out-of-work	
benefits
Impact	on	
number	in	work
Impact	on	number	
no	longer	receiving	
out-of-work	
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Impact	on	
number	in	work
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Flow 
sample
Overall 1.6*** 8.8 1.0*** 7.0 2.0*** 7.7 1.4*** 8.4
Phase 1 0.8** 5.2 1.4*** 9.8 1.9*** 7.9 1.4*** 8.9
Phase 2 2.0*** 10.1 0.9*** 5.9 2.1*** 7.5 1.3*** 7.4
Phase 3 1.2*** 7.8 1.5*** 12.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Phase 4 1.8*** 8.3 0.2 1.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Stock 
sample
Overall 0.5 3.7 0.7 4.8 1.6 9.0 1.2 8.1
Phase 1 0.1 0.9 0.4*** 2.9 0.9*** 5.1 0.8*** 5.1
Phase 2 0.7*** 5.6 0.8*** 5.4 1.5*** 7.5 1.2*** 7.5
Phase 3 0.6*** 6.3 1.1*** 8.7 2.2*** 13.1 1.5*** 10.7
Phase 4 0.3* 1.4 0.2 2.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Notes: The table shows the estimated impact of the LPPs on the proportion of lone parents 
no longer on benefit, and (separately) now in work, a certain number of months after first 
becoming potentially eligible for IWC. Impacts estimated by OLS regressions on flow sample and 
stock sample a certain number of months after first becoming potentially eligible for IWC. Work 
outcome is ‘whether in work according to WPLS’. Benefit outcome is ‘no longer receiving out-
of-work benefits according to NBD’. Results are presented in ppts, so an estimate of 1.6 means 
1.6 ppts. * = significant at 10 per cent level, ** = significant at 5 per cent level, *** = significant 
at 1 per cent level; standard errors have not been calculated for the impacts expressed as 
percentage of those no longer on benefit (or now in work), nor the overall impact for the stock 
sample. Additionality rate is calculated as ‘100 × impact/(outcome)’.
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Disentangling the impact of the LPPs: did they encourage 
more lone parents to leave benefit for work or encourage 
those who did leave to stay in work and off benefit for 
longer? 
The headline estimates of the LPPs combine any initial impact the LPPs had on 
encouraging lone parents to leave benefit and enter work, and any subsequent 
impact they had on encouraging IWC recipients to stay in work and off benefit. 
Two separate analyses suggest that the main impact of IWC has been to encourage 
more lone parents to leave benefit and start work than would otherwise have done 
so; the effect of the LPPs on reducing the benefit re-entry rate of IWC recipients 
seems to have been very small in comparison. One piece of evidence that supports 
this conclusion comes from estimating the impact of IWC on potentially eligible 
lone parents who left IS for work in the LPP districts using the DiD method. These 
estimated impacts are small (but statistically significant): for example, around 
70 per cent of these lone parents are still off benefit a year after leaving IS, and 
only 2 ppts of this can be attributed to IWC. The other piece of evidence comes 
from a duration (or survivor) model. This was used to simulate directly how long 
IWC recipients would remain off out-of-work benefits in the absence of IWC, and 
estimated that only 9 per cent of the overall effect of the LPPs a year after first 
receiving IWC was attributable to a retention impact. These two methods are each 
valid in different situations, and so it is informative to consider them both. 
Apparent impacts of the LPPs on lone parents who are not 
yet eligible for IWC
It is possible to use the DiD method to estimate the ‘impact’ of the LPPs on lone 
parents who have been on IS for less than 12 months and who are, therefore, 
not yet potentially eligible for IWC. These estimates are small (although generally 
statistically significant) and negative. But interpreting such ‘impacts’ is not simple: 
there are two main causes, with very different implications, and the data available 
to the research team was insufficient to distinguish between these hypotheses.
First, the negative ‘impacts’ may be genuinely caused by the LPPs. There are at 
least two ways this could occur: Lone parents in IWC districts whose IS claim has 
lasted less than 12 months, and who are contemplating leaving IS for a job of 16 
or more hours a week, might delay leaving IS until they become eligible for IWC 
in order to benefit from the £2,080 maximum payment of IWC; this is known as 
an ‘anticipation effect’. There may also be ‘spillover effects’; in the case of the 
LPPs, this would refer to a situation where the higher number of lone parents 
induced by the LPPs to look for work makes it harder for others – such as lone 
parents who have been on IS for less than 12 months – to find work, although 
these effects seem unlikely to be very important in a flexible labour market. If 
anticipation or substitution effects are present, and are leading to the apparent 
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negative impacts on lone parents whose IS claim has lasted less than 12 months, 
the headline estimates of the additional impact of the LPPs presented earlier are 
overstating the overall impact of the LPPs. However, qualitative research with 
IWC recipients (Ray et	al., 2007) found that the majority of those IWC recipients 
who had not received WSP or had a QWFI heard about IWC for the first time after 
they had found a job, suggesting anticipation effects are unlikely (although that 
research was based on a small sample of IWC recipients). Furthermore, a variant 
of the duration model that allows for anticipation effects finds little evidence for 
their existence. However, anticipation effects were found to be present in a similar 
programme in Canada (Card and Hyslop, 2005) and it is also plausible that there 
were spillover effects, as described above in the Canadian programme.
Second, the negative ‘impacts’ may be due to a general deterioration in the 
outcomes in the pilot districts that did not occur in the comparison districts and 
which cannot be explained by the explanatory factors included in the analysis (this 
would reflect a failure of the ‘common trends’ assumption). If such a deterioration 
had occurred, the headline estimates of the impact of the LPPs presented above 
are understating the actual impact of the LPPs. 
Deadweight
‘Deadweight’ reports what fraction of IWC recipients would have behaved in the 
same way in the absence of IWC. It is possible to calculate a rough measure of 
deadweight as 
100
IWC received have  whopeople ofNumber 
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This measure has been calculated separately for the stock and the flow samples 
and separately for all of the outcomes analysed. 
For the flow sample, the estimates of deadweight for benefit outcomes are grouped 
around 80 per cent in all phases; for the stock sample, estimated deadweight for 
benefit outcomes is 85 per cent in Phases 1 and 2, 95 per cent in Phase 4 and 66 
per cent in Phase 3 (the estimated deadweight for work outcomes is rather erratic). 
These results are broadly consistent with those from the duration model, which 
estimates that, two years after first receiving IWC, only one out of every five 
IWC recipients is not receiving IS thanks to the LPPs: the remaining four in five 
IWC recipients have either returned to IS or would have left IS and started work 
without the LPPs. The fact that their behaviour is – after two years – unaffected 
by IWC represents the ‘deadweight’ of the policy. The size of the deadweight is 
similar to that implied by previous evaluations of the Working Families’ Tax Credit 
(WFTC), another in-work financial incentive programme, in Brewer et	al. (2006) 
and of the NDLP, a voluntary programme to help lone parents leave IS and start 
work, in Dolton et	al. (2006) and Cebulla et	al. (2008).
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What has changed since DWP Research Report 415  
(RR 415)?
These estimates supersede those in RR 415. In general, the estimated impact of 
the LPPs in this report is higher than that in RR 415. It is not possible to isolate a 
single reason for this, as there have been many changes to the data analysed and 
the empirical strategy, the most important of which are:
• This report had access to more recent data containing newer cohorts of lone 
parents. From a statistical point of view, the larger flow sample has made it 
easier to detect small impacts reliably. More importantly, there is evidence that 
the impact of the LPPs on later cohorts of lone parents in the flow sample is 
greater than that on earlier cohorts and that the impact on the stock sample 
seems to have grown over time; this is partly why the estimated impacts of the 
LPPs reported here are higher than those in RR 415.
• This report uses data for Phase 4 districts, as well as the LPP districts in Scotland 
and Wales, which were not covered by RR 415. Furthermore, the sample of 
lone parents used before the LPPs began has been extended back to cover all 
those whose claims exceeded 12 months’ duration on or after 1 April 2001 
(compared with 1 April 2002 in RR 415).
• The measure of whether a lone parent is ‘off benefit’ has been improved to 
account for errors in the DWP administrative data and the measure of work has 
been further refined to account for errors in the WPLS. 
• Estimates of the number of IWC recipients provided by DWP to the authors 
were lower than they were for RR 415; this has reduced estimates of the IWC 
take-up rates.
• In the flow sample, the implementation of the DiD estimator has been refined 
to correctly allow for the start dates of the LPPs to vary by phase and to allow 
for an arbitrary underlying trend in outcomes. 
Implications for policy 
The target population for the LPPs – lone parents who have been receiving out-of-
work benefits for at least one year – tend to stay on benefits and out of work for 
long periods of time. The results in this report imply that the main role of the LPPs 
is to encourage more lone parents to leave benefit and start work. The size of the 
impact is similar to the estimated impacts of NDLP and WFIs on all lone parents on 
IS, as reported by Cebulla et	al. (2008). 
There is little evidence that the LPPs are having any impact on job retention, 
although job retention amongst most IWC recipients is very high, with 70 per 
cent remaining off benefit a year after claiming IWC. 
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One potential drawback of limiting IWC payments to a maximum of 12 months, 
compared with, say, a £40 a week increase in the Working Tax Credit (WTC), 
is that any positive impact it had would cease immediately when the payments 
stopped. This report has rejected this concern, by showing that lone parents do 
not stop work or start a new IS claim when they reach the 12-month limit of 
IWC payments. 
A potential drawback of restricting eligibility for IWC to lone parents who have 
spent at least 12 months receiving out-of-work benefits is that it gives lone parents 
on out-of-work benefits a financial incentive to postpone starting work until they 
have been on out-of-work benefits for a year. The data is consistent with this 
happening on a small scale but there are alternative explanations. Furthermore, 
an estimate of the overall impact of IWC that allows for such anticipation effects 
is very similar to the headline estimate reported earlier. 
An impact assessment alone does not provide sufficient evidence to determine whether 
a policy is cost effective or should be continued: such decisions should be based on 
a full cost-benefit analysis, fully informed by the estimates in this impact assessment. 
Finally, it should be noted that this impact assessment covers the operation of the 
LPPs from 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2007. It is entirely possible that the impact of 
IWC and related policies during a recession is different from its impact when the 
economy is growing.
Summary
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1 Introduction
This is the second and final published report from a project designed to evaluate, 
quantitatively, the net impact on various labour market outcomes of a set of 
Government policies designed to help lone parents into work (known as the lone 
parent pilots (LPP)). The first report was Brewer et	al. (2007), hereafter referred 
to as RR 415 (as it was published as Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
Research Report 415). This report includes the material that was intended to be 
published as a DWP working paper in 2007.
Over the period covered by this report (April 2004 to March 2007), various central 
government policies were piloted to help or encourage lone parents into work 
and/or to stop claiming benefits. These were collectively known as the lone parent 
pilots (LPPs or ‘the pilots’) and in full are In-Work Credit (IWC), Work Search 
Premium (WSP), Extended Schools Childcare and Childcare Tasters (ESC), Quarterly 
Work Focused Interviews (QWFIs) for lone parents in Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs) in which an ESC pilot is operating, whose youngest child is aged 12 or over 
(ESQWFI), and New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP). The main estimates are 
of the overall impact of the LPPs but an attempt is made to estimate the additional 
impact of QWFIs and to estimate impacts separately for ND+fLP districts.
This report estimates the impact of the LPPs on the benefit and employment 
outcomes of lone parents who had been receiving Income Support (IS) or 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). Lone parents who were eligible for the LPPs because 
they had been claiming Incapacity Benefit (IB), Carer’s Allowance or Severe 
Disability Allowance (SDA) were not included in this analysis. It makes use of two 
empirical methods – difference-in-differences (DiD) and a duration (or survivor) 
model – both of which use lone parents in Jobcentre Plus districts not operating 
an LPP as a comparison group. Data was available up to 31 March 2007, covering 
the first 18 months (Phase 4 districts) to the first 36 months (Phase 1 districts) of 
the pilots’ operation (Appendix A contains full details of the districts and policies 
that are included in each phase). IWC was rolled out to all of Great Britain in April 
2008, outside the period covered by this report.
Much of the analysis focuses on those lone parents who were ‘potentially eligible’ 
for IWC: this is a key concept and refers to lone parents in pilot districts who had 
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been receiving IS or JSA for at least 12 months, and so would have been eligible 
to claim IWC had they left IS/JSA and started a job of 16 or more hours per week. 
If they had entered work of 16 or more hours, such lone parents could have been 
paid IWC of £40 per week while they were in work, for a maximum of 12 months. 
Formally, then, this report calculates the impact of the LPPs on lone parents who 
were potentially eligible for IWC.
The outline of this report is as follows: 
• Chapter 2 discusses the aims, the methodology and the data used. The 
substantive analysis in this report is then in several chapters. 
• Chapter 3 presents descriptive analysis of what is known about IWC recipients 
from administrative data. It examines the take-up rate of IWC, how long 
potentially eligible lone parents spent on IS before claiming IWC, how long 
they received IWC and whether they claimed IS or stopped work after they had 
stopped receiving IWC. It also examines whether certain sorts of lone parents 
were more likely than others to receive IWC or to receive IWC for the full 12 
months. This analysis is new to this report, as RR 415 did not have data on 
which lone parents were receiving IWC.3
• Chapters 4 and 5 present the headline estimates of this report: the additional 
impact of the LPPs on the key benefit and work outcomes of the whole population 
of potentially eligible lone parents. These estimates can be derived from the DiD 
or the duration model and both are presented. Chapter 4 also examines the 
apparent impact of the LPPs on lone parents who are not yet eligible for IWC: 
such impacts might be affected by anticipation or substitution effects, or they 
may be informative about trends in underlying outcomes specific to the LPP 
districts. Chapter 4 presents results for the flow and Chapter 5 presents results 
for the stock: an estimate of the long-run impact of the LPPs needs to be made 
using the flow sample, because, in the long run, the initial stock sample will 
have all left IS/JSA and the only lone parents eligible for the pilots will be those 
from the flow sample (i.e. those who become eligible for IWC after the pilots 
were introduced). In the short run, though, the impact of the LPPs on the stock 
sample is of interest in itself as the majority of those potentially eligible for IWC 
come from the stock sample.
• Chapter 6 extends the DiD analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 to break down the impact 
of the LPPs on the population of potentially eligible lone parents into impacts 
among different groups of lone parents. Specifically, this chapter examines 
whether the impact varies according to which ‘flavour’ of LPP packages the lone 
parents were exposed to. This supplementary analysis is conducted for both the 
flow and stock samples.
3 RR 415 presented estimates of participation rates in IWC derived from 
Jobcentre Plus district-level aggregate data, now known to be inaccurate 
(see Chapter 3 for discussion). 
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• Chapter 7 presents a full discussion of the differences in results between this 
report and RR 415. The results should be seen as an update to similar analysis 
presented in RR 415 but the results in this report are based on a longer spell of 
data and include the Phase 4 districts and districts in Scotland and Wales, and 
there are also small but important differences in the precise specification of 
the analysis.
• Any positive impacts of the LPPs on the whole population of potentially eligible 
lone parents could arise both because the LPPs encouraged more lone parents 
to leave benefit (or encouraged lone parents to leave benefit sooner than they 
otherwise would) and because the LPPs (particularly IWC) encouraged those 
lone parents who left benefit for work to stay in work and off benefit for longer 
(hereafter abbreviated to ‘encouraging job retention’). Chapter 8 aims to isolate 
the second of these: the impact of the LPPs (particularly IWC) on encouraging 
job retention. This is done with both the duration model and a DiD estimator. 
• Chapter 9 presents further analysis of the impact of the LPPs on IWC recipients. 
It also provides grossed-up estimates of the actual number of lone parents 
moved off benefit or into work thanks to the IWC.
• Finally, Chapter 10 summarises the report’s conclusions and provides 
policy implications.
As stated above, this report has made use of two methods: a DiD model and a 
duration model. Both models have been used to examine most of the questions that 
this report addresses and so the results they produce can be compared with each 
other. In general, the methods give similar answers. However, the computational 
demands of the duration model meant that it was not possible to make use of 
data on employment and it had to be estimated on a (random) 5 per cent sample 
of the lone parents who claim IS, with only a handful of explanatory variables. 
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2 Aims of the research and  
 methodology
This chapter sets out the aims of the research project as a whole and of this report 
in particular. It also describes the methods used in this report to estimate the 
impact of the lone parent pilots. 
2.1 The policies that comprise the lone parent pilots
This project was designed to evaluate the impact of a number of policies designed 
to help or encourage lone parents into work and/or to stop claiming benefits, 
collectively known as the lone parent pilots (LPPs). These policies are:
• In-Work Credit (IWC);
• Work Search Premium (WSP);
• Extended Schools Childcare and Childcare Tasters (ESC);
• Quarterly Work Focused Interviews (QWFIs) for lone parents in Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs) in which an ESC pilot is operating, whose youngest child 
is aged 12 or over (Extended Schools Quarterly Work Focused Interviews 
(ESQWFIs));
• New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP).
Appendix A to this report gives more details of the policies and shows how the 
policies overlap spatially and temporally.
Chapter 6 attempts to estimate impacts separately for ND+fLP areas and to 
estimate the additional impact of ESQWFIs on lone parents who were subject to 
them. But it is the opinion of the authors that the impact of the pilots as a whole 
will be dominated by the impact of IWC, which substantially alters the financial 
gain to working for eligible lone parents. IWC also operates in more districts than 
the other policies, reaching around 45 per cent of lone parents on benefit for at 
least a year. 
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IWC was piloted in four phases: 
• Phase 1 (April 2004): Bradford; North London; South-East London.
• Phase 2 (October 2004): Cardiff and Vale; Central London; Dudley and Sandwell; 
Edinburgh, Lothian and Borders; Lancashire West; Leeds; Leicestershire; 
Staffordshire; West London.
• Phase 3 (April 2005): Brent, Harrow and Hillingdon; City and East London; 
Lambeth, Southwark and Wandsworth; South London.
• Phase 4 (October 2005): Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire; Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire; Essex; Hampshire and the Isle of Wight; 
Kent; Surrey and Sussex.
2.2 The population of interest, what outcome  
 variables will be investigated and what might  
 be expected to happen
2.2.1 The population of interest
The fact that this evaluation is using the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
(WPLS) means that it is constrained to evaluate the impact of the LPPs on lone 
parents who appear in the WPLS – that is, those lone parents who, at some point 
in time, have claimed a Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) benefit. 
Much of the analysis estimates the impact of the LPPs on lone parents who are 
potentially eligible for IWC: these are lone parents who have been receiving 
Income Support (IS)/Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least 12 months and who 
live in a Jobcentre Plus district where IWC is being piloted; they would be eligible 
for IWC if they stopped claiming IS, started a job of at least 16 hours per week 
and were living in a Jobcentre Plus district operating IWC at the time. This concept 
of being potentially eligible is fundamental to the evaluation: a lone parent is 
potentially eligible for IWC if they live in a pilot district and have been on IS/JSA 
for at least 12 months. 
Using the technical terms, the analysis measuring the impact on lone parents 
who are potentially eligible means that this report presents estimates of the 
‘intention to treat’ impact of the LPPs. How this definition was implemented in 
practice is described in Appendix B. 
Chapter 3 includes analysis of IWC recipients and various groups of lone parents 
who leave IS and the duration model is estimated on all lone parents who have 
made a claim for IS since 2001. And some parts of the report (Section 4.2.3) look 
at a wider population: all lone parents who make a claim for IS/JSA. Theoretically, if 
they were aware of IWC, some lone parents on IS/JSA might delay leaving benefits 
until the duration of their claim exceeds 12 months in order to become potentially 
eligible for IWC; conversely, the prospect of having to attend QWFIs as part of the 
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ESC programme (ESQWFIs) may induce some lone parents to leave IS/JSA in the 
first 12 months when they might not have done so had they been unaware of 
ESQWFIs. 
2.2.2 Outcome variables: what impacts does this report  
 investigate?
The key outcomes of interest under consideration in this report are whether, 
at particular points in time, lone parents who are potentially eligible for IWC in 
the pilot districts are more likely to have stopped claiming out-of-work benefits 
(defined as IS, JSA or Incapacity Benefit (IB)), or are more likely to have started 
working, thanks to the LPPs (Appendix B discusses how this was measured in 
practice; note that the measure of work does not record the number of hours 
worked). 
The data used in this evaluation means that this report cannot provide information 
about the impact of the LPPs on the lone parent employment rate nor on the 
proportion of lone parents claiming IS/JSA, as these require the existence of a 
dataset containing all lone parents. Such estimates could be produced using a 
household survey, such as the Family Resources Survey (FRS) or the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) but, in practice, the small impacts that this report estimates (discussed 
in subsequent chapters) mean that any impact on the overall employment rate 
amongst lone parents would be very small.
2.2.3 What might be expected to happen?
Economic theory and past evidence from similar programmes suggest the following 
responses are likely following the introduction of IWC:
• IWC should make it more likely that a potentially eligible lone parent in a pilot 
district leaves benefit to work at least 16 hours a week. 
• Having left benefits for a job, IWC should make it more likely that a lone parent 
recipient stays in work of at least 16 hours a week, but this effect may decline 
or cease entirely when an individual stops receiving IWC payments.
• IWC may induce some lone parents who would otherwise have left IS/JSA after 
less than 12 months to remain on IS/JSA for longer in order to be entitled to 
these additional payments. These responses are known as anticipation effects. 
(Card and Hyslop (2005) find evidence of such anticipation effects for lone 
parents in Canada who were potentially eligible for the Self-Sufficiency Project 
(SSP) programme if they remained on welfare for 12 months. A variant of the 
duration model allows for anticipation effects (see Appendix F).) In the extreme, 
they may also induce lone parents who would otherwise not have claimed IS/
JSA at all to claim IS/JSA and continue doing so for at least 12 months in order 
to become eligible for IWC, but this is very unlikely in practice and these effects 
are assumed not to exist in the analysis in this report.
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In addition, the ESC pilots should increase parents’ information about childcare 
opportunities and/or make childcare more accessible. This should increase the 
usage of formal childcare, perhaps at the expense of informal childcare and may 
increase parental employment as a result. The ESQWFIs should increase flows off IS/
JSA and into work for lone parents with a youngest child aged 12 or above through 
various mechanisms that increase the likelihood of the lone parent receiving an 
acceptable job offer. They may also act as a deterrent and lead to some lone parents 
leaving IS/JSA in under 12 months in order to avoid having an ESQWFI.
The conclusion from Research Report 415 (RR 415) was that ‘the	 [lone parent]	
pilots	 had	 small,	 positive	 impacts	 on	 the	number	of	 lone	parents	 in	work	 and	
no	longer	receiving	out-of-work	benefits’	but that	‘the	main	achievement	of	the	
pilots	was	to	make	better	off	those	lone	parents	who	would	have	left	benefits	for	
work	had	the	pilots	not	been	in	operation,	rather	than	to	encourage	substantially	
more	lone	parents	to	do	just	that.’ (Brewer et	al., 2007, 1 and 2).
2.3 Empirical methods
There are two empirical methods used in this report to produce estimates of the 
impact of the LPPs: one is a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator and the other 
is based on a duration (or survivor) model. Appendices E and F give full details of 
these methods and how they were implemented.
Both methods need to estimate what would have happened to potentially eligible 
lone parents in the LPP districts in the absence of the LPPs and, in principle, this can 
be addressed using an appropriate comparison group which was not affected by 
the pilots. RR 415 explained that the preferred comparison group is lone parents 
who have been claiming IS/JSA for at least 12 months but who live in districts that 
are not affected by the LPPs. 
The DiD estimator works by comparing trends in the outcomes of lone parents in 
the LPP districts with trends in the outcomes of lone parents in the comparison 
districts (in practice, this comparison is made having controlled for a very wide 
range of explanatory factors). This will be a good estimate of the impact of the 
LPPs if trends in the outcomes of lone parents in the comparison districts are 
a good guide to what the trends in the outcomes of lone parents in the LPP 
districts would have been had there been no LPPs. This requirement is known 
as the ‘common trends’ assumption and estimates of the impact of a labour 
market programme that are based on DiD are only ever valid if the assumption 
of ‘common trends’ is true in practice. Estimates based on a duration model do 
not technically require the common trends assumption to be true but, in practice, 
the model’s estimate of the impact of the LPPs will be derived to a large extent 
from comparisons between the behaviour of lone parents in pilot and comparison 
districts before and after the LPPs began.
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The ‘common trends’ assumption will be satisfied if the unobserved influences 
on labour market outcomes do not change in different ways between the pilot 
and comparison groups during the period under consideration. An informal test 
of the ‘common trends’ assumption is to test for a ‘placebo effect’ – in other 
words, to apply the DiD method to a period of time where it is known that there 
was no policy change, and then to test whether the DiD estimator correctly 
estimates there to be no effect. Section 4.2.1 reports the results of a similar test, 
which examines whether the differences in outcomes between each of the pilot 
phases and the set of comparison districts are constant over the period before the 
LPPs begin.
Both the DiD method and a duration model can be used to investigate the 
additional impact of the LPPs on the population of potentially eligible lone parents, 
and this is done in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. But these positive impacts of the LPPs on 
the population of potentially eligible lone parents could arise both because the 
LPPs encouraged more lone parents to leave benefit (or encouraged lone parents 
to leave benefit sooner than they otherwise would have done) and because the 
LPPs (particularly IWC) encouraged those lone parents who left benefit for work 
to stay in work and off benefit for longer (hereafter abbreviated to ‘encouraging 
job retention’). Understanding the relative importance of these two effects is very 
important, and can be done in two ways:
• The duration model can provide an exact breakdown of the overall impact of the 
LPPs into the two effects described above; it can do this because it attempts to 
model lone parents’ transitions onto and off benefit and into and out of work, 
and how these depend upon observable and unobservable characteristics, as 
well as on potential eligibility for, or receipt of, IWC.
• The DiD estimator can be applied to the sample of potentially eligible lone 
parents who left benefit for work. Because this sample has already left benefit, 
any impact detected by this method must be due to the impact of the LPPs on 
encouraging job retention.
There are statistical advantages and disadvantages to both methods, and each 
method will produce robust estimates of the true impact only under a particular 
set of conditions: see Appendices E and F. 
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3 Descriptive analysis of  
 In-Work Credit recipients
This chapter presents descriptive analysis of In-Work Credit (IWC) recipients.
Section 3.1 discusses the take-up rate of IWC by pilot phase: this is of interest 
because some measures of take-up provide a theoretical upper bound to the 
additional impact of IWC on labour market outcomes; furthermore, knowing 
what fraction of lone parents actually received IWC helps the estimated impacts 
to be understood better. Section 3.2 discusses how long IWC recipients stayed on 
IWC and what they did next, and Section 3.3 analyses the characteristics of IWC 
recipients: in both cases, the findings for IWC recipients are compared with the 
findings for other groups of Income Support (IS) leavers. 
Appendix G provides supplementary tables. In particular, it provides comparisons 
between IWC and work/benefit data from the Work and Pensions Longitudinal 
Study (WPLS), which allows one to see whether IWC recipients are recorded as 
being in work in the WPLS.
3.1 Participation in (or take-up of) IWC
This section presents a number of different ways of looking at take-up of IWC. 
A significant issue when looking at take-up of IWC is defining and estimating 
the population of lone parents eligible for IWC. It is possible to calculate three 
different take-up rates:
i. Number receiving IWC as a percentage of the number of potentially eligible 
lone parents (where, as in the rest of this report, ‘potentially eligible’ means 
a lone parent on IS or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least 12 months and 
living in a pilot district).
ii. Number of new IWC recipients as a percentage of the number of potentially 
eligible lone parents who left benefit over some period.
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iii. Number of new IWC recipients as a percentage of the number of potentially 
eligible lone parents who left benefit and started a job of at least 16 hours a 
week over some period. 
To be genuinely entitled to IWC, a lone parent has to be potentially eligible, and 
then leave benefit and start a job of at least 16 hours per week, so definition (iii) is 
the closest to a genuine measure of ‘take-up’. The measure of work constructed 
from eligibility to Working Tax Credit (WTC), which is now available in the WPLS, 
potentially provides an accurate assessment of which lone parents are in work 
of 16 or more hours. However, this measure was not available in time for this 
research report. Research Report 415 (RR 415) showed that an estimate of IWC 
take-up according to definition (iii) (but that disregards the hours worked per 
week) often exceeds 100 per cent, presumably because of the limitations of the 
measure of work in the WPLS. In particular, it is suspected that some lone parents 
receiving IWC have met the conditions for receiving IWC but that this is not being 
reflected in the WPLS (for example, if a job start date has been incorrectly recorded 
in the WPLS or if a lone parent receiving IWC has taken a job earning less than 
the personal allowance which does not appear in the WPLS). Such estimates are, 
therefore, not repeated here.
Because of this problem in identifying in the WPLS lone parents who have met all 
of the conditions necessary for receipt of IWC, the other two measures of take-
up use a broader definition of eligibility. Measure (ii) requires that the lone parent 
is recorded in the IS History database as leaving IS but does not necessarily have 
an entry for a new job in the WPLS. One downside of this measure is that lone 
parents will leave benefit for reasons other than moving into jobs of at least 16 
hours a week, and so this measure of participation should always be lower than 
100 per cent. 
Measure (i) compares the numbers receiving IWC to the total potentially eligible 
population (i.e. those lone parents who could receive IWC were they to leave 
benefit and start a job of at least 16 hours per week). This measure is of interest 
partly because it provides a theoretical upper bound to the additional impact of 
IWC on the proportion of lone parents who leave benefit or move into work: in 
the extreme scenario where none of the lone parents receiving IWC would have 
left benefit in the absence of the IWC (i.e. where the policy has no deadweight, 
discussed in Chapter 9), the additional impact of IWC would be equal to this 
measure. 
Figure 3.1 shows take-up rate (i) over time: the cumulative number receiving IWC 
as a percentage of the cumulative number of potentially eligible lone parents 
(Appendix G gives the numbers starting IWC in each phase over time and take-up 
rates separately for the stock and flow samples; Box 3.1 discusses why Figure 3.1 
is different from the equivalent figure in RR 415). The figure shows that: 
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• in each phase, the number of IWC recipients as a proportion of the potentially 
eligible population has increased over time (the average take-up rate exhibits 
step changes after 18, 24 and 30 months, as the number of phases contributing 
to the average falls over time – see Section 4.1.2). By March 2007, just under 
10 per cent of potentially eligible lone parents had received IWC;
• the participation rate varies across the phases, with Phases 1 and 3 having lower 
participation rates than Phases 2 and 4. This disparity could reflect differences 
in local labour markets, or in the characteristics of lone parents in the districts in 
the various phases. But given that potentially eligible lone parents in the Phase 1 
districts were less likely to leave benefit than those in the Phase 2 districts in the 
absence of IWC (this is shown in RR 415, or see Figure I.1 for justification), it is 
not surprising to see that participation in IWC as a proportion of all potentially 
eligible lone parents varies across phases in the same way. However, the lower 
take-up rate could reflect that it took longer in the Phase 1 and 3 districts for 
staff and customers to become aware of IWC.
Figure 3.1 Participation measure (i): recipients of IWC as    
 percentage of all lone parents ever potentially eligible,  
 by phase and month since LPPs started  
 (up to 31 March 2007)
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Figure 3.2 shows IWC starts as a fraction of IS off-flows amongst potentially 
eligible lone parents. It reveals that: 
• on average, the number of new IWC claims each month is a third of the number 
of potentially eligible lone parents who leave benefit but there is considerable 
variation across the year, with the highest ratios in September, January and May 
(also see Table G.1);
• this measure has a slight upward trend in the first few months of operation in 
each phase, consistent with potentially eligible lone parents who left benefit for 
work very early in the pilots’ operation, not being aware of IWC;
• this measure is slightly higher in Phases 2 and 4 than in Phases 1 and 3; it is 
likely that this is because a higher proportion of benefit leavers in the Phase 2 
and 4 districts move into work of at least 16 hours than in the other phases (this 
is shown in RR 415 or see Figure I.1 in Appendix I for justification);
Figure 3.2 Participation measure (ii): new recipients of IWC as  
 percentage of IS off-flows from potentially eligible lone 
 parents, by phase and month (up to 31 March 2007)
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Box 3.1: Why have estimates of the IWC participation/take-up 
rates changed since RR 415? 
The participation rates presented in Figure 3.1 are different from (and lower 
than) those in Figure 5.1 in RR 415. This is because the estimates of the 
number of IWC starts in each month, by district, that have been estimated 
from the full micro-data on IWC payments (and that the project team have 
verified with officials at DWP) are considerably lower than similar estimates 
provided to the project team for RR 415: this clearly acts to lower the implied 
take-up rate. The current estimates have calculated more precisely which 
lone parents are potentially eligible for IWC, and this has slightly reduced (by 
around 3 per cent) the estimate of the ever-potentially-eligible population: 
this acts to raise, very slightly, the implied take-up rate. The former effect is 
much more important, though.
The analysis in Figure 3.2 is different from that in Figure 5.2 in RR 415. 
Cosmetically, the horizontal axis has been changed to record calendar time, 
not time since the pilots started, and this brings out the seasonal pattern 
to IWC participation rates. More importantly, though, and as with Figure 
3.1, the estimates of the number of IWC starts are considerably lower than 
those provided to the project team for the 12 month report, and exits from IS 
amongst potentially eligible lone parents have been measured more precisely; 
each of these has the effect of reducing the implied IWC participation rate.
3.2 How long did IWC recipients stay on IWC and what  
 did they do next?
This section looks at the length of IWC claims and at what IWC recipients did after 
their IWC claims ended.
3.2.1 Duration of IWC claims
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the length of IWC claim in each phase, dividing 
claims into those that lasted less than six months, those that lasted at least six but 
less than 11 months and those that lasted at least 11 months (this last category 
essentially corresponds to those who received IWC for the full 12 months, but 
allows for some measurement error in the administrative data). The length of IWC 
claim is measured in two ways in the table: the top panel uses information on the 
start and end dates of the IWC claim and the bottom panel uses the total amount 
of IWC received to infer the length of claim. The choice of measure makes little 
difference to the results.
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Table 3.1 Length of IWC claim, by phase
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 All phases
IWC claim length defined using spell start and end dates
At least 11 months 2,709 6,697 1,824 2,379 13,609
(65.0%) (68.9%) (61.4%) (70.5%) (67.2%)
6–11 months 723 1,481 610 583 3,397
(17.3%) (15.2%) (20.6%) (17.3%) (16.8%)
Less than 6 months 739 1,549 535 415 3,238
(17.7%) (15.9%) (18.0%) (12.3%) (16.0%)
Total 4,171 9,727 2,969 3,377 20,244
IWC claim length defined using total amount paid to recipients
At least 11 months 2,551 6,334 1,686 2,270 12,841
(63.3%) (67.3%) (59.1%) (69.0%) (65.6%)
6–11 months 650 1,280 539 479 2,948
(16.1%) (13.6%) (18.9%) (14.6%) (15.1%)
Less than 6 months 831 1,795 627 541 3,794
(20.6%) (19.1%) (22.0%) (16.4%) (19.4%)
Total 4,032 9,409 2,852 3,290 19,583
Note: Sample is all lone-parent IS claimants in pilot districts with an IWC claim starting on or 
before 31 March 2006. 
Table 3.1 shows that the majority of IWC recipients (66–67 per cent) claim for at 
least 11 of the maximum 12 months. This figure is highest in Phase 4 (69–71 per 
cent) and lowest in Phase 3 (59–61 per cent). Of the remaining IWC recipients, 15–
17 per cent claim for between six and 11 months and 16–19 per cent claim for less 
than six months. Using spell start and end dates (top panel) generates IWC claims 
of slightly longer length than using the amount of IWC received (bottom panel).
3.2.2 What IWC recipients did next
This section documents the benefit and work profiles of IWC recipients (by length 
of IWC claim) and compares them with those of other groups of lone parents who 
leave IS. These other groups are:
• lone parents in pilot districts who leave IS after claiming for at least 12 months, 
but not for IWC; 
• lone parents in comparison districts who leave IS after claiming for at least 
12 months; 
• lone parents in pilot districts who leave IS after claiming for less than 12 months. 
In most cases, the work and benefit outcomes of these groups of lone-parent IS 
leavers would not be expected to be very similar to those of IWC recipients. Any 
differences between the groups should not be inferred as having been caused 
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by IWC: the purpose of this section is to provide background information and 
context to the main impact estimates in subsequent chapters.
Table 3.2 compares the numbers of IWC recipients and the numbers of these 
other groups of lone-parent IS claimants. It shows that IWC recipients made up 
18–19 per cent of all lone-parent IS leavers in pilot districts and 27 per cent of 
all lone parents who leave IS after 12 months in the pilot districts.4 (The figure of 
27 per cent is calculated as follows: 18,284 IWC recipients (using start and end 
dates)/66,523 IS leavers after at least 12 months = 27.49%; similarly, 17,698 IWC 
recipients (using amount received)/65,937 IS leavers after at least 12 months = 
26.84%).
Table 3.2 Summary of the destinations of lone-parent IS leavers
Comparison 
districts
Pilot districts
IWC claim 
length 
defined using 
start and end 
dates
IWC claim 
length 
defined using 
amount 
received
Leave IS after claiming for at least 12 
months, of which:
201,761 66,523 65,937
(63.0%) (68.3%) (68.1%)
IWC	recipients,	of	which: 18,284 17,698
(18.8%) (18.3%)
Claims for at least 11 months 12,625 11,943
(13.0%) (12.3%)
Claims for between 6 and 11 months 2,894 2,501
(3.0%) (2.6%)
Claims for less than 6 months 2,765 3,254
(2.8%) (3.4%)
Leave	IS	after	12	months	but	not	for	IWC 48,239 48,239
(49.5%) (49.8%)
Leave IS after claiming for less than 12 
months
118,583 30,903 30,903
(37.0%) (31.7%) (31.9%)
Total 320,344 97,426 96,840
Note: Sample is all lone parents who left IS between the introduction of the pilots and  
31 March 2006.
4 This take-up figure of 27 per cent is slightly lower than the take-up figure 
calculated in Section 3.1, for four reasons: (i) Sections 3.2 and 3.3 consider 
all potentially eligible lone parents who leave IS, rather than all lone parents 
who are potentially eligible for the LPPs; (ii) in the analysis in Sections 3.2 
and 3.3, individuals are deemed to be potentially eligible if they are a lone 
parent living in one of the pilot districts on the date they leave IS; (iii) the 
period over which take-up is assessed is slightly different; and (iv) Sections 
3.2 and 3.3 use individual data and Section 3.1 uses aggregate data.
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Figures 3.3 to 3.8 illustrate the proportions of each of these groups of IS leavers 
who are on benefit and in work, from two years before to 30 months after leaving 
IS. These graphs use IWC recipients whose claim length is defined using IWC start 
and end dates.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 compare the benefit and work profiles of all lone parents 
who leave IS after claiming for at least 12 months in pilot districts (including IWC 
recipients), all lone parents who leave IS after claiming for at least 12 months in 
comparison districts and all lone parents who leave IS after claiming for less than 
12 months in pilot districts. 
For benefit outcomes, these graphs show that:
• the patterns of benefit receipt in the run-up to leaving IS are virtually identical 
for lone parents in pilot and comparison districts whose IS claims lasted for 
at least 12 months, with just over 80 per cent on benefit two years before 
leaving IS and 100 per cent on benefit in the 12 months prior to leaving IS 
(by construction);
• lone parents in pilot districts who leave IS having claimed for less than 
12 months are much less likely to have been on benefit in the two years prior 
to leaving IS than lone parents in either pilot or comparison districts who leave 
IS having claimed for at least 12 months;
• despite their different benefit histories, these three groups of lone-parent IS 
leavers have very similar patterns of benefit receipt in the months after leaving 
IS, rising from just over 20 per cent on benefit in the first month after leaving to 
around 40 per cent on benefit two years later.
For work outcomes, the graphs show that:
• in the two years prior to leaving IS, between 15 and 23 per cent of lone parents 
in pilot and comparison districts who have claimed IS for at least 12 months are 
recorded as being in work;
• over 45 per cent of lone parents who have claimed IS for less than 12 months 
are recorded as being in work approximately one year before leaving IS. This 
suggests that many of the lone parents who leave IS quickly were in work 
immediately before claiming IS;
• throughout the two years after leaving IS, lone parents in pilot districts whose 
IS claim lasted at least 12 months (including IWC recipients) are marginally 
more likely to be in work than lone parents in comparison districts whose IS 
claim lasted at least 12 months and slightly more likely to be in work than lone 
parents in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted less than 12 months. 
These disparities are not particularly surprising, given the likely differences in the 
composition of these groups of lone-parent IS leavers (see Section 3.3).
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Figure 3.3 Lone parents who leave IS: proportion on benefit  
 over time
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Figure 3.4 Lone parents who leave IS: proportion in work  
 over time
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 split the group of lone parents who have been claiming IS for 
at least 12 months in pilot districts into two groups: those who leave IS for IWC 
and those who do not. The outcomes of these two groups are then compared 
with those of lone parents in comparison districts who have claimed IS for at least 
12 months. The graphs show that:
• the benefit outcomes of lone parents who leave IS having claimed for at least 
12 months are similar in the run-up to leaving IS across both pilot and comparison 
districts and, within pilot districts, for both IWC and non-IWC recipients;
• IWC recipients are much more likely to have been in work (of any number of 
hours) in the months before leaving IS than non-IWC recipients in pilot districts 
(and lone parents in comparison districts) who leave IS having claimed for at 
least 12 months;
• IWC recipients are slightly less likely (than non-IWC recipients and lone-parent 
IS leavers in comparison districts whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months) to be 
on benefit after leaving IS, with around 22 per cent on benefit one month after 
leaving IS, compared with 26 per cent of lone parents in comparison districts 
and 31 per cent of non-IWC recipients;
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• in the months after leaving IS, IWC recipients are considerably more likely 
to be recorded as being in work than lone-parent IS leavers in comparison 
districts, who are, in turn, more likely to be recorded as being in work than 
non-IWC recipients in pilot districts. These differences are largest in the months 
immediately after leaving IS but persist throughout the next 30 months. Note 
that even amongst those who leave IS and start IWC, less than 80 per cent have 
a matching job start recorded in the WPLS at that time.
Figure 3.5 Lone parents who leave IS after claiming for at least  
 12 months: proportion on benefit over time
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Figure 3.6 Lone parents who leave IS after claiming for at least  
 12 months: proportion in work over time
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate the benefit and work profiles for IWC recipients split 
according to the length of their IWC claim. They show that:
• the observed patterns of employment and benefit receipt in the months before 
leaving IS are similar for all IWC recipients; but thereafter, there are clear 
differences according to the length of the IWC claim;
• lone parents who claimed IWC for at least 11 months are the least likely to be 
on benefit and the most likely to be in work. Only 11 per cent are on benefit one 
year after leaving IS, compared with 49 per cent of IWC recipients whose claim 
lasted between six and 11 months and 63 per cent of IWC recipients whose 
claim lasted less than six months. Two-thirds (66 per cent) of IWC recipients 
whose claim lasted at least 11 months are in work one year after leaving IS, 
compared with 35 per cent of IWC recipients whose claim lasted between six 
and 11 months and 26 per cent of IWC recipients whose claim lasted less than 
six months. Amongst all lone parents who received IWC for less than the full 
12 months, 56 per cent were receiving an out-of-work benefit one year after 
starting an IWC claim and 30 per cent were in work.
Again, these disparities are not particularly surprising, given the likely differences 
in the composition of these groups of IWC recipients (see Section 3.3). 
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Figure 3.7 IWC recipients: proportion on benefit over time
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Figure 3.8 IWC recipients: proportion in work over time
 
To summarise: IWC recipients are generally less likely to be on benefit, and more 
likely to be in work, than other groups of lone-parent IS leavers, particularly in 
the first year after leaving IS (when they are likely to be receiving IWC). This 
is particularly true for individuals who claim IWC for at least 11 months, who 
experience only a slow increase in benefit receipt rates (and a slow reduction in 
employment rates) after they stop receiving IWC. 
These patterns are roughly similar when the sample is restricted to individuals 
whose IS claim was less than 12 months old when the pilots were introduced in 
their area (see Appendix G for details).
3.3 Characteristics of IWC recipients compared with  
 other IS claimants
This section considers whether IWC recipients differ from other lone-parent IS 
claimants in terms of a range of observable characteristics, including the age and 
sex of lone parent, age of youngest child, number of children, work and benefit 
histories and some local area characteristics (average claimant counts and job 
densities). 
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Several different comparisons are made:
• Lone parents in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months and who 
left IS whilst the pilots were in operation are compared with lone parents in pilot 
districts whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months but who were still claiming IS 
on 31 March 2006 (Table 3.3).
• Lone-parent IS leavers in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months 
are compared with lone-parent IS leavers in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted 
less than 12 months (Table 3.4).
• Lone-parent IS leavers in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months 
are compared with lone-parent IS leavers in comparison districts whose IS claim 
lasted at least 12 months (Table 3.5).
• Lone parents in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months and who 
left IS for IWC are compared with lone parents in pilot districts whose IS claim 
lasted at least 12 months but who did not claim IWC after leaving IS (Table 3.6).
• IWC recipients whose IWC claim lasted at least 11 months (defined using IWC 
start and end dates) are compared with IWC recipients whose IWC claim lasted 
less than six months (Table 3.7).
Table 3.3 compares the characteristics of lone parents in pilot districts whose IS 
claim lasted at least 12 months and who left IS whilst the pilots were in operation 
(‘leavers’) with those of lone parents in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted at least 
12 months but who were still claiming IS on 31 March 2006 (‘stayers’). The table 
includes an assessment of whether the differences are statistically significant and 
shows the following:
• leavers are more likely to be male and are, on average, slightly younger than 
stayers;
• leavers tend to have fewer children than stayers and their youngest child tends 
to be older;
• leavers have spent a greater proportion of the 30 months prior to IS leave date 
in work and a larger percentage of months 13 to 21 prior to IS leave date off 
benefit than stayers (for stayers, this is assessed over the period ending on 
31 March 2006);
• leavers are 17 percentage points (ppts) more likely to have been on the New 
Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) than stayers and are significantly less likely to have 
received a disability benefit in the previous 18 months. 
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Table 3.3 Characteristics of IS leavers compared to IS stayers in  
 pilot districts
Leavers Stayers Difference
Percentage male 6.8 4.8 2.0**
Average age 34.7 34.9 –0.3**
Average age of youngest child 7.7 6.5 1.2**
Percentage with youngest child aged 0 to 3 23.8 28.9 –5.1**
Percentage with youngest child aged 3 to 7 28.9 28.7 0.3
Percentage with youngest child aged 7 to 11 18.3 21.6 –3.3**
Percentage with youngest child aged 11 plus 29.0 20.8 8.2**
Percentage with one child 52.2 43.4 8.8**
Percentage with two children 30.7 33.1 –2.4**
Percentage with three children 11.7 15.1 –3.4**
Percentage with four children 5.4 8.4 –3.0**
Percentage of 30 months prior to IS leave date 
(31 March 2006 for stayers) spent in work
8.8 0.1 8.7**
Percentage of months 13 to 30 prior to IS 
leave date (31 March 2006 for stayers) spent 
off benefit
17.5 7.6 9.9**
Percentage ever been on NDLP in the three 
years prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
43.9 27.1 16.8**
Percentage ever been disabled in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
12.1 17.4 –5.2**
Average claimant count in local area in 
2003/04
2.8 2.7 0.1**
Average job density in local area in 2004 88.8 88.9 –0.1**
Sample	size 66,523 245,414
Notes: Sample is all lone parents whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months in pilot districts and 
who either left IS between when the pilots were introduced and 31 March 2006 or who were 
still claiming IS on 31 March 2006. * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level; ** indicates 
significance at the 1 per cent level.
Table 3.4 compares the characteristics of lone-parent IS leavers in pilot districts 
whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months with those of lone-parent IS leavers in 
pilot districts whose IS claim lasted less than 12 months. It shows that lone-parent 
IS leavers in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months:
• are somewhat older, on average, than lone-parent IS leavers in pilot districts 
whose IS claim lasted less than 12 months;
• are considerably less likely to have a youngest child under the age of three (24 
per cent compared with 36 per cent of lone-parent IS leavers whose IS claim 
lasted less than 12 months) and also tend to have more children;
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• have spent a considerably smaller proportion of the 30 months prior to their 
IS leaving date in work and a considerably smaller proportion of months 13 to 
21 prior to their IS leaving date off benefit than lone-parent IS leavers in pilot 
districts whose IS claim lasted less than 12 months;
• are considerably more likely to have been on NDLP in the three years before 
leaving IS;
• are slightly less likely to have been recorded as having received a disability 
benefit in the previous 18 months.
Table 3.4 Characteristics of IS leavers after 12 months compared  
 to before 12 months in pilot districts
Leave 
after claim 
reaches 12 
months
Leave 
before claim 
reaches 12 
months
Difference
Percentage male 6.8 6.9 –0.1
Average age 34.7 32.8 1.8**
Average age of youngest child 7.7 6.3 1.4**
Percentage with youngest child aged 0 to 3 23.8 36.0 –12.2**
Percentage with youngest child aged 3 to 7 28.9 25.8 3.2**
Percentage with youngest child aged 7 to 11 18.3 16.7 1.6**
Percentage with youngest child aged 11 plus 29.0 21.6 7.4**
Percentage with one child 52.2 55.4 –3.2**
Percentage with two children 30.7 28.7 2.0**
Percentage with three children 11.7 10.9 0.8**
Percentage with four children 5.4 5.0 0.4**
Percentage of 30 months prior to IS leave date 
(31 March 2006 for stayers) spent in work
8.8 68.9 –60.1**
Percentage of months 13 to 21 prior to IS 
leave date (31 March 2006 for stayers) spent 
off benefit
17.5 38.3 –20.8**
Percentage ever been on NDLP in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
43.9 22.2 21.6**
Percentage ever been disabled in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
12.1 15.0 –2.8**
Average claimant count in local area in 
2003/04
2.8 2.7 0.1**
Average job density in local area in 2004 88.8 87.9 0.9**
Sample	size 66,523 30,903
Notes: Sample is all lone parents in pilot districts who left IS between when the pilots were 
introduced and 31 March 2006. * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level; ** indicates 
significance at the 1 per cent level.
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Table 3.5 compares the characteristics of lone-parent IS leavers in pilot districts 
whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months (including IWC recipients) with the 
characteristics of lone-parent IS leavers in comparison districts whose claim lasted 
at least 12 months. It shows that:
• pilot district leavers tend to be slightly older than comparison district leavers and 
tend to have slightly older children;
• pilot district leavers are less likely to have been on NDLP or on a disability benefit 
in the period prior to leaving IS than comparison district leavers and they also 
tend to live in areas with higher average job densities. 
Table 3.5 Characteristics of pilot compared to comparison district  
 leavers
Pilot district 
leavers
Comparison 
district 
leavers
Difference
Percentage male 6.8 6.7 0.1
Average age 34.7 33.4 1.3**
Average age of youngest child 7.7 7.3 0.4**
Percentage with youngest child aged 0 to 3 23.8 25.8 –2.0**
Percentage with youngest child aged 3 to 7 28.9 29.2 –0.3
Percentage with youngest child aged 7 to 11 18.3 18.4 –0.1
Percentage with youngest child aged 11 plus 29.0 26.6 2.4**
Percentage with one child 52.2 52.1 0.1
Percentage with two children 30.7 31.0 –0.3
Percentage with three children 11.7 11.9 –0.2
Percentage with four children 5.4 5.0 0.4**
Percentage of 30 months prior to IS leave date 
(31 March 2006 for stayers) spent in work
8.8 9.3 –0.6**
Percentage of months 13 to 21 prior to IS 
leave date (31 March 2006 for stayers) spent 
off benefit
17.5 16.9 0.6**
Percentage ever been on NDLP in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
43.9 48.3 –4.4**
Percentage ever been disabled in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
12.1 14.9 –2.7**
Average claimant count in local area in 
2003/04
2.8 2.8 0.0**
Average job density in local area in 2004 88.8 79.9 8.9**
Sample	size 66,523 201,761
Notes: Sample is all lone parents in pilot and comparison districts whose IS claim lasted at least 
12 months and who left IS between when the pilots were introduced and 31 March 2006. * 
indicates significance at the 5 per cent level; ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level.
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Table 3.6 compares the characteristics of lone parents in pilot districts whose IS 
claim lasted at least 12 months and who left IS for IWC (‘IWC recipients’) with 
those of lone parents in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months 
but who did not claim IWC after leaving IS (‘non-IWC recipients’). It shows the 
following:
• IWC recipients are slightly less likely to be male and are over a year younger, on 
average, than non-IWC recipients. They also tend to have fewer children, on 
average, than non-IWC recipients;
• there is no significant difference between the proportion of the 30 months prior 
to IS leave date that IWC and non-IWC recipients have spent in work, although 
IWC recipients tend to have spent a larger proportion of months 13 to 21 prior 
to IS leave date off benefit;
• IWC recipients are considerably more likely to have been on NDLP in the three 
years prior to leaving IS than non-IWC recipients (84 per cent compared with 29 
per cent), although this may be because joining NDLP was a condition of IWC 
receipt when the pilots were first introduced;
• IWC recipients are significantly less likely to have been recorded as receiving a 
disability benefit in the 18 months before leaving IS than non-IWC recipients.
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Table 3.6 Characteristics of IWC recipients compared to non-IWC  
 recipients
IWC 
recipients
Non-IWC 
recipients
Difference
Percentage male 4.1 7.8 –3.7**
Average age 33.5 35.1 –1.7**
Average age of youngest child 7.3 7.8 –0.6**
Percentage with youngest child aged 0 to 3 21.0 24.8 –3.8**
Percentage with youngest child aged 3 to 7 33.0 27.4 5.7**
Percentage with youngest child aged 7 to 11 21.7 17.0 4.7**
Percentage with youngest child aged 11 plus 24.3 30.8 –6.5**
Percentage with one child 53.9 51.6 2.3**
Percentage with two children 32.3 30.1 2.2**
Percentage with three children 10.7 12.1 –1.4**
Percentage with four children 3.1 6.2 –3.1**
Percentage of 30 months prior to IS leave date 
(31 March 2006 for stayers) spent in work
8.8 8.8 0.0
Percentage of months 13 to 21 prior to IS 
leave date (31 March 2006 for stayers) spent 
off benefit
20.0 16.6 3.4**
Percentage ever been on NDLP in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
84.2 28.6 55.7**
Percentage ever been disabled in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
6.8 14.2 –7.4**
Average claimant count in local area in 
2003/04
2.8 2.9 –0.1**
Average job density in local area in 2004 88.1 89.1 –0.9**
Sample	size 18,284 48,239
Notes: Sample is all lone parents in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months 
and who left IS between when the pilots were introduced and 31 March 2006. * indicates 
significance at the 5 per cent level; ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level.
Table 3.7 compares the characteristics of IWC recipients whose IWC claim lasted at 
least 11 months (‘long-claim IWC recipients’) with those of IWC recipients whose 
IWC claim lasted less than six months (‘short-claim IWC recipients’). The top panel 
defines IWC claim length using IWC start and end dates, while the bottom panel 
defines claim length using the total amount of IWC received. The table shows the 
following:
• the vast majority (more than 90 per cent) of IWC recipients are female. Long-
claim IWC recipients are slightly less likely to be male than short-claim IWC 
recipients and are nearly three years older than them on average;
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• long-claim IWC recipients are significantly less likely to have a child under the 
age of three than short-claim IWC recipients and are significantly more likely to 
have a child over the age of seven;
• there are only very small differences between the work and benefit histories 
of long- and short-claim IWC recipients but slightly larger differences in the 
proportion who have been on NDLP in the three years prior to leaving IS 
(85 per cent for long-claim IWC recipients compared with 82–83 per cent for 
short-claim IWC recipients) and in the proportion who have been recorded as 
receiving a disability benefit in the 18 months before leaving IS (6–7 per cent 
compared with 8–9 per cent).
Table 3.7 Characteristics of long-claim IWC claimants compared to 
 short-claim IWC claimants
Claim IWC 
for at least 
11 months
Claim IWC 
for less than 
6 months
Difference
IWC	claim	length	defined	using	spell	start		
and	end	dates
Percentage male 3.7 5.2 –1.5**
Average age 34.2 31.4 2.9**
Average age of youngest child 7.6 6.4 1.2**
Percentage with youngest child aged 0 to 3 18.4 28.8 –10.4**
Percentage with youngest child aged 3 to 7 32.4 33.8 –1.4
Percentage with youngest child aged 7 to 11 22.4 19.1 3.3**
Percentage with youngest child aged 11 plus 26.8 18.3 8.5**
Percentage with one child 53 57.6 –4.6**
Percentage with two children 33.6 28.9 4.7**
Percentage with three children 10.5 10.6 –0.1
Percentage with four children 2.9 2.9 –0.1
Percentage of 30 months prior to IS leave date 
(31 March 2006 for stayers) spent in work
8.5 9.2 –0.7
Percentage of months 13 to 21 prior to IS 
leave date (31 March 2006 for stayers) spent 
off benefit
20.3 19.5 0.8
Percentage ever been on NDLP in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
84.9 82.6 2.3**
Percentage ever been disabled in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
6.5 8.7 –2.2**
Average claimant count in local area in 
2003/04
2.7 2.8 –0.1**
Average job density in local area in 2004 87.9 88.8 –0.9**
Sample	size 12,625 2,765
Continued
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Table 3.7 Continued
Claim IWC 
for at least 
11 months
Claim IWC 
for less than 
6 months
Difference
IWC	claim	length	defined	using	total	amount	
paid	to	recipients
Percentage male 3.7 5.0 –1.4**
Average age 34.3 31.4 2.9**
Average age of youngest child 7.7 6.4 1.3**
Percentage with youngest child aged 0 to 3 18.1 28.3 –10.2**
Percentage with youngest child aged 3 to 7 32.3 34.1 –1.8
Percentage with youngest child aged 7 to 11 22.4 18.9 3.5**
Percentage with youngest child aged 11 plus 27.2 18.7 8.5**
Percentage with one child 52.8 58.2 –5.4**
Percentage with two children 33.7 28.4 5.3**
Percentage with three children 10.6 10.4 0.2
Percentage with four children 2.9 3 –0.2
Percentage of 30 months prior to IS leave date 
(31 March 2006 for stayers) spent in work
8.5 9.4 –0.9*
Percentage of months 13 to 21 prior to IS 
leave date (31 March 2006 for stayers) spent 
off benefit
20.3 19.9 0.4
Percentage ever been on NDLP in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
85.1 82.4 2.7**
Percentage ever been disabled in the 18 
months prior to IS leave date (31 March 2006 
for stayers)
6.3 8.4 –2.1**
Average claimant count in local area in 
2003/04
2.7 2.8 –0.0**
Average job density in local area in 2004 87.9 88.6 –0.8**
Sample	size 11,943 3,254
Notes: Sample is all lone parents in pilot districts whose IS claim lasted at least 12 months and 
who left IS for IWC between when the pilots were introduced and 31 March 2006. * indicates 
significance at the 5 per cent level; ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has provided some descriptive details about IWC participants: their 
rates of take-up, their claim durations and post-IWC destinations and their 
background characteristics. 
Section 3.1 showed that take-up of IWC amongst those ever potentially eligible 
for it has grown over time in both the flow and stock samples, with spikes in the 
number of IWC claims in the first full month of operation in Phases 2 and 4, and 
in September of each year. The take-up rate is higher in Phases 2 and 4 than in 
Phases 1 and 3. 
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Section 3.2 revealed that just under 70 per cent of IWC recipients claimed it 
for at least 11 months. Furthermore, lone parents who claimed IWC for at least 
11 months experienced better labour market outcomes after their IWC claim 
ended than lone parents who claimed it for a shorter period, lone parents in 
pilot districts who did not claim it or lone parents in comparison groups who left 
IS after at least 12 months. There is no evidence that lone parents who claimed 
IWC for the full 12 months stopped work or re-claimed IS when their IWC 
payments stopped.
Finally, Section 3.3 examined the family characteristics and work and benefit 
histories of lone parents who left IS. IWC recipients tend to have slightly more 
of the characteristics that are associated with return to work than other lone 
parents who leave IS after at least 12 months in the pilot districts (i.e. than other 
potentially eligible lone parents). (For previous research on factors associated 
with lone parents’ return to work, see Yeo (2007), D’Souza et	 al. (2008) and 
La Valle et	al. (2008).) Most notably, IWC recipients are 55 ppts more likely to 
have been on NDLP (although this may be because of the conditions attached 
to IWC receipt when the pilots were first introduced) and 7 ppts less likely to 
have been receiving a disability benefit. They are also less likely to have a child 
under the age of three and tend to have fewer children, on average, than 
other potentially eligible lone parents who left IS. However, these groups do 
not differ substantially in terms of the proportion of time spent in work in the 
30 months before leaving IS. Amongst IWC recipients, those who claim for at least 
11 months are much less likely to have a child under the age of three and much 
more likely to have a child over the age of seven than IWC recipients who claim 
for less than six months. The difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis in Chapters 
4, 5 and 8, therefore, controls for these characteristics (and many others) when 
estimating the impact of the lone parent pilots (LPPs).
The findings about lone parents in pilot districts provide useful background 
information for the next chapter, in which the impact of the LPPs on work and 
benefit outcomes is estimated using DiD techniques.
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4 The overall impact of  
 the lone parent pilots  
 on potentially eligible  
 lone parents in the flow  
 sample
This chapter presents estimates of the overall impact of the lone parent pilots 
(LPPs) on all potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample – that is, on all 
potentially eligible lone parents who become eligible for In-Work Credit (IWC) at 
some point after the pilots have been introduced in their district. In general, the 
impact of the LPPs on the flow sample is more interesting than the impact of the 
LPPs on the stock sample, as it determines the impact of the LPPs in the long run. 
The estimates in this chapter, then, should be thought of as the headline estimates 
of the impact of the LPPs. They were derived in two ways, first using a difference-
in-differences (DiD) estimate and then using a duration (or survivor) model. 
Section 4.1 presents the headline estimates. Extensions to this are presented in 
Appendix J; these allow the impact of the LPPs to be different in each pilot phase 
and in each cohort (where a ‘cohort’ of lone parents refers to a group of lone 
parents who first became potentially eligible for IWC in a particular six-month 
period). 
Section 4.2 assesses the robustness of the main findings. Specifically, it tests 
whether the ‘common trends’ assumption appears to hold in the period before 
the LPPs began, it tests whether the estimated impact of the LPPs is sensitive to 
the way in which the underlying trend in outcomes has been specified and it 
tests for effects of the policy on lone parents who are not yet potentially eligible. 
Section 4.3 presents the estimated impact of the LPPs using a duration model and 
Section 4.4 concludes.
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4.1 DiD estimates: overall impact of the LPPs on  
 potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample
This section reports DiD estimates of the impact of the LPPs on potentially eligible 
lone parents in the flow sample. It first discusses the impact on all potentially 
eligible lone parents in the flow sample and then discusses estimates of the impact 
of the LPPs by pilot phase, and by pilot phase and cohort, with full results in 
Appendix J. Box 4.1 describes the flow sample for the DiD analysis. Appendix E 
gives full details of this method and how it was implemented. This report does not 
present the coefficients on the other regressors in the model, as there are a large 
number of regressions and a very large number of regressors in each but they are 
listed in Appendix D. 
Section 6.1 extends the DiD analysis in this chapter to show how the overall impact 
in the flow sample varies for different policy packages within the LPPs.
Box 4.1: Technical information about the DiD analysis on the 
flow sample
The ‘flow sample’ comprises all claims of Income Support (IS) that reached 
12 months’ duration between 1 April 2001 and 31 March 2007 where the 
claimant was a lone parent on that date, plus other claims of IS whose duration 
exceeded 12 months and during which the claimant subsequently became a 
lone parent; these claims were followed from the earliest date meeting all 
these conditions. The intention was to create a sample of IS claims that would 
have been potentially eligible for IWC if the LPPs had been in existence in 
all districts since April 2001 and to follow lone parents from the first day on 
which they became potentially eligible for IWC. 
The ‘variant flow sample’ (used in Appendix L and discussed in Section 4.2.3) 
comprised all claims of IS made by lone parents between 1 April 2001 and  
31 March 2007. 
Appendix B describes how the samples were constructed, Appendix D 
contains some summary statistics and sample sizes and mean outcomes are 
given in Appendix H.
4.1.1 The headline results
Table 4.1 presents estimates of the headline impact of the LPPs (in percentage-
point (ppt) terms) on work and benefit outcomes for the flow sample, at three-
month intervals from the date on which the lone parent first became potentially 
eligible for the LPPs; they are also shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
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Table 4.1 Estimated impact of the LPP on potentially eligible lone  
 parents in the flow sample: all phases and all cohorts
Months 
since first 
potentially 
eligible for 
IWC
Impact on 
number off 
benefit
Impact on 
number in 
work
Benefit 
outcome 
(percentage 
off benefit 
in pilot 
districts) 
Work 
outcome 
(percentage 
in work 
in pilot 
districts)
Benefit 
additionality 
rate (benefit 
impact as 
percentage 
of gross 
outcome)
Work 
additionality 
rate (work 
impact as 
percentage 
of gross 
outcome)
Estimates reported in 
ppts (standard errors 
given in parentheses)
3 0.5 0.3 6.8 10.4 7.4 2.9
(0.112)*** (0.129)**  
6 1.0 0.7 11.8 12.0 8.5 5.8
(0.154)*** (0.151)***  
9 1.3 0.9 15.3 13.3 8.5 6.8
(0.187)*** (0.174)***  
12 1.6 1.0 18.2 14.3 8.8 7.0
(0.220)*** (0.199)***  
15 1.7 1.1 20.5 14.9 8.3 7.4
(0.260)*** (0.230)***  
18 1.7 1.3 22.5 15.6 7.6 8.3
(0.301)*** (0.265)***  
21 1.8 1.3 24.2 16.2 7.4 8.0
(0.348)*** (0.306)***  
24 2.0 1.4 25.9 16.7 7.7 8.4
(0.419)*** (0.366)***  
27 1.4 1.6 26.4 17.1 5.3 9.4
(0.539)** (0.469)***  
30 1.2 0.4 27.3 16.6 4.8 2.4
(0.758) (0.650)  
33 1.1 0.3 29.2 17.3 3.8 1.7
(1.014) (0.856)
Notes: The table reports the estimated impact of the LPPs based on various ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions on the flow sample (see Appendix B). Sample sizes are shown in Appendix H. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * = significant at 10 per cent level; ** = significant at 
5 per cent level; *** = significant at 1 per cent level. Additionality rate is calculated as ‘100 × 
impact/outcome’.
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Figure 4.1 Fractions of potentially eligible lone parents in the  
 flow sample who are off benefit and in work, and  
 estimated fractions off benefit and in work in the  
 absence of the LPPs
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Figure 4.2 Estimated impact of the LPPs on potentially eligible  
 lone parents in the flow sample
 
As a guide to how to interpret these results, the top left-hand figure in the table 
shows that the DiD estimate of the impact of the LPPs is 0.5 ppts. This indicates 
that the proportion of lone parents no longer claiming benefit three months after 
first becoming potentially eligible for the pilots is 0.5 ppts higher for lone parents 
living in the pilot districts than it is for lone parents living in the comparison districts. 
Chapter 10 compares these estimated impacts with those of other Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP) programmes.
The estimated impacts at months 6 to 24 are all positive and significantly different 
from zero at (at least) the 1 per cent level. 
The point estimates of the impact of the LPPs on benefit outcomes rise over time 
(where time is measured relative to when a lone parent first became potentially 
eligible for IWC), peaking at 2.0 ppts after 24 months, and then decline. This 
decline is partly caused by the increasing importance given to Phase 1 districts for 
the later outcomes, as discussed in Section 4.1.2. The impact on work follows a 
similar pattern to that for benefit outcomes but the point estimates are smaller, 
peaking at 1.6 ppts after 27 months. 
It is also valid to express the additional impact of the LPPs as a proportion of those 
potentially eligible lone parents who are in work or no longer receiving an 
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out-of-work benefit. This is sometimes known as the additionality rate. As an 
example, the first column of Table 4.1 says that the LPPs led to a 1.6 ppt increase 
in the proportion of potentially eligible lone parents who were off benefit 12 
months after they first became potentially eligible for IWC. They show that, for 
example, 8.8 per cent of the potentially eligible lone parents no longer receiving 
an out-of-work benefit after 12 months’ exposure to the LPPs is attributable to the 
LPPs and the equivalent figure for the work outcome is 7.0 per cent. 
Expressing the impacts in this way is interesting because there is less change 
over time in the additionality rate of the LPPs expressed as a proportion of those 
potentially eligible lone parents who are in work or no longer receiving an out-
of-work benefit. For example, the proportion of potentially eligible lone parents 
who are in work (or no longer receiving an out-of-work benefit) rises over time 
measured relative to when they first became potentially eligible for IWC. The same 
is true for the additional impact of the LPPs, expressed as a proportion of all 
potentially eligible lone parents. For example, after 24 months’ exposure to the 
LPPs, 25.9 per cent of potentially eligible lone parents were no longer on benefit, 
and 2.0 ppts of this is attributable to the LPPs. For work outcomes, the equivalent 
figures are 16.7 per cent and 1.4 ppts. These are larger impacts than those after 
12 months’ exposure to the LPPs, but it is not at all surprising that the impact of 
the LPPs rises the longer a lone parent is exposed to their policies and services. 
However, there is less change over time in the additionality rate of the LPPs defined 
for potentially eligible lone parents who are in work or no longer receiving an 
out-of-work benefit: after 24 months, this ratio was 7.7 per cent for the benefit 
outcomes or 8.4 per cent for the work outcomes; the respective ratios after 12 
months were 8.8 per cent and 7.0 per cent. In other words, while the additional 
impact of the LPPs on all potentially eligible lone parents rises with the length of 
time during which a lone parent is exposed to the LPPs, their additionality rate is 
fairly constant. 
4.1.2 Variation between phases and between different cohorts  
 of lone parents
Table 4.1 reported a single treatment effect for all phases. It is important to note, 
though, that the estimate of the impact at each point in time is based on a different 
sample of potentially eligible lone parents, because later cohorts of potentially 
eligible lone parents appear in the data for shorter durations (given the cut-off 
date in the data of 31 March 2007). This means that the number of potentially 
eligible lone parents falls as outcomes are measured over longer periods of time. 
For example, outcomes after 30 months are only observed for lone parents in the 
flow sample who first became potentially eligible for IWC in the Phase 1 districts 
between April and September 2004. 
This also means that the contribution of particular phases to the average estimated 
impact alters as outcomes are measured over a longer period of time: Phase 4 
districts contribute to outcomes at 3–15 months, Phase 3 districts to outcomes at 
3–21 months, Phase 2 districts to outcomes at 3–27 months and Phase 1 districts 
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to outcomes at 3–33 months. To get round this problem, Appendix J reports the 
estimated impact of the LPPs separately by phase and these results are summarised 
in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. The key results are:
• as in Table 4.1, the estimated impacts tend to increase with the length of time 
a lone parent has been potentially eligible for IWC;
• as in Table 4.1, the estimates of the impact on work outcomes are a little smaller 
than those on benefit outcomes at the same point in time (except in Phase 3 
and initially in Phase 1);
• for benefit outcomes, the impact of the LPPs is greater in Phases 2 and 4 than 
it is in Phases 1 and 3 (both dominated by London). For work outcomes, the 
impact of the LPPs is greater in Phases 1 and 3 (both dominated by London) than 
it is in Phases 2 and 4. However, the variation across phases in the estimated 
impacts for the benefit outcomes is almost never statistically significant. 
Figure 4.3 Estimated impact of the LPPs on percentage off benefit:  
 potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample, all  
 cohorts, by phase (ppts) 
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Figure 4.4 Estimated impact of the LPPs on percentage in work:  
 potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample, all  
 cohorts, by phase (ppts)
Appendix J also presents estimates of the impact of the LPPs where a separate 
impact of the LPPs is estimated for separate cohorts of lone parents within a 
particular phase. The key results are:
• the estimated impact of the LPPs on both benefit and work outcomes appears 
to be greater for later cohorts of potentially eligible lone parents than it is for the 
earlier cohorts. For example, lone parents in Phase 1 pilot districts who became 
potentially eligible for IWC between April 2004 and October 2004 (during the 
first six months of its operation) were no more likely to be off benefit and/or 
in work than lone parents who became potentially eligible at the same time in 
the comparison districts, but lone parents in the Phase 1 districts who became 
potentially eligible after October 2005 (at least 18 months after its introduction) 
were 2.0 ppts more likely to be off benefit and 2.7 ppts more likely to be in 
work than potentially eligible lone parents in comparison districts. However, 
only for work outcomes is the growth in impacts statistically significant;
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• the increasing impact of the LPPs over time is consistent with a story in which 
awareness of the policy among potentially eligible lone parents is low to begin 
with, but gradually increases, leading to higher take-up rates. Alternatively, it 
could reflect an increase in the effectiveness of Jobcentre Plus advisers (and 
other practitioners) in the pilot districts as they gain experience of the policy. 
A third possible interpretation is that the more recent cohorts of potentially 
eligible lone parents are somehow different from previous cohorts in ways that 
are not captured by the data. If such differences also affected their chances of 
leaving benefit for work, they would lead to increases in the estimated impact 
of the LPPs. Research based on secondary-data analysis, such as this, cannot 
differentiate between these possible causes.
4.2 Robustness checks
This section discusses the results from robustness checks, designed to see how 
sensitive the results in Section 4.1 are to the specification used and the assumptions 
relied upon. In particular, it probes the effects of relaxing the following assumptions:
• the underlying difference between each pilot and comparison district can be 
adequately represented by a constant and that the underlying time trend can 
be adequately represented by a full set of quarterly indicators, common to all 
districts;
• there are no anticipation effects.
These are discussed in turn below.
4.2.1 Testing the ‘common trends’ assumption
This section discusses supporting evidence (presented in full in Appendix I) that 
there is no evidence that the ‘common trends’ assumption fails to hold in the 
period before the LPPs began. This should provide some reassurance that it will 
also hold after the LPPs have started and thus, that DiD provides an unbiased 
estimate of the impact of the LPPs. 
As explained in Appendix E, the essence of the DiD approach is to attribute any 
change over time in the difference between outcomes in the pilot and comparison 
districts to the impact of the LPPs, having controlled for a range of explanatory 
factors that are changing over time. Of course, what one would ideally want to 
know is whether, in the absence of the LPPs, the trends in the pilot and comparison 
districts would have been identical – but this is unobservable. As a substitute, 
though, it is possible to test whether there were ‘common trends’ in the pilot 
and comparison districts in the period before the introduction of the LPPs. This is 
examined first over the whole period (from April 2001 onwards) and then over 
six-monthly periods immediately before the LPPs were introduced (from April 2003 
onwards). The full results, presented in Appendix I, show that:
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• before the LPPs began, outcomes were statistically significantly different in the 
pilot and comparison districts. This is why the estimates of the impact of the 
LPPs have to use a DiD estimator, rather than simply comparing outcomes after 
the LPPs began;
• for each phase and for both work and benefit outcomes, the set of differences 
between pilot and comparison districts in each time period before the LPPs 
begin is almost always not significantly different from a constant: this is another 
way of saying that the trends in outcomes in the pilot and comparison areas 
are essentially parallel, with the difference between them not changing over 
time. Formally, therefore, the hypothesis of common pre-programme trends 
cannot be rejected for any phase or for any outcome; the exception is the work 
outcome after 12 months in the Phase 3 districts.
Appendix I also reports the result of an explicit ‘placebo’ test. This examines whether 
there appear to be ‘placebo treatment effects’ amongst potentially eligible lone 
parents in the pilot districts immediately before the pilots were introduced. In 
general, there is no evidence of these ‘placebo treatment effects’, which gives 
further confidence that the ‘common trends’ assumption holds after the LPPs 
have begun.
4.2.2 Trend variants
Section 4.2.1 concluded that the ‘common trends’ assumption appeared to hold 
before the LPPs began. This is equivalent to saying that the difference between 
each pilot and comparison district can be represented adequately by a constant, 
and that the underlying time trend can be represented by a full set of quarterly 
indicators, common to all districts. However, it is never possible to test whether 
the ‘common trends’ assumption holds after the start of the LPPs and so tables 
in Appendix K report three alternative estimates of the impact of the LPPs using 
different assumptions about the underlying trend in outcomes:
a. no time trend but seasonal indicators;
b. separate quadratic and linear time trends (see Glossary of terms) for each of 
the four phases and the set of comparison districts and seasonal indicators 
common to all districts;
c. separate linear time trends for each of the four phases and the set of comparison 
districts, a common quadratic time trend and seasonal indicators common to 
all districts.
Compared with the results in Section 4.1, which assumed that the underlying 
trend in outcomes is common to all phases but has an unrestricted form:
• under the assumption of no trend in outcomes, the estimated impacts on 
benefit outcomes are higher and for work outcomes are lower, particularly 
for outcomes measured a long time since first becoming potentially eligible 
for IWC;
The overall impact of the lone parent pilots on potentially eligible lone parents  
in the flow sample
63
• under the assumption of a differential quadratic trend in outcomes specific to 
each phase, the estimated impacts on benefit and work outcomes are lower 
and the standard errors on the estimated impacts are substantially higher;
• under the assumption of a differential linear trend in outcomes specific to 
each phase and a common quadratic trend, the estimated impacts on benefit 
and work outcomes are generally higher, except for outcomes at the longest 
durations, and the standard errors on the estimated impacts are substantially higher.
The overall conclusion, then, is that the estimated impacts do not differ dramatically 
when different assumptions are made about the underlying trend in outcomes.
4.2.3 Allowing for treatment effects on lone parents who are  
 not yet potentially eligible for IWC
Section 4.1 presented the estimated impact of the LPPs on lone parents who 
had been receiving IS or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least 12 months. 
One assumption underpinning these results was that the LPPs did not affect 
lone parents before they had been receiving out-of-work benefits for 12 months 
(if the LPPs had affected lone parents before they had been receiving out-of-work 
benefits for 12 months, this would bias the estimated impacts of the LPPs in an 
unknown direction). 
But this assumption can be tested by estimating apparent ‘treatment effects’ on 
lone parents who have been on IS for less than 12 months and who are, therefore, 
not yet eligible for IWC, as well as on lone parents who are potentially eligible 
for IWC. The results are reported in Appendix L. An example is given in Table 4.2, 
which estimates the impact of the LPPs on all lone parents who have made a claim 
for IS and who, if they had remained on IS for at least 12 months and there were 
no changes in personal circumstances since the start of the claim, would have 
been potentially eligible for IWC. 
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Table 4.2 Estimated impact of the LPPs on lone parents who are  
 not yet potentially eligible: variant flow sample, all  
 phases and all cohorts
Estimates reported in ppts  
(standard errors given in parentheses)
Months before/
since potentially 
eligible for IWC
Months since 
claim of IS
Impact on number off 
benefit 
Impact on number in work
-9 3 –0.6 –0.3
(0.094)*** (0.134)**
-6 6 –0.4 –0.3
(0.147)*** (0.151)*
-3 9 –0.7 –0.6
(0.178)*** (0.168)***
0 12 –0.6 –0.7
(0.199)*** (0.184)***
3 15 –0.2 –0.6
(0.221) (0.203)***
6 18 0.3 –0.4
(0.244) (0.222)
9 21 0.2 –0.0
(0.274) (0.249)
12 24 0.9 0.6
(0.310)*** (0.285)**
15 27 0.8 0.2
(0.363)** (0.334)
18 30 1.2 0.8
(0.429)*** (0.398)**
21 33 0.4 0.2
(0.492) (0.458)
24 36 0.7 1.0
(0.579) (0.542)*
Notes: The table reports the estimated impact of the LPPs based on various OLS regressions on 
the variant flow sample (see Appendix B). Standard errors are given in brackets. * = significant at 
10 per cent level; ** = significant at 5 per cent level; *** = significant at 1 per cent level. 
For both benefit and work outcomes, the estimated apparent impacts are negative 
(and generally statistically different from zero) in months –9 to 3, where time is 
measured relative to when the claimant would have actually become potentially 
eligible for IWC and then rise until month 18. 
However, interpreting such treatment effects is not simple: there are two main 
causes, with very different implications, and no reliable way of distinguishing 
between them given the data available to the authors:
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1 Any estimated apparent treatment effects may genuinely be caused by the 
LPPs. There are at least three ways this could occur:
• Chapter 2 discussed that one might expect that lone parents in the 
LPP districts whose duration of IS is less than 12 months and who are 
contemplating leaving IS for a job of 16 or more hours a week, might 
delay leaving IS until they become eligible for IWC; these are known as 
anticipation effects. The benefits from doing this would be up to £2,080 
in IWC payments; assuming it is costless to delay leaving IS for a job, the 
only cost would be the net earnings (i.e. net of taxes paid and benefits 
lost) forgone during the period of delay. If present, such effects would lead 
to a negative apparent treatment effect on lone parents in pilot districts 
whose duration of IS is less than 12 months before they become potentially 
eligible; the implication would be that estimates of the net impact of the 
LPPs that ignored these would be overstating the genuine impact of the LPPs.
• There may be ‘spillover’ or ‘substitution’ effects operating through the 
labour market; in the case of the LPPs, this would refer to a situation where 
the higher number of lone parents whose duration on IS exceeds 12 months 
looking for work makes it harder for others – such as lone parents on IS for 
less than 12 months – to find work. Such effects would lead to a negative 
apparent treatment effect on lone parents in pilot districts whose duration 
of IS is less than 12 months; the implication would be that estimates of the 
net impact of the LPPs that ignored these would be overstating the genuine 
impact of the LPPs.
• Some of the IWC districts were also operating other LPPs, such as New Deal 
Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP), which, in principle, could have affected 
lone parents whose duration on IS was less than 12 months. If these 
programmes had a positive impact on lone parents’ outcomes, then this 
could lead to estimated positive apparent treatment effects on outcomes 
measured before the duration on IS reaches 12 months. The implication 
would be that estimates of the net impact of the LPPs that ignored these 
other programmes would correctly estimate the impact of the LPPs on 
potentially eligible lone parents but underestimate the impact of the LPPs 
as a whole (Chapter 6 analyses the additional impacts of Extended Schools 
Quarterly Work Focused Interviews (ESQWFIs) and of ND+fLP). 
 The authors’ view is that substitution effects through the labour market are 
unlikely to explain the apparent negative impacts: the additional impact of 
IWC on potentially eligible lone parents is too small for it to be plausible that 
this would disadvantage other lone parents looking for work. The authors also 
consider that the presence of policies other than IWC is unlikely to explain the 
apparent negative impacts (because the LPPs were designed to encourage lone 
parents to leave IS and find work, not stay on IS for longer). It is also possible 
to question whether anticipation effects are plausible: anticipation effects can 
exist only if lone parents whose duration on IS is less than 12 months are aware 
of IWC and alter their behaviour as a result. But qualitative research with IWC 
recipients (Ray et	al., 2007) found that the majority of those IWC recipients 
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who had not received Work Search Premium (WSP) or had a Quarterly Work 
Focused Interview (QWFI) heard about IWC for the first time after they had 
found a job (although this research was based on a small sample). Furthermore, 
in a variant of the duration model that allowed for anticipation effects, these 
were found to be statistically insignificant, and the overall impact of IWC was 
little different (see Appendix F). However, anticipation effects were found to 
be present in a similar programme in Canada (Card and Hyslop, 2005) and 
it is also plausible that there were spillover effects as described above in the 
Canadian programme.
2 Any estimated treatment effects may be due to a failure of the ‘common trends’ 
assumption after the LPPs started (see Section 4.2.1). This would happen if 
there were a deterioration or improvement in the outcomes in the pilot districts 
that did not occur in the comparison districts, which could not be explained by 
the explanatory factors included in the regression. If such a deterioration had 
occurred, it would lead to estimated treatment effects on outcomes measured 
before duration on IS reaches 12 months that were negative, and it would 
imply that the conventional DiD estimates of the net impact of the LPPs were 
understating the genuine impact of the LPPs. Section 4.2.1 reported that 
statistical tests concluded that the ‘common trends’ assumption appeared to 
hold before the LPPs but allowing for time-varying area effects in a duration 
model increased the effect of the LPPs on the proportion of lone parents off 
benefit by around 1 ppt (see Appendix F). 
The data available to the research team was insufficient to distinguish between 
these hypotheses. It would be possible to learn more by using data on non-lone-
parent benefit recipients or qualitative research with lone parents in their first year 
of receipt of IS. 
4.3 Duration model estimates: overall impact of the  
 LPPs on potentially eligible lone parents in the  
 flow sample
This section presents simulations of the overall impact of the LPPs on all potentially 
eligible lone parents in the flow sample that have been derived from a duration 
model (set out in Appendix F).
The results of these simulations are shown in Figure 4.5. They are produced by 
using the duration model to simulate directly how outcomes would change in 
the absence of the LPPs. This is done by simulating the probability that each lone 
parent starts or stops receiving benefit in each quarter and then using a set of 
random numbers to decide whether each transition actually did occur. By doing 
this successively over time, a simulated profile is produced for each lone parent. 
When performing this simulation, the set of random terms is chosen so that the 
profile for each lone parent matches what is actually observed; this is sometimes 
known as calibrating the errors (see Appendix F).
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Figure 4.5 Simulated effect of the LPPs on proportion of lone  
 parents off benefit: flow sample
The estimated impact of the LPPs on potentially eligible lone parents in the 
flow sample based on the duration model increases the longer lone parents are 
potentially eligible, reaching around 2 ppts 12 months after lone parents first 
became potentially eligible for IWC. This means that the proportion of lone parents 
in the flow sample in the pilot areas who were not on benefit at this time would 
have been 2 ppts lower if the LPPs had not existed. After 24 months’ exposure, 
the impact is around 3 ppts. Section 9.1 uses the duration model to simulate the 
impact of the LPPs on IWC recipients – and thus, the policy’s deadweight – but 
not distinguishing between whether they are in the stock or flow samples. The 
estimated coefficients of the model imply that IWC had a statistically significant 
impact on encouraging lone parents to leave IS but it has not been possible to 
estimate standard errors for the simulations reported in Figure 4.5.
The figure also contains the estimates based on the DiD model previously shown 
in Table 4.1. The estimated impacts of the LPPs derived from the duration model 
are slightly larger than the DiD estimates (it is not possible to estimate whether the 
difference is statistically different from zero, as the two estimates are from entirely 
different models); even so, the differences could exist for a number of reasons:
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• the duration model was estimated on a 5 per cent sample of lone parents (over 
70,000 lone parents, 1,300 of whom received IWC), whereas the DiD analysis 
used all potentially eligible lone parents. This means that the estimates from the 
duration model are subject to a higher margin of error than those based on a 
DiD estimator;
• the DiD analysis controlled for many more explanatory variables than the 
duration model and so it is possible that part of the simulated impact of the 
LPPs using the duration model is actually capturing the impact of a characteristic 
that has been left out of the model (known as omitted-variable bias). Section 
3.3 showed that IWC recipients had significantly different characteristics from 
other lone parents who left IS, and not all of these characteristics have been 
controlled for in the duration model;
• the simulation results using the duration model only take one draw from the 
error distribution; it is conceivable (but unlikely) that re-running the simulation 
several times with different draws from the error distribution might change the 
results;
• the duration model assumes that the effect of the LPPs on the probability of 
starting and leaving benefit is the same for the stock and flow samples, and that 
it is the same for all durations of time spent on benefit. On the other hand, by 
running different regressions for the stock and flow and at every three-month 
point after the date on which the lone parent first became potentially eligible 
for IWC, the DiD estimates relax these assumptions. Thus, the DiD method 
potentially allows for more accurate estimates of the effect of the LPPs;
• there is a slight difference in the outcomes measured: the duration model 
considers lone parents on IS and JSA as being ‘on benefit’, but the DiD analysis 
also considers lone parents on Incapacity Benefit (IB) as being ‘on benefit’. This 
will affect estimates of the impact of the LPPs if the LPPs encouraged lone 
parents to leave IS for IB; this seems unlikely for all aspects of the LPPs apart 
from ESQWFIs.
Because of these points, and because a stronger set of assumptions about the 
nature of the unobserved heterogeneity and error terms is needed for the duration 
model than for the DiD analysis to provide robust estimates, it is likely that the 
estimates in Figure 4.5 based on the DiD analysis give a more reliable guide to the 
true impact of the LPPs on the total population of potentially eligible lone parents. 
However, the simulations from the duration model do add considerably to our 
understanding of the impact of the LPPs, as will be shown in Chapter 8.
4.4 Summary: overall impact of the LPPs on potentially  
 eligible lone parents in the flow sample
This chapter has provided a series of estimates of the overall impact of the LPPs 
on all potentially eligible lone parents derived from a DiD estimator and also using 
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a duration model. In general, the impact of the LPPs on the flow sample (in this 
chapter) is more interesting than the impact of the LPPs on the stock sample 
(in Chapter 5), as it determines the impact of the LPPs in the long run. This is 
because, eventually, all lone parents in the flow sample will have become potentially 
eligible for IWC after the pilots were introduced. 
Section 4.1 provided the headline estimates of the impact of the LPPs on all 
potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample (i.e. those who first became 
potentially eligible for IWC at some point after the pilots had been introduced 
in their area). The main estimates are that 1.6 ppts more potentially eligible lone 
parents were no longer receiving an out-of-work benefit after 12 months’ exposure 
to the pilots and 2.0 ppts more lone parents were no longer receiving an out-of-
work benefit after 24 months’ exposure (the latter is based on Phases 1 and 2 
only). An alternative way of expressing these impacts is that the additionality rate 
of the LPPs was 8.8 per cent for benefit outcomes after 12 months’ exposure and 
7.7 per cent after 24 months’ exposure. The equivalent estimates for being in 
work are 1.0 ppts and 1.4 ppts. Unsurprisingly, the impact as a proportion of all 
potentially eligible lone parents rises over time, but the additionality rate changes 
by much less.
In general, the percentage-point impact of the LPPs on the proportion of potentially 
eligible lone parents off benefit exceeded the percentage-point impact of the 
LPPs on the proportion of potentially eligible lone parents in work; in theory, the 
impacts should be identical in the short run, so these differences probably reflect 
errors in the administrative data, particularly for work spells. 
Section 4.1 also discussed the impact of the LPPs on benefit and work outcomes 
by pilot phase and cohort, where a ‘cohort’ refers to a group of lone parents who 
first became potentially eligible for IWC in a particular six-month period. These 
estimates suggest that later cohorts benefited more from the introduction of the 
LPPs than earlier cohorts, although most of the differences are not statistically 
significant. One potential explanation for this pattern is that, over time, lone 
parents on IS become more aware of the existence of IWC and other parts of the 
LPPs and therefore more likely to respond to them.
Section 4.2.1 justified the use of a DiD estimator: it showed that work and benefit 
outcomes were significantly different across the pilot and comparison districts, 
thus necessitating a DiD estimator rather than a straightforward comparison of 
outcomes following the introduction of the LPPs. It also showed that this difference 
was constant over time for all pilot districts, which supports the ‘common trends’ 
assumption underlying the DiD approach. Section 4.2.2 showed that the estimated 
impacts of the LPPs do not differ dramatically when different assumptions are 
made about the underlying trend in outcomes. However, Section 4.2.3 found 
that lone parents on IS for less than 12 months in the pilot districts were slightly 
(and statistically significantly) less likely to be off benefit and less likely to be in 
work than lone parents on IS for less than 12 months in the comparison districts. 
Interpreting such ‘impacts’ is not simple: there are two main potential causes, 
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with different implications, and the data available to the research team was 
insufficient to distinguish between these hypotheses. First, the negative ‘impacts’ 
may be genuinely caused by the LPPs, most likely either through anticipation 
effects or substitution effects. If so, then the headline estimates of the additional 
impact of the LPPs presented earlier are overstating the overall impact of the 
LPPs (although estimates based on the duration model suggest that the extent of 
any such ‘overstatement’ is very small). Second, the negative impacts may be due 
to a general deterioration in the outcomes in the pilot districts that did not occur 
in the comparison districts and which cannot be explained by the explanatory 
factors included in the analysis (this would reflect a failure of the ‘common trends’ 
assumption). If such a deterioration had occurred, the headline estimates of the 
impact of the LPPs presented above are understating the actual impact of the 
LPPs.
A technical conclusion is that simulations of the impact of the LPPs derived from 
the duration model (shown in Section 4.3) are slightly larger than those based on 
DiD estimates (Section 4.1) but the larger sample means that those based on the 
DiD estimator should be preferred in this case. The benefit of the duration model 
is that it can be used to examine how much of the overall impact of IWC is due to 
retention effects, and this is done in Chapter 8. 
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5 The overall impact of  
 the lone parent pilots  
 on potentially eligible  
 lone parents in the stock  
 sample
The previous chapter presented estimates of the impact of the lone parent pilots 
(LPPs) on the flow sample. This chapter presents estimates of the additional impact 
of the LPPs on the stock of potentially eligible lone parents – that is, on all lone 
parents who were potentially eligible for In-Work Credit (IWC) on the day the pilots 
were introduced in their district. The long-run impact of the LPPs is determined 
by its impact on the flow sample but the stock sample is of interest because it still 
represents the majority of lone parents who are potentially eligible for IWC.
As in the previous chapter, estimates of the overall impact on the stock sample 
have been derived from both the difference-in-differences (DiD) method and 
the duration model; full details can be found in Appendices E and F. Box 5.1 
describes the stock sample used for the DiD analysis and provides some technical 
background information on the analysis in this chapter.
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Box 5.1: Technical information about the DiD analysis on the 
stock sample
There is a separate stock sample for each of the four pilot phases. 
The stock sample for analysing Phase 1 of the LPPs comprises the following:
• all claims of Income Support (IS) live on 1 April 2001 in the comparison 
districts and the Phase 1 districts, where the claimant was a lone parent 
and the duration of the IS/Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claim exceeded 12 
months on that date;
• all claims of IS live on 1 April 2004 in the comparison districts and the 
Phase 1 districts, where the claimant was a lone parent and the duration 
of the IS/JSA claim exceeded 12 months on that date.
This sample, therefore, consists of the IS claims that were immediately 
eligible for IWC when the LPPs were introduced in the Phase 1 districts, plus 
their equivalents in the comparison districts, plus their equivalents in the  
Phase 1 pilot and comparison districts had the LPPs started on 1 April 2001. 
Stock samples for the other three phases were constructed similarly, always 
using 1 April 2001 for the first bullet but using the actual start date for that 
phase in the second bullet. 
Appendix B describes how the sample was constructed, Appendix D contains 
some summary statistics, and sample sizes and mean outcomes are given 
in Appendix H. The coefficients on the other regressors in the model (the 
individual and local-area characteristics) are not shown as there are too many 
of them and too many regressions but they are listed in Appendix D.
There are fewer variants to the estimated impact on the stock sample than 
there were to the estimated impact on the flow sample in Chapter 4, for a 
number of reasons:
• it is not possible to calculate an impact averaged across pilot districts, 
because each phase requires its own comparison group and many lone 
parents will appear in more than one comparison group;
• within phase, all lone parents in the stock sample became potentially 
eligible for IWC on the same day, so there is no variation by cohort; 
• similarly, because all lone parents became potentially eligible for IWC on 
the same day, there is no time trend (simply a before/after comparison); 
thus, one cannot test different specifications of the underlying trend;
• it is, in principle, possible to examine whether there were anticipation 
effects amongst this group but the way the stock samples are constructed 
makes this much more involved than it was for the flow sample.
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5.1 DiD estimates: overall impact of the LPPs on  
 potentially eligible lone parents in the stock sample 
Table 5.1 presents estimates of the impact of the LPPs on work and benefit 
outcomes amongst all potentially eligible lone parents in the stock samples 
separately by phase. Outcomes are available up to 36/30/24/18 months following 
the introduction of the pilots in the Phase 1/2/3/4 districts, and are presented in 
percentage-point terms and as a percentage of the outcome (the additionality rate). 
In all four phases, the estimated impacts of the pilots are generally smaller than the 
equivalent set of estimates for the flow sample in Table 4.1 and sometimes they 
are not statistically different from zero. For benefit outcomes after 12 months, the 
point estimates suggest that the impact was greatest in the Phase 2 districts and 
smallest (insignificantly different from zero) in the Phase 1 districts. The weighted 
average of the four estimates is 0.5 percentage points (ppts) (weighted by the 
number of potentially eligible lone parents on the first day of operation of the 
LPPs in each phase), so this is the central estimate of the additional impact of the 
LPPs on the fraction of lone parents in the stock sample as a whole who have 
left benefits in the pilot districts, 12 months after the pilots were introduced. The 
estimated impacts in the different phases come from separate regressions and so 
it is not possible to tell whether the differences in estimates between the phases 
are statistically significant.
For work outcomes after 12 months, the point estimates suggest that the impact 
was greatest in the Phase 3 districts and smallest (and insignificantly different 
from zero) in the Phase 4 districts. The weighted average of the four estimates is 
0.6 ppts, so this is the central estimate of the additional impact of the LPPs on the 
fraction of lone parents in the stock sample as a whole who are in work in the 
pilot districts, 12 months after the pilots were introduced. 
In general, the point estimates on both benefit and work outcomes tend to increase 
over time, reaching 1.4 and 1.6 ppts respectively after 36 months in the Phase 1 
pilot districts, 1.7 and 1.8 ppts after 30 months in the Phase 2 pilot districts, 2.2 
and 1.5 ppts after 24 months in the Phase 3 pilot districts and 0.5 and 0.8 ppts 
after 18 months in the Phase 4 pilot districts. These impacts – which correspond 
to outcomes measured at the end of the period of data available for this report – 
can be measured much more accurately for the stock than for the flow, because 
the sample size does not change as the length of time since becoming potentially 
eligible increases. The impact of the LPPs on the stock sample is smaller than on 
the flow sample (compare Tables 5.1 and 4.1). This is unsurprising: lone parents in 
the stock sample are likely to have been on IS for considerably longer periods of 
time when they first become potentially eligible for IWC than lone parents in the 
flow sample.
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Table 5.1 also shows the estimated impact as a percentage of the gross outcome, 
i.e. the additionality rate. For example, the net impact of the LPPs in Phase 1 
districts accounted for 6 per cent of the potentially eligible lone parents who were 
not on benefit 36 months after the LPPs began. Unlike the flow sample, these 
estimates tend to rise with the length of time for which lone parents have been 
exposed to the LPPs. 
Figure 5.1 shows the actual fractions of potentially eligible lone parents in the 
stock sample who are off benefit and in work and the estimated fractions off 
benefit and in work in the absence of the LPPs. The difference between each pair 
of lines is the impact on the stock sample averaged across the four phases.
Figure 5.1 Fractions of potentially eligible lone parents in the  
 stock sample who are off benefit and in work, and  
 estimated fractions off benefit and in work in the  
 absence of the LPPs
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5.2 Duration model estimates: overall impact of the  
 LPPs on potentially eligible lone parents in the stock  
 sample
This section presents simulations of the overall impact of the LPPs on all potentially 
eligible lone parents in the stock sample that have been derived from a duration 
model (set out in Appendix F).
The results of these simulations are shown in Figure 5.2. They are produced by 
using the duration model to simulate directly how outcomes would change in 
the absence of the LPPs. This is done by simulating the probability that each lone 
parent starts or stops receiving benefit in each quarter, and then using a set of 
random numbers to decide whether each transition actually did occur. By doing 
this successively over time, a simulated profile is produced for each lone parent. 
When performing this simulation, the set of random terms is chosen so that the 
profile for each lone parent matches what is actually observed; this is sometimes 
known as calibrating the errors (see Appendix F).
Figure 5.2 Simulated effect of the LPPs on proportion of lone  
 parents off benefit: stock sample
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The estimated impact of the LPPs on potentially eligible lone parents in the stock 
sample based on the duration model increases the longer lone parents have been 
potentially eligible for IWC, reaching 2.6 ppts 18 months after the date on which 
the lone parent first became potentially eligible for IWC. This means that the 
proportion of lone parents off benefit at this time in the pilot areas would have 
been 2.6 ppts lower if the LPPs had not been introduced (the impact after this 
date is not strictly comparable as the number of phases contributing to outcomes 
changes over time, as discussed in Section 4.1). Section 9.1 uses the duration 
model to simulate the impact of the LPPs on IWC recipients – and thus, the policy’s 
deadweight – but not distinguishing between whether they are in the stock or flow 
samples. The estimated coefficients of the model imply that IWC had a statistically 
significant impact on encouraging lone parents to leave IS, but it has not been 
possible to estimate standard errors for the simulations reported in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2 also contains the estimates based on the DiD model (and previously 
shown in Table 5.1). Estimated impacts of the LPPs derived from the duration 
model are slightly larger than the DiD estimates, but it is not possible to estimate 
whether the difference is statistically different from zero, as the two estimates are 
from entirely different models. Section 4.3 discussed a number of reasons why the 
differences might exist, to which should be added: 
• The stock sample examined in the duration model is a subset of that used in the 
DiD analysis and contains those lone parents with relatively short durations on IS 
at the time the LPPs were introduced (because it does not include lone parents 
whose IS claim started before 1 April 2001). It is possible that the genuine 
impact of the LPPs is greater on the subsample of the overall stock sample with 
relatively short durations on IS.
5.3 Summary: overall impact of the LPPs on potentially  
 eligible lone parents in the stock sample
In general, the impact of the LPPs on the flow sample is more interesting than the 
impact of the LPPs on the stock sample, as it determines the impact of the LPPs 
in the long run. This is because, eventually, all lone parents in the flow sample 
will have become potentially eligible for IWC after the pilots were introduced. 
But the stock sample is of interest too, both because it comprises the majority of 
lone parents who have become potentially eligible for IWC to date and because 
it indicates, reliably, the time profile of the impact of the LPPs beyond 24 months. 
In general, the impact of the LPPs on the stock of potentially eligible lone parents 
(based on the DiD estimator) is smaller than the impact of the LPPs on the flow 
of potentially eligible lone parents, particularly for benefit outcomes: this is 
unsurprising, given that lone parents in the stock sample are likely to have been 
on IS for considerably longer than 12 months when they first become potentially 
eligible for IWC. For example, 12 months after becoming potentially eligible, lone 
parents in the stock sample in Phase 1 districts were 0.1 ppts more likely to be off 
The overall impact of the lone parent pilots on potentially eligible lone parents 
in the stock sample
78
benefits than lone parents in the stock sample in comparison districts, but lone 
parents in the flow sample in Phase 1 districts were 0.8 ppts significantly more likely 
to be off benefits than lone parents in the flow sample in comparison districts. For 
Phase 2 districts, the equivalent numbers were 0.7 ppts for the stock and 2.0 ppts 
for the flow (the estimated impacts in each phase for the flow sample are reported 
in Table J.1. In most cases, the impact of the LPPs on the stock samples peaked in 
the final month in which outcomes were available, suggesting that the impact of 
the LPPs on the flow sample might also continue to grow. 
A technical conclusion is that simulations of the impact of the LPPs derived from 
the duration model were up to twice as large as those based on DiD estimates 
but the larger sample means that those based on the DiD estimator should be 
preferred. The benefit of the duration model is that it can be used to examine how 
much of the overall impact of IWC is due to retention effects and this is done in 
Chapter 8.
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6 Variation in the overall  
 impact of the lone parent  
 pilots on potentially  
 eligible lone parents
Chapters 4 and 5 presented the overall impact of the lone parent pilots (LPPs) 
for all potentially eligible lone parents in the flow and stock samples respectively. 
This chapter supplements that analysis by examining, for both the flow and stock 
samples, how the impact of the LPPs varies according to different combinations 
of policies offered as part of the LPPs that were available to potentially eligible 
lone parents in pilot districts at the time when their outcomes were recorded and 
whether the potentially eligible lone parents had previously participated in New 
Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP). 
The analysis in this chapter has been implemented by taking the difference-
in-differences (DiD) model used to look at the overall impact of the LPPs in 
Chapters 4 and 5 and extending it in order to break down the overall impact into:
• the impact in New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP) districts;
• the impact in districts where mandatory Extended Schools Quarterly Work 
Focused Interviews (ESQWFIs) were in operation for certain lone parents;
• the impact for lone parents who were previously on NDLP or ND+fLP;
• the impact for all other kinds of potentially eligible lone parents. 
This last term is hereafter referred to as the ‘base impact’, against which the three 
variants of the impact will be compared. Box 6.1 explains how the estimates were 
produced, and how they should be interpreted, in more detail.
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Box 6.1: Estimating the variation in the overall impact of the 
LPPs: detail
This chapter looks at what the estimated impact of the LPPs is for potentially 
eligible lone parents in pilot districts:
• who were subject to mandatory ESQWFIs when their labour market 
outcomes were measured, because their youngest child was aged 12 
or over and they lived in a Local Education Authorities (LEA) operating 
Extended Schools Childcare and Childcare Tasters (ESC) at the time;
• where ND+fLP was in operation when their labour market outcomes were 
measured;
• who had participated in NDLP at some point during the period 6–30 months 
before the date on which they became potentially eligible for IWC. As in 
Research Report 415 (RR 415), NDLP participation less than six months 
before a lone parent first became potentially eligible for In-Work Credit 
(IWC) is ignored in this analysis, in order to avoid any issues surrounding 
the fact that during the first months of Phase 1 of the LPPs, receipt of IWC 
was conditional on participating in NDLP.
Appendix A has more details on ESQWFIs and ND+fLP.
The base impact, therefore, measures the impact of the LPPs on potentially 
eligible lone parents in pilot districts where ND+fLP was not in operation, 
who were not subject to ESQWFIs and who had not previously participated 
in NDLP. It is based on a comparison with the outcomes of lone parents in 
comparison districts whose Income Support (IS) claim had reached 12 months 
(and who had not previously been on NDLP), after controlling for observable 
personal and geographic characteristics. 
continued
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The ESQWFI impact measures the impact of the LPPs on potentially eligible 
lone parents who lived in pilot districts where ND+fLP was not in operation 
but who were subject to ESQWFIs (because their youngest child was aged 12 
or over and they lived in an LEA offering ESC) and who did not participate 
in NDLP. It is based on a comparison with the outcomes of equivalent lone 
parents in comparison districts who had similar observable characteristics and 
whose youngest child was aged 12 or over.5
The ND+fLP impact measures the impact of the LPPs on potentially eligible 
lone parents in pilot districts where ND+fLP was in operation (at the time 
their labour market outcomes were measured), but who were not subject to 
ESQWFIs and did not previously participate in NDLP/ND+fLP. It is based on a 
comparison with the outcomes of lone parents in comparison districts whose 
IS claim had reached 12 months (and who had not previously been on NDLP/
ND+fLP), after controlling for observable personal and geographic characteristics. 
The NDLP impact measures the impact of the LPPs on potentially eligible lone 
parents in pilot districts where ND+fLP was not in operation and who were not 
subject to ESQWFIs, but did participate in NDLP. It is based on a comparison 
with the outcomes of equivalent lone parents in comparison districts who had 
previously been on NDLP.6
continued
5 Strictly speaking, this comparison is made only for outcomes measured 
before October 2005, after which Quarterly Work-Focused Interviews 
(QWFIs) were rolled out nationally for lone parents whose youngest child 
was aged 14 or over. This policy change must be accommodated in order 
to ensure that potentially eligible lone parents in pilot districts who had to 
attend pilot QWFIs are always compared with potentially eligible lone parents 
in comparison districts who did not have to attend QWFIs. Therefore, when 
looking at outcomes measured after October 2005, the analysis compares 
lone parents in LEAs operating ESC whose youngest child was between 12 
and 14, with lone parents in comparison districts whose youngest child was 
between 12 and 14.
6 The model used to produce the analysis for this chapter assumes that previous 
participation in NDLP (for lone parents who did not live in ND+fLP areas) 
has the same effect on labour market outcomes as previous participation in 
NDLP/ND+fLP for lone parents who did live in ND+fLP areas. Thus while this 
chapter reports the former, the latter can also be calculated from the same 
set of estimates.
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All of these impacts are estimated jointly (i.e. within the same model), so 
in addition to testing whether the LPPs had a statistically significant impact 
on benefit and work outcomes for the variants above, it is possible to test 
whether the impacts for these variants are statistically different from the base 
impact: that is, whether there is any statistically significant variation in the 
overall impact.
It is important to note that the base impact defined here will not match the 
impacts in Chapters 4 and 5, although it is very similar in most cases. The 
base impact in this chapter measures the impact for potentially eligible lone 
parents who did not previously participate in NDLP and who lived in pilot 
districts where ND+fLP was not in operation and were not subject to ESQWFIs. 
The estimates in Chapters 4 and 5 are a weighted combination of the base 
impact and the three variant impacts, as they are the average impact across 
all potentially eligible lone parents in all pilot districts.
6.1 Flow sample: variation in the overall impact of the  
 LPPs on potentially eligible lone parents
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present the estimated base impacts and variant impacts for 
potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample, at six-monthly intervals after 
the date on which they first became potentially eligible for IWC. The base impacts 
(first column of numbers) are generally very slightly lower than the average impacts 
(final column of numbers) shown in Section 4.1.
The first row of Table 6.1 indicates that the impact of the LPPs on lone parents 
subject to ESQWFIs (second column) was to make them 0.8 percentage points 
(ppts) less likely to be off benefit six months after they became potentially eligible 
for IWC than lone parents in comparison areas with a child aged 12 or over. Note 
that this estimated impact is not statistically significant, so there is no evidence 
that IWC made these lone parents less likely to leave benefit after six months. 
However, the impact is statistically different from the base impact of 1.0 ppts, so 
there is evidence that the impact on this particular outcome was smaller for lone 
parents who attended ESQWFIs than for those who did not.
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Table 6.1 Variants of estimated impact of the LPPs on number of  
 potentially eligible lone parents off benefit in the flow  
 sample 
Months after became 
potentially eligible for 
IWC 
Base Subject to 
ESQWFI
Lived in 
an ND+fLP 
district
Previously 
on NDLP
Average
Impact in ppts  
(Standard errors given in parentheses)
6
Impact 1.0 –0.8 1.2 2.1 1.0
(0.164)*** (0.753) (0.264)*** (0.763)*** (0.154)***
Impact significantly 
different from base?
N/A Yes No No N/A
12
Impact 1.5 0.2 1.4 4.2 1.6
(0.247)*** (1.028) (0.337)*** (1.010)*** (0.220)***
Impact significantly 
different from base?
N/A No No Yes N/A
18
Impact 1.6 2.0 1.6 2.4 1.7
(0.368)*** (1.345) (0.410)*** (1.329)* (0.301)***
Impact significantly 
different from base?
N/A No No No N/A
24
Impact 1.8 3.2 1.9 2.8 2.0
(0.662)*** (1.844)* (0.500)*** (1.872) (0.419)***
Impact significantly 
different from base?
N/A No No No N/A
30
Impact 1.4 –1.2 N/A 1.7 1.2
(0.793)* (2.510) N/A (3.113) (0.758)
Impact significantly 
different from base?
N/A No N/A No N/A
Notes: Based on various ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the flow sample (see 
Appendix B). Sample sizes given in Appendix H.
Base impact refers to impact of LPPs in areas not operating ESQWFIs or ND+fLP, for lone parents 
not subject to ESQWFIs and not previously on NDLP. Average impact at each date is taken from 
Table 4.1.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * = significant at 10 per cent level; ** = significant at  
5 per cent level; *** = significant at 1 per cent level.
‘Impact significantly different from base?’ is a test that the estimated impact in each column is 
significantly different from the base impact.
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In districts where ND+fLP was in operation, lone parents were 1.2 ppts more likely 
to be off benefit six months after they became potentially eligible for IWC; this 
impact is statistically significant, but it is not statistically different from the base 
impact. In other words, while potentially eligible lone parents in ND+fLP districts 
were more likely to leave benefit after six months, the impact was not stronger 
than in non-ND+fLP districts.
Finally, looking at the fourth column, lone parents in pilot districts who had 
previously been on NDLP were 2.1 ppts more likely to be off benefit six months 
after becoming potentially eligible for IWC; this impact is statistically different from 
zero, but not statistically different from the base impact. In other words, six months 
after lone parents became potentially eligible for IWC, the benefit outcomes of 
those in pilot districts who had been on NDLP improved by 2.1 ppts more relative 
to the outcomes of lone parents who had been on NDLP in comparison districts. 
This relative improvement is significantly different from zero. However, it is not 
significantly different from the relative improvement experienced by the other 
lone parents in pilot districts (who had not been on NDLP).
Over time, the estimated impacts tend to become more positive for all groups of 
lone parents considered here – as in Section 4.1 – although they become erratic 
towards the end of the flow sample window, probably because small numbers 
of lone parents are observed for 30 months after becoming potentially eligible 
for IWC. 
In districts where ND+fLP was operating, lone parents who had been potentially 
eligible for two years were 1.9 ppts more likely to be off benefit, which is very 
similar to the base impact. Lone parents who had previously been on NDLP were 
2.8 ppts more likely to be off benefit by this time, but as this impact is very 
imprecisely measured, it is neither statistically significant nor statistically different 
from the base impact.
As a whole, Table 6.1 shows:
• the impact of the LPPs on the benefit outcomes of lone parents subject to 
ESQWFIs is never significantly positive, and is almost never significantly different 
from the base impact, but this reflects the imprecision of this estimate, because 
ESQWFIs applied to relatively few lone parents;
• the impacts for lone parents in ND+fLP areas are always statistically significant. 
They are very similar in magnitude to the base impacts, so the impact on benefit 
outcomes does not vary significantly according to the availability of ND+fLP;
• the estimated impact of the LPPs for lone parents who had previously been on 
NDLP is always larger than the base impact, being in the region of 2.0–4.0 ppts 
across the table as a whole. However, these impacts become imprecise as the 
sample sizes diminish for later outcomes and as a result are not significantly 
different from the base impact (except at 12 months after lone parents became 
potentially eligible for IWC).
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Table 6.2 repeats the analysis for work outcome. As for the benefit outcomes in 
Table 6.1:
• the estimated impact for potentially eligible lone parents who were subject to 
ESQWFIs is not statistically significant (despite growing over time), and it is not 
statistically different from the base impact either. This reflects the imprecision of 
the estimates due to the small numbers of lone parents affected by ESQWFIs;
• the estimated impacts in ND+fLP districts are between 1.0 and 1.5 ppts, which 
are, as for benefit outcomes, similar to the base impact and therefore not 
significantly different from it (but always significantly different from zero);
• for lone parents who had previously been on NDLP, the impact of the LPPs on 
work outcome is larger (around 1–2 ppts) and significantly positive up to 18 
months after lone parents became potentially eligible for IWC but then becomes 
erratic as the sample sizes fall for later outcomes. As it is quite imprecisely 
measured, it is never statistically different from the base impact.
Some of the findings for the flow sample can be compared with the findings in 
RR 415 and they are broadly consistent with the results in that report. In particular, 
small (and therefore, insignificant) differences between impacts in ND+fLP areas 
and non-ND+fLP areas were found before, which is consistent with the estimates 
here. Second, the impacts in RR 415 were larger for potentially eligible lone parents 
who had previously been on NDLP but not in a significant manner (due to the 
imprecision caused by small samples). This is also consistent with the estimates here.
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Table 6.2 Variants of estimated impact of the LPPs on number of  
 potentially eligible lone parents in work in the flow  
 sample
Months after became 
potentially eligible for 
IWC 
Base Subject to 
ESQWFI
Lived in 
an ND+fLP 
district
Previously 
on NDLP
Average
Impact in ppts  
(Standard errors given in parentheses)
6
Impact 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.3 0.7
(0.133)*** (0.664) (0.217)*** (0.635)** (0.151)***
Impact significantly 
different from base?
N/A No No No N/A
12
Impact 0.8 0.2 1.3 1.9 1.0
(0.203)*** (0.895) (0.284)*** (0.852)** (0.199)***
Impact significantly 
different from base?
N/A No No No N/A
18
Impact 1.1 0.7 1.5 2.4 1.3
(0.312)*** (1.204) (0.353)*** (1.160)** (0.265)***
Impact significantly 
different from base?
N/A No No No N/A
24
Impact 1.3 1.7 1.2 0.9 1.4
(0.571)** (1.690) (0.439)*** (1.623) (0.366)***
Impact significantly 
different from base?
N/A No No No N/A
30
Impact 0.1 0.1 N/A –4.6 0.4
(0.691) (2.400) N/A (2.661)* (0.650
Impact significantly 
different from base?
N/A No N/A No N/A
Notes: Based on various OLS regressions on the flow sample (see Appendix B). Sample sizes 
given in Appendix H.
Base impact refers to impact of LPPs in areas not operating ESQWFIs or ND+fLP, for lone parents 
not subject to ESQWFIs and not previously on NDLP. Average impact at each date is taken from 
Table 4.1.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * = significant at 10 per cent level; ** = significant at  
5 per cent level; *** = significant at 1 per cent level.
‘Impact significantly different from base?’ is a test that the estimated impact in each column is 
significantly different from the base impact.
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6.2 Stock sample: variation in the overall impact of the  
 LPPs on potentially eligible lone parents
The DiD analysis in Chapter 5 showed estimates of the impact of the LPPs on 
the stock sample separately for each phase because each phase required its own 
comparison group. In keeping with that method, this section presents separate 
estimates for each phase. However:
• as ESQWFIs were never introduced in Phases 3 and 4, their impact can only be 
presented for Phases 1 and 2; this is illustrated in Table 6.3;
• only Phase 2 contained a mixture of ND+fLP and non-ND+fLP districts, so the 
impact in ND+fLP districts can only be measured for this phase, and is shown in 
Table 6.4;
• Tables 6.5 and 6.6 present the impacts on (respectively) benefit and work 
outcomes for lone parents who had previously participated in NDLP.
Table 6.3 shows that, in Phase 1 districts, the impact of the LPPs on benefit 
outcomes is almost always greater for those subject to ESQWFIs than the base 
impact and this difference is statistically significant between 12 and 30 months 
after becoming potentially eligible for IWC. Both impacts generally increase over 
time (except towards the end of the sample window) and this holds true for 
the work outcome as well. However, the impact on work outcomes in Phase 1 
does not seem to differ significantly according to whether potentially eligible lone 
parents were subject to ESQWFIs.
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Table 6.3 Estimated impact of the LPPs for potentially eligible  
 lone parents subject to ESQWFIs on benefit and work  
 outcomes in Phases 1 and 2 of the stock sample
Months after became potentially 
eligible for IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2
Benefit Work Benefit Work
Impact in ppts  
(Standard errors given in parentheses)
6
Base impact –0.5 0.1 0.1 0.5
(0.182)** (0.191) (0.137) (0.136)***
ESQWFI impact –0.0 –0.8 1.4 1.4
(0.391) (0.420)* (0.581)** (0.564)**
Impact significantly different 
from base?
No Yes Yes No
Average impact –0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5
(0.20) (0.20) (0.14)** (0.14)***
12
Base impact –0.3 0.1 0.6 0.8
(0.249) (0.227) (0.189)*** (0.173)***
ESQWFI impact 1.0 0.3 2.8 2.5
(0.497)** (0.456) (0.769)*** (0.717)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes No Yes Yes
Average impact 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7
(0.26) (0.23)*** (0.17)*** (0.16)***
18
Base impact –0.4 0.3 1.0 1.2
(0.275) (0.257) (0.208)*** (0.192)***
ESQWFI impact 0.8 0.6 1.8 2.5
(0.545) (0.519) (0.834)** (0.741)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes No No No
Average impact 0.2 0.9 1.0 1.0
(0.28) (0.24)*** (0.19)*** (0.18)***
24
Base impact 0.2 0.5 1.4 1.6
(0.301) (0.269)* (0.249)*** (0.223)***
ESQWFI impact 2.0 0.9 0.2 1.5
(0.598)*** (0.549) (0.854) (0.771)*
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes No No No
Average impact 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.3
(0.30)*** (0.26)*** (0.20)*** (0.18)***
Continued
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Table 6.3 Continued
Months after became potentially 
eligible for IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2
Benefit Work Benefit Work
Impact in ppts  
(Standard errors given in parentheses)
30
Base impact 0.4 1.3 1.5 2.4
(0.316) (0.287)*** (0.260)*** (0.237)***
ESQWFI impact 1.8 1.0 –0.9 1.5
(0.621)*** (0.569)* (0.881) (0.789)*
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes No Yes No
Average impact 1.0 1.8 1.7 1.8
(0.31)*** (0.27)*** (0.21)*** (0.19)***
36
Base impact 0.8 1.5
(0.331)*** (0.297)***
ESQWFI impact 0.9 0.8
(0.635) (0.576)
Impact significantly different 
from base?
No No No No
Average impact 1.4 2.1
(0.31)*** (0.28)***
Notes: Based on various OLS regressions on the flow sample (see Appendix B). Sample sizes 
given in Appendix H.
Base impact refers to impact of LPPs in areas not operating ESQWFIs or ND+fLP, for lone parents 
not subject to ESQWFIs and not previously on NDLP. Average impact at each date is taken from 
Table 5.1.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * = significant at 10 per cent level; ** = significant at 5 
per cent level; *** = significant at 1 per cent level.
‘Impact significantly different from base?’ is a test that the estimated ESQWFI impact is 
significantly different from the base impact.
Results are presented in percentage points, so an estimate of –0.1 means –0.1 ppts, not –10 ppts.
The impact of the LPPs on the stock sample as a whole is generally higher in 
Phase 2 than in Phase 1, in line with the findings in Section 5.1 of larger impacts 
in Phase 2 for benefit outcomes and slightly larger impacts in Phase 2 for work 
outcomes. Within Phase 2 districts, the impact of the LPPs on benefit outcomes 
starts off higher for lone parents who attended ESQWFIs than for lone parents who 
did not, but falls over time and is eventually lower. As a result, it is significantly 
higher 12 months after lone parents became potentially eligible for IWC, but 
then significantly lower after 30 months and no longer significantly positive. This 
pattern is also true to an extent for work outcomes, where the impact in ESQWFI 
areas is only significant in the first 18 months after becoming potentially eligible, 
and is only significantly higher than the base impact at 12 months.
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Table 6.4 compares the impacts of the LPPs in Phase 2 districts that operated ND+fLP 
with the impacts in Phase 2 districts that did not operate it (the base impact). 
Impacts are only presented from month 12 onwards because the introduction of 
ND+fLP happened just after lone parents in Phase 2 had been potentially eligible 
for six months. 
Table 6.4 Estimated impact of the LPPs for potentially eligible  
 lone parents in ND+fLP districts on benefit and work  
 outcomes in Phase 2 of the stock sample
Months after became potentially eligible  
for IWC
Phase 2
Benefit Work
Impact in ppts  
(Standard errors given in parentheses)
12
Base impact 0.6 0.8
(0.189)*** (0.173)***
Impact in ND+fLP areas –0.6 0.0
(0.377)* (0.337)
Impact significantly different from base? Yes Yes
Average impact 0.7 0.7
(0.17)*** (0.16)***
18
Base impact 1.0 1.2
(0.208)*** (0.192)***
Impact in ND+fLP areas –0.5 –0.8
(0.421) (0.374)**
Impact significantly different from base? Yes Yes
Average impact 1.0 1.0
(0.19)*** (0.18)***
24
Base impact 1.4 1.6
(0.249)*** (0.223)***
Impact in ND+fLP areas 0.6 0.2
(0.317)** (0.285)
Impact significantly different from base? Yes Yes
Average impact 1.5 1.3
(0.20)*** (0.18)***
Continued
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Table 6.4 Continued
Months after became potentially eligible  
for IWC
Phase 2
Benefit Work
Impact in ppts  
(Standard errors given in parentheses)
30
Base impact 1.5 2.4
(0.260)*** (0.237)***
Impact in ND+fLP areas 0.9 0.5
(0.331)*** (0.301)
Impact significantly different from base? No Yes
Average impact 1.7 1.8
(0.21)*** (0.19)***
Notes: Based on various OLS regressions on the flow sample (see Appendix B). Sample sizes 
given in Appendix H.
Base impact refers to impact of LPPs in areas not operating ESQWFIs or ND+fLP, for lone parents 
not subject to ESQWFIs and not previously on NDLP. Average impact at each date is taken from 
Table 5.1.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * = significant at 10 per cent level; ** = significant at  
5 per cent level; *** = significant at 1 per cent level.
‘Impact significantly different from base?’ is a test that the estimated ND+fLP impact is 
significantly different from the base impact. 
Results are presented in percentage points, so an estimate of –0.1 means –0.1 ppts, not –10 ppts.
The impact in ND+fLP districts is always smaller than the base impact, for both 
benefit and work outcomes, and this difference is almost always statistically 
significant (the sole exception being benefit outcomes 30 months after lone 
parents became potentially eligible). The estimated impacts in ND+fLP districts 
do rise over time, but they only become statistically greater than zero for benefit 
outcomes 24 months after becoming potentially eligible for IWC. It is difficult to 
think of explanations for a significantly lower impact in ND+fLP areas (Cardiff and 
Vale; Dudley and Sandwell; Edinburgh, Lothian and Borders; Leicestershire), but it 
could be that the assumption underlying a DiD analysis – namely a common trend 
in outcomes in the absence of the policy – was not satisfied here.
These estimates are qualitatively similar to the comparable estimated impacts 
in RR 415. 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 examine the impact of the LPPs for potentially eligible lone 
parents in pilot districts who joined NDLP at least six months before the LPPs 
began. For benefit outcomes (Table 6.5), the impact of the LPPs for lone parents 
who had previously been on NDLP is large, always statistically significant and 
always significantly different from the base impact. It increases with the length of 
time that lone parents are potentially eligible for IWC in each phase, eventually 
reaching about 5.5 ppts in Phase 1, 4 ppts in Phase 2, 7 ppts in Phase 3 and 
3 ppts in Phase 4.
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Table 6.5 Estimated impact of the LPPs for potentially eligible  
 lone parents previously on NDLP on benefit outcomes:  
 stock sample 
Months after became potentially 
eligible for IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Impact in ppts 
(Standard errors given in parentheses)
6
Base impact –0.5 0.1 –0.1 –0.0
(0.182)** (0.137) (0.152) (0.144)
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
2.5 1.2 1.2 1.9
(0.706)*** (0.520)** (0.549)** (0.486)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average impact –0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3
(0.20) (0.14)** (0.16) (0.13)**
12
Base impact –0.3 0.6 0.1 –0.1
(0.249) (0.189)*** (0.201) (0.184)
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
3.6 2.5 3.9 2.6
(0.948)*** (0.657)*** (0.699)*** (0.612)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average impact 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.3
(0.26) (0.17)*** (0.21)*** (0.17)*
18
Base impact –0.4 1.0 0.5 0.0
(0.275) (0.208)*** (0.219)** (0.200)
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
4.5 3.2 4.6 3.2
(1.033)*** (0.710)*** (0.760)*** (0.658)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average impact 0.2 1.1 1.0 0.5
(0.28) (0.19)*** (0.23)*** (0.18)***
Continued
Variation in the overall impact of the lone parent pilots on potentially  
eligible lone parents 
93
Table 6.5 Continued
Months after became potentially 
eligible for IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Impact in ppts 
(Standard errors given in parentheses)
24
Base impact 0.2 1.4 1.5
(0.301) (0.249)*** (0.242)***
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
5.9 4.3 7.4
(1.103)*** (0.760)*** (0.816)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes Yes Yes
Average impact 0.9 1.5 2.2
(0.30)*** (0.20)*** (0.25)***
30
Base impact 0.4 1.5
(0.316) (0.260)***
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
5.1 4.4
(1.140)*** (0.780)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes Yes
Average impact 1.0 1.7
(0.31)*** (0.21)***
36
Base impact 0.9
(0.331)***
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
5.7
(1.174)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes
Average impact 1.4
(0.31)***
Notes: Based on various OLS regressions on the flow sample (see Appendix B). Sample sizes 
given in Appendix H.
Base impact refers to impact of LPPs in areas not operating ESQWFIs or ND+fLP, for lone parents 
not subject to ESQWFIs and not previously on NDLP. Average impact at each date is taken from 
Table 5.1.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * = significant at 10 per cent level; ** = significant at  
5 per cent level; *** = significant at 1 per cent level.
‘Impact significantly different from base?’ is a test that the estimated impact for NDLP 
participants is significantly different from the base impact.
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For work outcomes (Table 6.6), the impacts for NDLP participants are typically 
smaller than those for benefit outcomes, and they are initially not statistically 
significant in Phase 2, but they grow over time and are eventually statistically 
significant in all phases. It is still the case that the LPPs had a greater impact for 
lone parents who had previously been on NDLP than for those who had not. This 
difference is always positive and mostly statistically significant (always in Phases 3 
and 4, sometimes in Phase 1 and never in Phase 2).
Table 6.6 Estimated impact of the LPPs for potentially eligible  
 lone parents previously on NDLP on work outcomes:  
 stock sample 
Months after became potentially 
eligible for IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Impact in ppts 
(Standard errors given in parentheses)
6
Base impact 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.0
(0.191) (0.136)*** (0.153) (0.134)
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
2.3 0.9 2.4 1.0
(0.794)*** (0.549)* (0.602)*** (0.497)**
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes No Yes Yes
Average impact 0.3 0.5 0.8 –0.3
(0.20) (0.14)*** (0.16)*** (0.14)**
12
Base impact 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.0
(0.227) (0.173)*** (0.178)*** (0.158)
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
2.6 1.0 4.1 1.3
(0.929)*** (0.633) (0.678)*** (0.568)**
Impact significantly different 
from base?
Yes No Yes Yes
Average impact 0.6 0.8 1.5 –0.3
(0.23)*** (0.16)*** (0.19)*** (0.16)
18
Base impact 0.3 1.2 1.4 0.6
(0.257) (0.192)*** (0.198)*** (0.174)***
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
2.2 2.2 5.0 2.0
(1.033)** (0.693)*** (0.755)*** (0.626)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
No No Yes Yes
Average impact 0.9 1.0 2.2 0.4
(0.24)*** (0.18)*** (0.20)*** (0.17)**
Continued
Variation in the overall impact of the lone parent pilots on potentially  
eligible lone parents 
95
Table 6.6 Continued
Months after became potentially 
eligible for IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Impact in ppts 
(Standard errors given in parentheses)
24
Base impact 0.5 1.6 1.2
(0.269)* (0.223)*** (0.210)***
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
2.5 2.7 4.6
(1.059)** (0.724)*** (0.781)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
No No Yes
Average impact 1.2 1.3 2.0
(0.26)*** (0.18)*** (0.21)***
30
Base impact 1.3 2.4
(0.287)*** (0.237)***
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
2.4 3.4
(1.122)* (0.757)***
Impact significantly different 
from base?
No No
Average impact 1.8 1.8
(0.27)*** (0.19)***
36
Base impact 1.5
(0.297)***
Impact for previous NDLP 
participation
2.8
(1.144)**
Impact significantly different 
from base?
No
Average impact 2.1
(0.28)***
Notes: Based on various OLS regressions on the flow sample (see Appendix B). Sample sizes 
given in Appendix H.
Base impact refers to impact of LPPs in areas not operating ESQWFIs or ND+fLP, for lone parents 
not subject to ESQWFIs and not previously on NDLP. Average impact at each date is taken from 
Table 5.1.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * = significant at 10 per cent level; ** = significant at  
5 per cent level; *** = significant at 1 per cent level.
‘Impact significantly different from base?’ is a test that the estimated impact for NDLP 
participants is significantly different from the base impact.
Results are presented in percentage points, so an estimate of –0.1 means –0.1 ppts, not –10 ppts.
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What this means, as in the flow sample, is that after the introduction of the pilots, 
the outcomes of lone parents in pilot districts who had previously been on NDLP 
improved significantly more than the outcomes of lone parents in comparison 
districts who had previously been on NDLP. However, unlike in the flow sample, 
this relative improvement is usually statistically different from the improvement 
made by lone parents who had not previously been on NDLP.
The finding that the impact of the LPPs is stronger for NDLP participants than for 
non-NDLP participants was also found in RR 415 (for Phase 3 districts), and it has 
at least four possible causes and interpretations:
• The difference may be driven by an ‘information effect’: lone parents who had 
previously been on NDLP would have had more contact with their Personal 
Adviser, and thus may have been more likely to find out about IWC; they might 
then have been more likely to respond to IWC.
• There may be a ‘selection effect’: since NDLP is a voluntary programme, it is 
highly likely that those who chose to sign up are lone parents with a greater 
underlying propensity to work, and this may also mean that they are more 
responsive to financial incentives to work, such as those offered by IWC.7
• There may be some sort of beneficial interaction between the two policies: that 
the advice and support provided by NDLP becomes much more effective when 
combined with the incentive of IWC. 
• Finally, between April 2004 and October 2004 in the Phase 1 districts, it was a 
requirement for lone parents who wanted to receive IWC to have been on NDLP 
when they left IS.
It is not possible for research based on secondary data analysis to differentiate 
between these possible explanations.
6.3 Summary: variation in the overall impact of the LPPs  
 on potentially eligible lone parents
This chapter has extended the analysis in previous chapters, based on DiD, to look 
at the overall impact of the LPPs in more detail. It split the overall impact across 
all potentially eligible lone parents in all pilot districts into impacts on: (i) lone 
parents in pilot districts that operated ESQWFIs and who had to attend them; 
(ii) lone parents in pilot districts that operated ND+fLP; (iii) lone parents who had 
previously been on NDLP or ND+fLP; and (iv) all other lone parents.
7 In technical terms, note that this would have to be ‘selection on unobservables’, 
whereby some innate characteristics of lone parents (that are invisible to 
researchers) influence the lone parents’ decision to participate in NDLP, their 
decision to take up IWC and their potential labour market outcomes.
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For the flow sample, all phases were considered together. The chapter found that: 
• the estimated impacts for potentially eligible lone parents who were subject to 
ESQWFIs are imprecise and statistically insignificant, because few lone parents 
had to attend ESQWFIs. The imprecision means that it is not possible to make 
robust statements about the additional impact of ESQWFIs;
• the estimated impacts in pilot areas that operated ND+fLP are statistically 
significant. However, they are very similar to (and not statistically different from) 
the estimated impacts in non-ND+fLP areas;
• potentially eligible lone parents who had previously been on NDLP appear to have 
been more responsive to the LPPs than those who had not, but this difference 
is rarely statistically significant and only apparent for short- and medium-term 
outcomes. Longer-term impacts are erratic and imprecise as the sample sizes 
diminish.
For the stock sample, impacts are reported separately by phase. The chapter 
found that:
• there is no uniform finding for the impact of the LPPs in areas that operated 
ESQWFIs on lone parents who would have been subject to them. In Phase 1, 
only for benefit outcomes does the estimated impact appear to be significantly 
higher. There is some evidence that the impact was higher in Phase 2 areas 
where lone parents were subject to ESQWFIs, but only for short-term outcomes 
as the impacts tend to fall thereafter;
• the estimated impact of the LPPs was generally lower in areas that operated 
ND+fLP than in areas that did not, and this difference is usually statistically 
significant. While this is odd, it may reflect a failure of the ‘common trends’ 
assumption;
• finally, there is evidence across all phases in the stock sample that the impact on 
the benefit outcomes of lone parents who had previously been on NDLP is both 
positive and larger than the impact on lone parents who had not previously 
been on NDLP. For work outcomes, the NDLP impacts are larger than the base 
impacts, but fewer of these differences are statistically significant (the differences 
are generally not significant in Phases 1 and 2 and generally, are significant in 
Phases 3 and 4).
There are several possible explanations for the finding that the impact of IWC is 
greater amongst NDLP participants and it is not possible to distinguish between 
them with the data available. First, the difference might be because lone parents 
on NDLP were more likely to hear about IWC. Second, it could be that, since NDLP 
is a voluntary programme, those who sign up are lone parents with a greater 
underlying propensity to work and have a greater responsiveness to financial 
incentives to work. Third, there may be some sort of beneficial interaction between 
the two policies. Finally, between April 2004 and October 2004 in the Phase 1 
districts, it was a requirement for lone parents who wanted to receive IWC to have 
been on NDLP when they left IS. 
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The analysis in this chapter provides no robust evidence that the additional 
combinations of policies analysed here made the overall package of LPPs more 
effective at getting lone parents off benefit and into work, compared with IWC 
alone. This is especially true for the flow sample, which is more interesting for 
long-run analysis.
The estimates in this chapter are generally consistent with the comparable findings 
in RR 415. 
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7 Why is the estimated  
 impact of the lone parent  
 pilots higher than in  
 previous work?
Chapters 4 and 5 presented estimates of the impact of the lone parent pilots 
(LPPs) on the whole population of potentially eligible lone parents and Chapter 6 
presented estimates of the impact of the LPPs which were allowed to vary across 
lone parents. Similar estimates were presented in Research Report 415 (RR 415). 
There are several reasons why the current estimates differ from those in RR 415:
• This report uses more data and more recent data. The fact that more data is used 
makes it easier to detect impacts reliably in the flow sample. The fact that more 
recent data is used is relevant because the impact on the stock sample seems 
to have grown over time, and because there is evidence that the impact of the 
LPPs on later cohorts of potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample may 
be greater than that on the earlier cohorts. 
• The method of determining when a lone parent is off benefit has been improved. 
In RR 415, a lone parent was deemed to be ‘on benefit’ on a certain day if they 
had a live claim of a key Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) benefit or 
were on a DWP programme. However, the end dates of programmes recorded 
in the National Benefits Database (NBD) is not felt to be reliable (specifically, 
lone parents can often seem to be on New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) long 
after their Income Support (IS) claim has ended), and so the definition of ‘on 
benefit’ used in this report only looks at whether a lone parent is receiving a key 
DWP benefit. The impact of this change has been to increase the proportion of 
lone parents recorded as off benefit.
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• The work measure has been refined in this report. The work outcomes are based 
on employment spells in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS), the 
start and end dates of which are not deemed to be very reliable. For this report, 
there was an extra data-cleaning stage wherein the employment spells for a 
lone parent were ended at the date on which they started a new spell of IS in 
the NBD dataset (see Appendix C). 
• The sample of lone parents used before the LPPs began has been extended back 
to cover all those whose claims exceeded 12 months’ duration on or after April 
2001; this is likely to have more of an effect on the estimated impacts for the 
stock than the flow.
• The estimate of the number of In-Work Credit (IWC) recipients provided to us is 
lower than it was for the 12-month report (the impact of this has been to lower 
implied participation rates and deadweight estimates; it has no impact on the 
estimated impact of the LPPs on the proportion of lone parents off benefit or 
in work).
• This report uses data for Phase 4 districts, which were not included in RR 415; 
while this does not affect the estimated impacts for Phases 1, 2 and 3, it will 
have some effect on the overall impacts across all phases. Furthermore, this 
report has also used data on lone parents in the Welsh and Scottish Jobcentre 
Plus districts in Phase 2; this change potentially affects the estimated impacts for 
Phase 2 and the overall estimated impacts.
• The empirical methodology for estimating the impacts on the flow sample has 
been refined in the following ways:
– Correctly allowing for the LPP start dates to vary by phase. In RR 415, the flow-
sample analysis used only one start date for the pilots: the date on which the 
LPPs were introduced in Phase 1. This was clearly the incorrect start date for 
Phases 2 and 3 (Phase 4 was not analysed); as a result, lone parents in these 
districts would have been falsely classified as exposed to the LPPs if their IS 
claim had reached 12 months between April 2004 and the date on which 
the LPPs were actually introduced in their Jobcentre Plus district. This report 
allows each phase to have its own (correct) start date, so that there is no such 
misclassification. This change affects the overall results and the phase-specific 
results for all phases including Phase 1 (as the impacts for all the phases are 
estimated jointly in the same model).
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– Including lone parents who were previously in the stock sample. The flow 
sample contains all lone parents who became potentially eligible for IWC at 
some point after the LPPs had been introduced in their Jobcentre Plus district. 
In addition, and in contrast to RR 415, it now contains all lone parents for 
whom the LPPs were not in operation when they first became potentially 
eligible, but were in operation on the date that their labour outcomes were 
measured. In RR 415, these lone parents only featured in the stock sample 
(thus there was a ‘window’ in the flow sample between lone parents who 
became potentially eligible before the LPPs were in operation and those who 
became eligible after they were in operation). This change has served to 
increase the size of the flow sample, making statistically significant impacts 
easier to detect. 
– Allowing for various trends. All of the difference-in-differences (DiD) analyses 
presented in this report rely on the premise that the underlying trend in 
labour market outcomes is the same in the pilot and comparison areas (after 
controlling for background characteristics). In RR 415, there was no allowance 
for a trend in outcomes at all; in this report, various trend specifications, 
both common and differential, have been employed before settling on the 
preferred specification. This has the potential to change the estimated impacts 
and their precision.
For reference, Tables 7.1 to 7.4 compare the impacts estimated in this report with 
the equivalent estimates from RR 415.
Table 7.1 Estimated impact of the LPPs on percentage off benefit  
 for potentially eligible lone parents in the stock sample
Months since 
potentially eligible 
for IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
RR 415 New 
estimates
RR 415 New 
estimates
RR 415 New 
estimates
6 –0.0 –0.2 –0.0 0.3 0.7 0.0
(0.19) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14)** (0.15)*** (0.16)
12 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.2 0.6
(0.25)** (0.26) (0.19) (0.17)*** (0.20)*** (0.21)***
18 0.7 0.2
(0.28)*** (0.28)
24 1.2 0.9
(0.30)*** (0.30)***
Notes: Based on estimates in Table 5.1 of this report and in Table 5.1 of RR 415. Estimated 
impacts reported in percentage points; standard errors shown in parentheses.
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Table 7.2 Estimated impact of the LPPs on percentage off benefit  
 for potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample
Months since potentially 
eligible for IWC
All phases Phase 1
RR 415 New estimates RR 415 New estimates
3 –0.2 0.5 –0.7 –0.2
(0.19) (0.112)*** (0.30)** (0.216)
6 0.1 1.0 –0.3 0.3
(0.25) (0.154)*** (0.40) (0.293)
9 0.3 1.3 –0.4 0.4
(0.32) (0.187)*** (0.50) (0.346)
12 0.2 1.6 –0.4 0.8
(0.41) (0.220)*** (0.59) (0.390)**
Months since potentially 
eligible for IWC
Phase 2 Phase 3
RR 415 New estimates RR 415 New estimates
3 0.2 0.8 –0.4 0.2
(0.24) (0.164)*** (0.34) (0.188)
6 0.5 1.5 –0.5 0.7
(0.31) (0.220)*** (0.44) (0.263)***
9 0.8 1.8 –0.4 1.1
(0.40)** (0.261)*** (0.66) (0.322)***
12 0.7 2.0 –1.6 1.2
(0.51) (0.298)*** (2.56) (0.382)***
Notes: Based on estimates in Tables 4.1 and J.1 of this report and in Table 5.3 of RR 415. 
Estimated impacts reported in percentage points; standard errors shown in parentheses.
Table 7.3 Estimated impact of the LPPs on percentage in work for  
 potentially eligible lone parents in the stock sample
Months since 
potentially eligible 
for IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
RR 415 New 
estimates
RR 415 New 
estimates
RR 415 New 
estimates
6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.1 0.8
(0.20) (0.20) (0.14)** (0.14)*** (0.15)*** (0.16)***
12 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.8
(0.23) (0.23)*** (0.17)*** (0.16)***
18 0.9 0.9
(0.26)*** (0.24)***
Notes: Based on estimates in Table 5.1 of this report and in Table 5.2 of RR 415. Estimated 
impacts reported in percentage points, standard errors shown in parentheses.
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Table 7.4 Estimated impact of the LPPs on percentage in work for  
 potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample
Months since potentially 
eligible for IWC
All phases Phase 1
RR 415 New estimates RR 415 New estimates
3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
(0.20) (0.129)** (0.30) (0.263)
6 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.6
(0.29)** (0.151)*** (0.40) (0.300)*
9 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.1
(0.41)* (0.174)*** (0.51) (0.334)***
12 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.4
(0.64) (0.199)*** (0.64) (0.363)***
Months since potentially 
eligible for IWC
Phase 2 Phase 3
RR 415 New estimates RR 415 New estimates
3 0.3 0.5 –0.1 0.8
(0.25) (0.188)** (0.43) (0.232)***
6 0.8 0.8 –2.1 1.0
(0.36)** (0.217)*** (1.90) (0.267)***
9 0.6 0.8
(0.61) (0.243)***
Notes: Based on estimates in Tables 4.1 and J.1 of this report and in Table 5.4 of RR 415. 
Estimated impacts reported in percentage points; standard errors shown in parentheses.
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8 The impact of the lone  
 parent pilots on job  
 retention
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examined the overall impact of the lone parent pilots (LPPs) 
on potentially eligible lone parents and showed that the LPPs did lead to fewer 
lone parents receiving out-of-work benefits and more lone parents being in 
work. These impacts could arise both because the LPPs encouraged more lone 
parents to leave benefit (or encouraged lone parents to leave benefit sooner than 
they otherwise would) and because the LPPs (particularly In-Work Credit (IWC)) 
encouraged those lone parents who left benefit for work to stay in work and off 
benefit for longer. 
This chapter attempts to isolate the second of these impacts by estimating the 
impact of the LPPs on encouraging those lone parents who left benefit for work 
to stay in work and off benefit for longer (hereafter abbreviated to ‘encouraging 
job retention’, although the analysis in Section 8.2 looks only at the impact of the 
LPPs on keeping people off benefit). 
This is done in two ways:
• the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator can be applied to the sample of 
potentially eligible lone parents who left benefit for work. Because this sample 
have already left benefit, any impact detected by this method must be due to 
the impact of the LPPs on encouraging job retention;
• the duration model can provide an exact breakdown of the overall impact of 
the LPPs into the two effects described above; it can do this because it models 
lone parents’ transitions onto and off benefit, and how these depend on their 
characteristics and potential eligibility for, or receipt of, IWC.
There are statistical advantages and disadvantages to both methods and each 
method will produce robust estimates of the true impact only under a particular 
set of conditions, as discussed in Appendices E and F. 
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8.1 DiD estimates: impact of the LPPs on job retention 
This section uses a DiD model to estimate the impact of the LPPs on job retention.
It is not possible to use the DiD framework to estimate the impact of the LPPs on 
IWC recipients directly, because one needs to be able to identify otherwise-identical 
individuals in the pilot districts before the LPPs started and otherwise-identical 
individuals in the comparison districts, and one can never know which individuals 
in the comparison districts would have claimed IWC had it been available. 
Instead, then, this section reports estimates of the impact of the LPPs on those 
lone parents who are observed (in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
(WPLS)) to start work within a month of leaving Income Support (IS) and who were 
potentially eligible for IWC when they left IS. The idea is that such lone parents in 
the pilot districts should provide a good proxy for IWC recipients and this section 
hereafter refers to this group as ‘IWC recipients’ (see Box 8.1 for more discussion). 
Box 8.1: Constructing the samples for the DiD estimates of the 
impact of the LPPs on job retention
The sample used in this section comprises all potentially eligible lone parents 
who left IS and started work within a month of this date, according to  
the WPLS. 
The intention was to create a sample of IS claims that ended and that would 
have been directly eligible for IWC if it had been in existence in all districts 
since April 2001. See Appendix B for full details, Appendix H for sample sizes 
and mean outcomes in this sample and Appendix D for summary statistics.
Seventy per cent of potentially eligible lone parents who leave IS for work in 
the pilot districts do indeed receive IWC (and 70 per cent of IWC recipients are 
observed to leave IS for work in the WPLS); slightly more potentially eligible 
lone parents who leave IS for work are recorded as being IWC recipients in 
Phases 2 and 4 (71 per cent and 73 per cent respectively) and slightly fewer 
in Phases 1 and 3 (66 per cent and 67 per cent respectively). These figures 
could be below 100 per cent for a number of reasons. For example, some 
lone parents who are recorded as being in work according to the WPLS may 
actually be working fewer than 16 hours per week, making them ineligible 
for IWC, or there may have been a delay in the recording of some IWC spells, 
such that genuine IWC recipients do not appear to have a claim starting 
within the correct period of time. On the other hand, some IWC recipients 
may be earning less than the tax threshold and therefore, not appear in  
the WPLS.
 
As well as hoping that lone parents in pilot districts who start work within a month 
of leaving IS are a good proxy for IWC recipients, it is also hoped that equivalent 
lone parents in non-pilot districts are a suitable comparison group. However, as 
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Appendix E discusses, if the LPPs do encourage more lone parents off benefit 
and into work, it is likely that those lone parents who do leave benefit for work 
in the pilot districts are likely to have different characteristics, on average, from 
the characteristics of lone parents who leave benefit for work in the comparison 
districts. If these differences affect the likelihood that they stay in work, and if 
they cannot be controlled for in the regressions, then the estimates of the impact 
of the LPPs on retention reported in this chapter may be too small (i.e. biased 
downwards).
Table 8.1 presents the headline impact estimates of the LPPs (in percentage-point 
terms) on benefit and work outcomes for the sample of IWC recipients at three-
month intervals after the potentially eligible lone parents left IS for work. Like the 
estimates in Section 4.1, this analysis estimates a single treatment effect across 
all phases. 
The additional impacts (but not the additionality rates) are generally larger than the 
estimates reported in Section 4.1 and are almost always significantly different from 
zero. Three months after leaving IS for work, IWC recipients are 1.3 percentage 
points (ppts) more likely than potentially eligible lone parents in the comparison 
districts who left IS for work to remain off benefit and in work; this is a difference 
of 1.6 per cent. The size of the impact generally increases over time, reaching 
a peak 15 months after leaving IS for work, at which point IWC recipients are 
2.6 ppts more likely to be off benefit and 2.4 ppts more likely to be in work than 
potentially eligible lone parents who left IS for work in the comparison districts. 
The implied additionality rates are also shown in Table 8.1.
It is important to note, as was the case in Section 4.1, that the estimate of the 
impact of the LPPs at each point in time is based on a different sample of lone 
parents because later cohorts of lone parents appear in our data for shorter 
durations. This also means that the contribution of particular phases to the average 
impact alters as the time since becoming potentially eligible increases. Appendix J, 
therefore, presents estimates of the impact of the LPPs on job retention separately 
for each phase.
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It is possible to recalculate the estimates shown in Table 8.1 so that they are 
relative to the date on which the lone parent first became potentially eligible for 
IWC, rather than to the date on which the lone parent left IS. Even so, comparing 
the estimates in Table 8.1 – which shows the impact of the LPPs on job retention 
– with those in Section 4.1 – which shows the overall impact of the LPPs – 
is difficult, as the samples used are very different. Table 8.2, nonetheless, expresses 
the estimated impact of the LPPs on job retention as a fraction of the overall 
estimated impact of the LPPs (i.e. both on initial movements off benefit and/or 
into work and on retention) reported in Section 4.1.8 It suggests that, particularly 
during the first few months after a lone parent first became potentially eligible for 
IWC, the impact of the LPPs was skewed more towards encouraging potentially 
eligible lone parents off benefit and into work than it was towards encouraging 
those who leave IS and enter work to remain in work. For example, for benefit 
outcomes after 12 months’ exposure to the LPPs, between 11 and 26 per cent of 
the impact of the LPPs appears to be on retention. However, there also seems to 
be a great deal of variability in this proportion over time, which might indicate that 
the comparison is not appropriate. 
Table 8.2 Estimated impact of the LPPs on job retention as  
 percentage of the estimated overall impact of the LPPs  
 on all potentially eligible lone parents, by phase
Months 
since left 
IS
Benefit outcomes Work outcomes
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
6 18 13 10 4 4 23 10 25
12 24 22 26 11 N/A 54 217 183
18 25 42 61 1 138 56
24 31 63 35 198
Notes: Based on estimates reported in Tables J.1 and J.4. N/A means that one of the estimated 
impacts was negative. 
8.2 Duration model estimates: impact of the LPPs on  
 keeping lone parents off IS
Sections 4.3 and 5.2 reported simulations of the overall additional impact of the 
LPPs on all potentially eligible lone parents based on the duration model set out in 
Appendix F. But the duration model allows the overall additional impact of the LPPs 
8 This intermediate calculation is available on request. Because the samples 
used to calculate these two sets of estimates were chosen in different ways, 
and because the estimates were calculated independently, the two sets of 
estimates are not guaranteed to be consistent with each other and this is 
why some numbers exceed 100 per cent (which would mean that the impact 
of the LPPs on retention exceeds its overall impact).
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to be separated into the impact of the LPPs on encouraging more lone parents to 
leave benefit and the impact of the LPPs (particularly IWC) on encouraging those 
lone parents who left benefit for work to stay in work and off benefit for longer. 
This can be done by performing two simulations: one where it is assumed that 
the LPPs affect only transitions off benefit and one where it is assumed that the 
LPPs affect only subsequent transitions back on to benefit (i.e. where the LPPs only 
have a ‘retention’ effect). 
Figure 8.1 presents the results of these two simulations, which have been 
performed only on IWC recipients (note that summing the two parts of our 
decomposition gives a total impact which is very slightly different from that shown 
in Appendix F). The dark grey area shows the additional impact of the LPPs on 
IWC recipients that is due to the LPPs encouraging more lone parents to leave 
IS for work; the light grey area shows the additional impact of the LPPs on IWC 
recipients that is due to any retention effects. 
Figure 8.1 Decomposing the additional impact of the LPPs on IWC  
 recipients
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In month 0, the simulations suggest that just over 40 per cent of IWC recipients 
would have left IS for work at that time, and none of this (by definition) can be 
due to a retention effect: it is all due to the LPPs encouraging more lone parents 
to leave IS for work. Over time, the retention effect grows, but it remains small: 
the simulations suggest that the retention effect of the LPPs leads to 2.6 per 
cent of IWC recipients remaining off IS 12 months after they first left benefit for 
work (and claimed IWC). This is close to the equivalent estimates in Section 8.1 
produced using the DiD model, of 2.2 per cent for benefit outcomes (and 1.8 per 
cent for work outcomes). But these numbers are much smaller than the impact 
of the LPPs that is attributed to the LPPs encouraging more lone parents to leave 
IS for work. Out of the total estimated impact of the LPPs on IWC recipients, only 
9 per cent of the overall impact of the LPPs on IWC recipients 12 months after they 
first received IWC can be attributed to a retention effect. Note that the estimated 
coefficients of the model imply that IWC had a statistically significant impact on 
encouraging lone parents to leave IS and to remain off benefit but it has not been 
possible to estimate standard errors for the simulations reported in Figure 8.1.
Note that the simulations also suggest that the LPPs are having an effect on 
(former) recipients even after IWC recipients have exhausted the 12-month 
payment period: although there is a decline over time in the estimated impact of 
the LPPs on recipients, there is no discernible fall after 12 months. Clearly, though, 
the data does not yet tell us for how long the overall effect lasts.9
8.3 Conclusions
This chapter has presented the estimated impact of the LPPs (but particularly IWC) 
on job retention, i.e. on encouraging those lone parents who left benefit for work 
to stay in work and off benefit for longer. 
By combining the results from Sections 8.1 and 8.2, it can be seen that the main 
impact of the LPPs is to induce more people to leave IS (or to leave IS earlier than 
they would have done otherwise; it is not possible to tell which, given our data) 
and that their impact on job retention (or the time spent off benefit) is small (but 
statistically significant). Simulations based on the duration model suggest that 
only 9 per cent of the overall impact of the LPPs on IWC recipients is through a 
retention effect; calculations based on the DiD estimates imply a higher (although 
highly variable) proportion.
9 Card and Hyslop (2005, 2006) examine whether the impact of the 
Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) in Canada declines after it stops being paid 
to recipients.  For some groups, they find the additional impact of SSP 
dissipates quickly after SSP payments stop (Card and Hyslop, 2005); but 
for other groups, they find the additional impact persists (Card and Hyslop, 
2006); the two groups roughly correspond to the stock and flow samples 
examined in this report.
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However, this result should be seen alongside the analysis in Chapter 3, which 
examined what happened to IWC recipients when their IWC claim ended. That 
showed that, for the majority (around seven in ten) of IWC recipients who claimed 
IWC for the full 12 months, job retention remained very high even after IWC 
payments had finished. Combining these two findings about job retention suggests 
that job retention is high amongst the majority of IWC recipients, although little 
of this is attributable to IWC.
A technical conclusion is that estimates of the effect of the LPPs on job retention 
based on the two methods are comparable in magnitude, although those derived 
from the duration model are slightly larger.
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9 Impact of the lone parent  
 pilots on IWC recipients,  
 the headcount impact  
 of the LPPs, and estimates 
 of deadweight
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 reported estimates of the impact of the lone parent pilots 
(LPPs) on all potentially eligible lone parents (or, in Chapter 8, all lone parents who 
left benefit to start work). This chapter presents some related estimates:
• Section 9.1 reports simulations, based on the duration model, about the impact 
of the LPPs on In-Work Credit (IWC) recipients and how this changes over time. 
• Section 9.2 presents estimates, based on the difference-in-differences (DiD) 
analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5, of the additional number of lone parents 
in work or not on benefit as a result of the LPPs (this is known as the headcount 
impact of the LPPs). 
Both of these analyses allow one to estimate simple measures of the ‘deadweight’ 
of the LPPs, although the methods are different. Box 9.1 discusses deadweight in 
more detail. Section 9.3 concludes.
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Box 9.1: Calculating and interpreting deadweight
The deadweight of a policy measures how poorly targeted or wasteful it is, 
although a finding of a high deadweight does not necessarily mean that a 
policy was a failure: only a full assessment of the costs and benefits of a policy 
can inform such a decision. 
This chapter uses a definition of deadweight that measures what fraction of 
the recipients or beneficiaries of a policy have not changed their behaviour 
because of the policy: in other words, it is equal to 1 minus the additional 
impact of the policy amongst its recipients, or:
.100
IWC received have  whopeople ofNumber 
LPPs  theofresult  a asin work or benefit  off people additional ofNumber 
1 ×



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−
Note that this will understate the true deadweight of IWC if the other policies 
that make up the LPPs were responsible for a significant part of the overall 
impact of the LPPs. 
It should be noted that estimates of deadweight are often high for in-
work financial incentive programmes such as IWC. For example, estimates 
presented in Brewer et	al. (2006) imply that there was a deadweight rate of 
74 per cent for the replacement of Family Credit with Working Families’ Tax 
Credit (WFTC) and a rate of 71 per cent for WFTC overall.10 Amongst other 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) programmes for lone parents, 
Dolton et	al. (2006) estimated that the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) led 
to its participants being 14.24 percentage points (ppts) less likely to be on 
benefit, and this means that its deadweight was 85.76 per cent (in the case 
of NDLP, the deadweight arises because some NDLP participants do not leave 
Income Support (IS) and because some of those who do leave IS would have 
done so anyway without NDLP). 
9.1 The impact of the LPPs on IWC recipients
Sections 4.3 and 5.2 presented simulations, based on the duration model, of the 
impact of the LPPs on all potentially eligible lone parents in the flow and stock 
samples respectively. This section presents a simulation of the impact of the LPPs 
on IWC recipients, similar to that in Section 8.2. That calculation can also be used 
to provide a measure of deadweight. 
10 These are based on the estimates in Brewer et	al. (2006) that the replacement 
of Family Credit by WFTC led to a rise in the lone parent employment rate 
of 5 per cent and that abolishing WFTC would reduce the lone parent 
employment rate by 11 per cent. Calculation of deadweight based on the 
following numbers: 407,000 lone parents in Great Britain were receiving 
Family Credit in August 1999, 698,000 lone parents in Great Britain were 
receiving WFTC in August 2002 and there were 1.85 million lone parents in 
Great Britain in 2002 – see Inland Revenue (2003). 
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Figure 9.1 shows the proportion of IWC recipients who are not receiving an 
out-of-work benefit over time relative to the month in which they first received 
IWC. By definition, none of these lone parents is receiving an out-of-work benefit 
at the time they first receive IWC (the figure does not show the small overlaps 
in receiving IS and receiving IWC that are present for some lone parents in the 
administrative data). The figure also shows the estimated additional impact of the 
LPPs on IWC recipients, which is calculated by comparing the actual outcomes of 
IWC recipients with their simulated behaviour in the absence of the LPPs (note 
that this impact is identical to the sum of the two impacts shown in Figure 8.1). 
This shows that just over 40 per cent of lone parents in the sample who left IS 
for IWC would not have left IS at that point in time if the LPPs had not been 
available. However, the additional impact of the LPPs on the proportion of IWC 
recipients who are not receiving an out-of-work benefit declines over time to 
reach 28 per cent after 12 months and 19 per cent after two years. Over the 24 
months after first receiving IWC, the average impact is 29 per cent. 
Figure 9.1 Simulated impact of the LPPs for IWC recipients, and  
 deadweight 
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There are three reasons for this decline over time:
• some of the 40 per cent of IWC recipients who are estimated to have been 
induced to leave IS by the LPPs would have left IS anyway in the absence of the 
LPPs but at a later date;
• some lone parents who leave IS for IWC do return to IS. This clearly reduces the 
impact of the LPPs on the proportion of IWC recipients off benefit; 
• more subtly, the additional lone parents who are induced to leave IS by the 
LPPs return to IS slightly more quickly than those who would have left anyway: 
28 per cent of lone parents who are induced to leave benefit by the existence of 
the LPPs return to benefit before the end of the 12 months of IWC, compared 
with 26 per cent of those who would have left IS in any event (it is not possible to 
tell whether these numbers are statistically significantly different from each other). 
Note that this analysis is measuring the impact of the LPPs on IWC recipients 
relative to the time that they first received IWC. This is different from the main 
DiD analysis in Sections 4.1 and 5.1, which measured time relative to when a 
lone parent first became potentially eligible for IWC. This helps explain why this 
analysis shows the impact declining over time and Section 4.1 found the impact 
of the LPPs rising over time: these two findings are for different groups of lone 
parents and are measuring ‘time’ in different ways.
As Box 9.1 explains, if deadweight is understood to measure the extent to which a 
programme fails to alter the behaviour of its recipients or beneficiaries, then this is 
defined as 1 minus the impact amongst its recipients or beneficiaries. Accordingly, 
the estimated deadweight at the moment that lone parents claim IWC is 60 
per cent. 
However, the estimate of deadweight rises over time, just as the estimated impact 
of IWC on its recipients falls over time. After 12 months, 19 per cent of the 
IWC recipients (some of whom are, by this stage, no longer receiving IWC) have 
returned to IS, and 54 per cent are not receiving IS but would have been not 
receiving IS anyway in the absence of the LPPs, with the remaining 28 per cent 
representing the additional impact of the LPPs (because they are not receiving IS 
but would have been receiving IS in the absence of the LPPs). This suggests two 
ways of calculating deadweight:
• amongst those still receiving IWC after 12 months, the estimated deadweight 
is 66 per cent (54 per cent divided by 81 per cent, although the numbers in the 
text use the unrounded estimates);
• if one also includes the former IWC recipients in the calculation of deadweight, 
then the deadweight after 12 months is 73 per cent: this is the sum of the 
19 per cent who have returned to IS 12 months after starting an IWC claim and 
the 54 per cent who are not receiving IS but would have left IS anyway in the 
absence of the LPPs. However, this is a slightly odd definition of deadweight, as 
some of the individuals under consideration are no longer receiving IWC. 
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After 24 months, it is not possible to calculate deadweight amongst IWC recipients, 
as none of this group is receiving IWC at this stage. But deadweight calculated 
amongst the initial sample of IWC recipients has risen to 81 per cent (consisting 
of 34 per cent who are back on IS and 47 per cent who are not receiving IS but 
would have left IS anyway in the absence of the LPPs).
9.2 The headcount impact of the LPPs 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 take the estimated impact of the LPPs on potentially eligible 
lone parents in the flow sample by phase, based on the DiD analysis in Chapters 4 
and 5, and gross it up to estimate the number of additional lone parents who are 
off benefit or in work at various points in time as a result of the LPPs. Tables 9.3 
and 9.4 show the same calculation for the stock sample, while Table 9.5 grosses 
up the estimated impact of the LPPs on potentially eligible lone parents who left 
IS for work in order to estimate the number of IS leavers who remain off benefit 
or in work as a result of receiving IWC.
Table 9.1 Headcount impact of the LPPs and estimated  
 deadweight on benefit outcomes amongst potentially  
 eligible lone parents in the flow sample, by phase 
Months since 
potentially 
eligible for 
IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2
Headcount 
numbers 
off benefit
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(benefit 
outcomes)
Headcount 
numbers 
off benefit
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(benefit 
outcomes)
6 71 1,020 93% 571 2,658 78%
12 162 1,164 86% 608 2,780 78%
18 248 1,102 77% 378 2,194 83%
24 233 827 72% 238 1,123 79%
30 98 485 80%
Months since 
potentially 
eligible for 
IWC
Phase 3 Phase 4
Headcount 
numbers 
off benefit
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(benefit 
outcomes)
Headcount 
numbers 
off benefit
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(benefit 
outcomes)
6 145 771 81% 245 1,509 84%
12 164 775 79% 196 1,062 82%
18 121 554 78%
Notes: Based on estimated impacts in Table 4.1, sample sizes in Appendix H and estimated 
number of IWC recipients from DWP administrative data. 
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Table 9.2 Headcount impact of the LPPs and estimated  
 deadweight on work outcomes amongst potentially  
 eligible lone parents in the flow sample, by phase
Months since 
potentially 
eligible for 
IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2
Headcount 
numbers in 
work
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(work 
outcomes)
Headcount 
numbers 
in work
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(work 
outcomes)
6 69 1,020 93% 293 2,658 89%
12 208 1,164 82% 217 2,780 92%
18 140 1,102 87% 99 2,194 95%
24 48 827 94% 63 1,123 94%
30 –95 485 N/A
Months since 
potentially 
eligible for 
IWC
Phase 3 Phase 4
Headcount 
numbers in 
work
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(work 
outcomes)
Headcount 
numbers 
in work
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(work 
outcomes)
6 178 771 77% 102 1,509 93%
12 193 775 75% 30 1,062 97%
18 126 554 77%
Notes: Based on estimated impacts in Table 4.1, sample sizes in Appendix H and estimated 
number of IWC recipients from DWP administrative data. 
Table 9.3 Headcount impact of the LPPs and estimated  
 deadweight on benefit outcomes amongst potentially  
 eligible lone parents in the stock sample, by phase 
Months since 
potentially 
eligible for 
IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2
Headcount 
numbers 
off benefit
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(benefit 
outcomes)
Headcount 
numbers 
off benefit
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(benefit 
outcomes)
6 –82 545 N/A 287 2,010 86%
12 60 1,242 95% 669 4,466 85%
18 95 1,927 95% 1,013 6,788 85%
24 385 2,647 85% 1,396 8,747 84%
30 441 3,191 86% 1,578 10,240 85%
36 596 3,666 84%
Months since 
potentially 
eligible for 
IWC
Phase 3 Phase 4
Headcount 
numbers 
off benefit
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(benefit 
outcomes)
Headcount 
numbers 
off benefit
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(benefit 
outcomes)
6 29 1,115 97% 260 3,167 92%
12 437 2,361 81% 280 6,779 96%
18 715 3,536 80% 529 9,222 94%
24 1,568 4,596 66%
Note: Based on estimated impacts in Table 5.1, sample sizes in Appendix H and estimated 
number of IWC recipients from DWP administrative data.
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Table 9.4 Headcount impact of the LPPs and estimated  
 deadweight on work outcomes amongst potentially  
 eligible lone parents in the stock sample, by phase 
Months since 
potentially 
eligible for 
IWC
Phase 1 Phase 2
Headcount 
numbers in 
work
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(work 
outcomes)
Headcount 
numbers 
in work
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(work 
outcomes)
6 112 545 79% 497 2,010 75%
12 264 1,242 79% 736 4,466 84%
18 393 1,927 80% 994 6,788 85%
24 527 2,647 80% 1,195 8,747 86%
30 786 3,191 75% 1,731 10,240 83%
36 920 3,666 75%
Months since 
potentially 
eligible for 
IWC
Phase 3 Phase 4
Headcount 
numbers in 
work
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(work 
outcomes)
Headcount 
numbers 
in work
IWC 
recipients 
to date
Deadweight 
(work 
outcomes)
6 540 1,115 52% –300 3,167 N/A
12 1,108 2,361 53% –250 6,779 N/A
18 1,626 3,536 54% 360 9,222 96%
24 1,480 4,596 68%
Note: Based on estimated impacts in Table 5.1, sample sizes in Appendix H and estimated 
number of IWC recipients from DWP administrative data.
Table 9.5 Headcount impact of the LPPs on lone parents who left  
 IS for work amongst potentially eligible lone parents in  
 the flow and stock sample: benefit and work outcomes
Months 
since left 
IS
Benefit outcomes Work outcomes
Headcount 
numbers off 
benefit
IWC recipients to 
date
Headcount 
numbers in work
IWC recipients to 
date
3 317 4,637 305 4,637
6 350 5,958 356 5,958
9 368 6,175 240 6,175
12 313 5,781 258 5,781
15 291 4,697 272 4,697
18 205 3,850 107 3,850
21 126 2,900 74 2,900
24 82 1,950 100 1,950
Note: Based on estimated impacts in Table 8.1 and estimated number of IWC recipients from 
DWP administrative data. It is not sensible to calculate deadweight for this table.
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Tables 9.1 to 9.4 also compare the estimated number of additional lone parents 
off benefit or in work as a result of the LPPs with estimates of the number of 
individuals in each phase of the same sample who have ever received IWC, to 
produce a crude measure of deadweight (see Box 9.1). These suggest the following:
• for benefit outcomes amongst the flow sample, 12 months after first becoming 
potentially eligible for IWC, deadweight was lowest in Phase 2 (78 per cent) and 
highest in Phase 1 (86 per cent). Unsurprisingly, the deadweight measure was 
lowest in districts where IWC appeared to have the greatest additional impact; 
• for work outcomes amongst the flow sample at the same point in time, 
deadweight was lowest in Phase 3 (75 per cent) and highest in Phase 4 (97 per 
cent); 
• across all outcomes and all time points amongst the flow sample, the estimate of 
deadweight never drops below 70 per cent, although there is some suggestion 
– for Phase 1 districts in particular – that this measure of deadweight declines 
over time: this would be the case if the lone parents in the flow sample who 
were the first to claim IWC were more likely (than lone parents who claimed 
IWC later) to have left benefit anyway;
• for benefit outcomes among the stock sample, 18 months after first becoming 
potentially eligible for IWC, deadweight was lowest in Phase 3 (80 per cent) and 
highest in Phase 1 (95 per cent); 
• for work outcomes amongst the stock sample at the same point in time, 
deadweight was lowest in Phase 3 (54 per cent) and highest in Phase 4 (96 per 
cent). For Phase 3 in particular, these estimates of deadweight are considerably 
lower than they were for the flow sample; this implies that IWC has been 
instrumental in Phase 3 districts in helping lone parents with very long benefit 
histories to start work who would not otherwise have done so.
9.3 Summary
A measure of deadweight reports what fraction of IWC recipients have not had 
their benefit or employment behaviour altered by the LPPs. This chapter has 
presented estimates of deadweight calculated in two different ways which are 
not directly comparable with each other. 
Estimates based on the duration model suggest that, at the instant when 
IWC recipients first received IWC (and left IS), deadweight was 60 per cent 
(i.e. 60 per cent of this group would have left IS anyway) and the remaining 
40 per cent represents the additional impact of IWC. But the impact of IWC falls 
over time: after 12 months, 19 per cent of the IWC recipients have returned to IS, 
54 per cent are not receiving IS but would have been not receiving IS anyway in 
the absence of the LPPs and the remaining 28 per cent represent the additional 
impact of the LPPs. The estimated deadweight similarly rises, although the actual 
number depends on precisely how it is calculated. 
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Crude estimates of the deadweight of the LPPs based on the DiD method are 
calculated in a different way and are not directly comparable. But they suggest 
that deadweight for benefit outcomes is grouped around 80 per cent in all phases 
for the flow sample. For the stock sample, estimated deadweight for benefit 
outcomes is 85 per cent in Phases 1 and 2, 95 per cent in Phase 4 and 66 per cent 
in Phase 3. The estimated deadweight for work outcomes is rather erratic. 
These figures are fairly similar to the deadweight implied by previous impact 
assessments of WFTC and NDLP.
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10 Summary and conclusions 
This is the second and final published report from a project designed to estimate 
the labour market impact of a set of five government policies designed to help 
lone parents into work. These policies are being piloted in different combinations 
in Jobcentre Plus districts in Great Britain. The five policies in question are 
In-Work Credit (IWC), Work Search Premium (WSP), Extended Schools Childcare 
and Childcare Tasters (ESC), Quarterly Work Focused Interviews (QWFIs) for lone 
parents whose youngest child is aged 12 or over in Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs) in which an ESC pilot is operating (Extended Schools Quarterly Work 
Focused Interview (ESQWFI)) and New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP). 
These are collectively referred to as ‘the lone parent pilots’ (LPPs or ‘the pilots’). 
This impact assessment covers the operation of the LPPs from 1 April 2004 to 
31 March 2007.
The report provides estimates of the overall impact of the LPPs. Much of the 
analysis focuses on those lone parents who were ‘potentially eligible’ for IWC: this 
refers to lone parents in pilot districts who had been receiving Income Support (IS) 
or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least 12 months and so would have been 
eligible to claim IWC had they left IS/JSA and started a job of 16 or more hours 
per week. 
The results update and supersede those in Research Report 415 (RR 415). 
Compared with that report, this report contains a number of new analyses:
• It investigates the characteristics and labour market behaviour of IWC recipients 
compared with other lone parents who leave IS, making use of individual data 
on which lone parents received IWC.
• It separates the impact of the LPPs into an initial impact of encouraging more 
potentially eligible lone parents to leave benefit and start work and a subsequent 
impact of encouraging recipients to stay in work and off IS.
• It assesses more thoroughly whether the key assumption of ‘common trends’, 
needed for estimates based on a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to be 
valid, is likely to hold.
• It examines what more can be learned about the impact of the LPPs from a 
duration (or survivor) model. 
Summary and conclusions
124
An additional aim – to investigate the impact of the LPPs on other outcomes, 
using data on earnings and tax credit claimants – proved infeasible as the tax 
credit data in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) was not available 
to the research team in time to affect this report and as the P14 earnings data 
was only available for 2003/04 to 2005/06, which did not give enough data after 
IWC had begun.
10.1 Summary of results
10.1.1 Take-up of IWC
A broad measure of take-up of IWC is the number of lone parents who have 
received IWC as a proportion of those who have ever been potentially eligible. 
This also provides a theoretical upper bound to the additional impact of IWC. By 
31 March 2007, just under 10 per cent of all potentially eligible lone parents had 
received IWC, and just under 33 per cent of all potentially eligible lone parents 
who left IS had received IWC. Take-up rates were higher in Phases 2 and 4 than 
Phases 1 and 3: this could reflect differences in local labour markets, differences 
in the characteristics of lone parents in the districts in the various phases, or 
differential awareness of IWC among lone parents. However, research based 
on secondary data analysis will always be unable to differentiate between these 
various explanations.
10.1.2 Characteristics of IWC recipients
IWC recipients tend to have characteristics known from past research 
(Yeo, 2007; D’Souza et	al., 2008; La Valle et	al., 2008) to be associated with a 
greater likelihood of leaving benefit and moving into work than other potentially 
eligible lone parents in the pilot districts who did not receive IWC. Most notably, 
IWC recipients are 56 percentage points more likely to have ever been on New 
Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) (although this may be because of the conditions 
attached to IWC receipt when the pilots were first introduced) and 7 percentage 
points (ppts) less likely to have been recently disabled. They are also less likely 
to have a child under the age of three and they tend to have fewer children, on 
average, than other potentially eligible lone parents in the pilot districts who left 
IS but not for IWC. However, these groups do not differ substantially in terms of 
the proportion of time spent in work in the 30 months before leaving IS.
10.1.3 Durations of IWC claims and post-IWC destinations
Just under 70 per cent of lone parents who claimed IWC received it for the 
maximum 12 months and 16 per cent of IWC claims lasted less than six months.
As IWC is a time-limited payment, an important issue is what happens to lone 
parents when payments of IWC stop. For lone parents who receive IWC for at 
least 11 months, there are very few changes, on average, to key labour market 
outcomes when IWC payments stop: over 80 per cent are still not receiving an 
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out-of-work benefit one year after they stopped receiving IWC and more than 
60 per cent are still in work. 
However, the picture is different for those lone parents who do not receive IWC 
for the full 12 months: of those who receive IWC for less than six months, 63 per 
cent are receiving an out-of-work benefit one year after starting a claim of IWC 
and only 26 per cent are in work. For those who receive IWC for more than six 
but less than 11 months, 49 per cent are receiving an out-of-work benefit one 
year after starting a claim of IWC and 35 per cent are in work. Amongst all lone 
parents who received IWC for less than the full 12 months, 56 per cent were 
receiving an out-of-work benefit one year after starting an IWC claim and 30 per 
cent were in work.
These findings strongly suggest that there are high levels of job retention for the 
majority of IWC recipients who are able to maintain an IWC claim for the full 
12 months. Furthermore, they suggest that the majority of those who do not 
complete an IWC claim stop receiving IWC because they are no longer working 
and have returned to benefits.
10.1.4 Flow sample: difference-in-differences estimates of the  
 impact of the lone parent pilots (headline results)
The estimates suggest that, on average, the LPPs led to statistically significant 
improvements in work and benefit outcomes. For example, 12 months after 
first becoming potentially eligible for IWC, just under a fifth (18.2 per cent) of 
potentially eligible lone parents were no longer receiving an out-of-work benefit, 
with 1.6 ppts of that 18.2 per cent attributable to the LPPs. Twelve months after 
first becoming potentially eligible for IWC, a seventh (14.3 per cent) of potentially 
eligible lone parents were in work according to the WPLS, with the LPPs responsible 
for 1.0 ppts of this 14.3 per cent. 
It is also valid to express the additional impact of the LPPs as a proportion of those 
potentially eligible lone parents who are in work or no longer receiving an 
out-of-work benefit. This is sometimes known as the additionality rate. These 
numbers are reported in Table 10.1 later. They show that, for example, 8.8 per 
cent of the potentially eligible lone parents no longer receiving an out-of-work 
benefit after 12 months’ exposure to the LPPs, is attributable to the LPPs; the 
equivalent figure for work outcomes is 7.0 per cent. 
The additional impact of the LPPs, expressed as a proportion of all potentially 
eligible lone parents, rises over time (measured relative to when they first became 
potentially eligible for IWC), as shown by the distance between the solid and 
dashed lines of the same colour in Figure 10.1. For example, after 24 months’ 
exposure to the LPPs, a quarter (25.9 per cent) of potentially eligible lone parents 
were no longer on benefit and 2.0 ppts of this is attributable to the LPPs. For 
work outcomes, the equivalent figures are 16.7 per cent and 1.4 ppts. These are 
larger impacts than those after 12 months’ exposure to the LPPs but it is not at 
all surprising that the impact of the LPPs rises the longer a lone parent is exposed 
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to their policies and services. However, there is much less change over time in the 
additionality rate (see Table 10.1). This means that the additional impact of the 
LPPs on all potentially eligible lone parents rises with the length of time during 
which a lone parent is exposed to the LPPs but their additionality rate is fairly 
constant. 
Figure 10.1 Percentage of potentially eligible lone parents in the  
 flow sample who are off benefit and in work, and  
 estimated percentage off benefit and in work in the  
 absence of the LPPs
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10.1.5 Stock sample: difference-in-differences estimates of the  
 impact of the lone parent pilots
The headline results presented above were for the flow sample as a whole, meaning 
that the estimates pooled all the phases together and, within a phase, also pooled 
lone parents who became potentially eligible for IWC at different points in time. 
The additional impact of the LPPs was estimated separately for the stock sample 
(those lone parents who were potentially eligible for the LPPs on the day they 
were introduced). The key difference between the flow and stock samples is 
that lone parents in the stock sample tend to have been receiving out-of-work 
benefits for far longer. In general, the additional impact on the stock was smaller 
than that on the flow. After 12 months of being potentially eligible for the LPPs, 
12.3 per cent of the stock sample were no longer receiving an out-of-work benefit, 
0.5 ppts of which is attributable to the LPPs. After 24 months, the equivalent 
figures are 18.4 per cent and 1.6 ppts. The impact on work outcomes was very 
similar. The estimated impacts on benefit outcomes in Phases 1 and 4 after 
12 months were not statistically significant but all impacts on all outcomes at 
24 months were statistically significant. The implied additionality rate for those 
not on benefit is 3.7 per cent after 12 months’ exposure and 9.0 per cent after 
24 months.
10.1.6 Variation across phases, cohorts and combinations  
 of policies
There are no robust differences in the impact of the LPPs across the four phases. 
For benefit outcomes, the impact of the LPPs is greater in Phases 2 and 4 than it 
is in Phases 1 and 3 (both dominated by London). For work outcomes, the impact 
of the LPPs is greater in Phases 1 and 3 (both dominated by London) than it is in 
Phases 2 and 4. However, the variation across phases in the estimated impacts for 
the benefit outcomes is almost never statistically significant. Estimates from the 
stock sample suggest that the impact of the pilots is greater for lone parents in 
Phase 2 and 3 districts than it is for lone parents in Phase 1 or Phase 4 districts. 
These differences exist after the analysis has controlled for many characteristics of 
lone parents and the areas in which they live, but they are small. 
It is also possible that the impact is different for lone parents who became 
potentially eligible at different dates. This is investigated by estimating separate 
impacts for each cohort of potentially eligible lone parents, where a cohort is 
defined as those lone parents who became potentially eligible for IWC in the same 
six-month window. Estimates suggest that, for all phases, the impact of the LPPs 
increases for each successive cohort: for example, in all phases, the LPPs seem to 
have had the largest impact on those lone parents who became potentially eligible 
between 1 October 2005 and 31 March 2006 (where outcomes are measured 
12 months later, between 1 October 2006 and 31 March 2007). One potential 
explanation for this pattern is that awareness of the LPPs amongst lone parents 
or Personal Advisers (PAs) grew over time. However, the estimated impacts of the 
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LPPs for different cohorts were generally not statistically significantly different from 
one another (but were statistically significantly different from zero), meaning that 
one should use the headline results averaged over all cohorts presented earlier. 
This report has found no robust evidence of variation in the impact of the LPPs 
according to the combinations of policies that were on offer. Specifically, the 
results do not suggest that the impact of the LPPs was any greater in pilot districts 
where ND+fLP was in place, nor for lone parents subject to ESQWFIs, than in 
pilot districts where only IWC was in place. Thus, there is no robust evidence that 
these additional policies have made the overall package of LPPs more effective at 
getting lone parents off benefit and into work. For ESQWFIs, this is because few 
potentially eligible lone parents would have been subject to them, so the estimated 
impacts are very imprecise. For ND+fLP, the estimated impacts are more precise 
but are either very similar to the impacts in non-ND+fLP districts or, as in the stock 
sample, weaker than in non-ND+fLP districts; in any case, most differences are not 
statistically significant.
There were very strong impacts of the LPPs among lone parents who had previously 
been on NDLP. For example, the impact of the LPPs on benefit outcomes for all 
potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample 12 months after becoming 
potentially eligible to IWC is estimated to be 1.6 ppts (see Table 10.1). The impact 
for lone parents who had not previously been on NDLP is 1.5 ppts and the impact 
for those who had previously been on NDLP is 4.2 ppts. It is not possible to tell 
whether this difference is genuinely caused by NDLP – which might happen if, 
for example, lone parents on NDLP were more likely to find out about IWC – or 
whether it is because the sort of lone parents who join NDLP are more work-ready, 
and therefore, more likely to respond to an increased incentive to work, than 
those who do not, or whether there is some sort of beneficial interaction between 
the two policies (it was also the case that, between April 2004 and October 2004 
in the Phase 1 districts, it was a requirement for lone parents who wanted to 
receive IWC to have been on NDLP when they left IS).
10.1.7 Summary of key results
Table 10.1 summarises the main impact estimates for those outcomes for which 
estimates are available for all phases.
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Table 10.1 Summary of impacts of the lone parent pilots 
Percentage	
points
After	12	months’	exposure	to	LPPs After	24	months’	exposure	to	LPPs
Impact	on	number	
no	longer	receiving	
out-of-work	
benefits
Impact	on	
number	in	work
Impact	on	number	
no	longer	receiving	
out-of-work	
benefits
Impact	on	
number	in	work
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Flow 
sample
Overall 1.6*** 8.8 1.0*** 7.0 2.0*** 7.7 1.4*** 8.4
Phase 1 0.8** 5.2 1.4*** 9.8 1.9*** 7.9 1.4*** 8.9
Phase 2 2.0*** 10.1 0.9*** 5.9 2.1*** 7.5 1.3*** 7.4
Phase 3 1.2*** 7.8 1.5*** 12.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Phase 4 1.8*** 8.3 0.2 1.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Stock 
sample
Overall 0.5 3.7 0.7 4.8 1.6 9.0 1.2 8.1
Phase 1 0.1 0.9 0.4*** 2.9 0.9*** 5.1 0.8*** 5.1
Phase 2 0.7*** 5.6 0.8*** 5.4 1.5*** 7.5 1.2*** 7.5
Phase 3 0.6*** 6.3 1.1*** 8.7 2.2*** 13.1 1.5*** 10.7
Phase 4 0.3* 1.4 0.2 2.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Notes: The table shows the estimated impact of the LPPs on the proportion of lone parents 
no longer on benefit, and (separately) now in work, a certain number of months after first 
becoming potentially eligible for IWC. Impacts estimated by OLS regressions on flow sample and 
stock sample a certain number of months after first becoming potentially eligible for IWC. Work 
outcome is ‘whether in work according to WPLS’. Benefit outcome is ‘no longer receiving out-
of-work benefits according to NBD’. Results are presented in ppts, so an estimate of 1.6 means 
1.6 ppts. * = significant at 10 per cent level; ** = significant at 5 per cent level; *** = significant 
at 1 per cent level; standard errors have not been calculated for the impacts expressed as a 
percentage of those no longer on benefit (or now in work) nor the overall impact for the stock 
sample. Additionality rate is calculated as ‘100 × impact/outcome’.
10.1.8 Disentangling the impact of the LPPs: did they encourage  
 more lone parents to leave benefit for work or encourage  
 those that did leave to stay in work and off benefit  
 for longer? 
The headline estimates of the LPPs combine any initial impact the LPPs had on 
encouraging lone parents to leave benefit and enter work, and any subsequent 
impact they had on encouraging IWC recipients to stay in work and off benefit. 
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Two separate analyses suggest that the main impact of IWC has been to encourage 
more lone parents to leave benefit and start work than would otherwise have done 
so; the effect of the LPPs on reducing the benefit re-entry rate of IWC recipients 
seems to have been very small in comparison. One piece of evidence that supports 
this conclusion comes from applying the DiD method to a sample of potentially 
eligible lone parents who left IS for work: IWC recipients formed a high proportion 
(70 per cent) of this sample in the pilot districts after the pilots started, and so any 
impacts estimated from this analysis should reflect only the impact of the LPPs on 
reducing the benefit re-entry rate of IWC recipients. However, these estimated 
impacts are small (although statistically significant). The other piece of evidence 
comes from a duration (or survivor) model. This was used to simulate directly how 
long IWC recipients would remain off out-of-work benefits in the absence of IWC. 
10.1.9 Apparent impacts of the LPPs on lone parents who are not 
 yet eligible for IWC
It is possible to use the DiD method to estimate the ‘impact’ of the LPPs on lone 
parents who have been on IS for less than 12 months and who are, therefore, 
not yet potentially eligible for IWC. These estimates are small (although generally 
statistically significant) and negative. But interpreting such ‘impacts’ is not simple: 
there are two main causes, with very different implications, and the data available 
to the research team was insufficient to distinguish between these hypotheses.
First, the negative ‘impacts’ may be genuinely caused by the LPPs. There are at 
least two ways this could occur. Lone parents in IWC districts whose IS claim has 
lasted less than 12 months and who are contemplating leaving IS for a job of 16 
or more hours a week, might delay leaving IS until they become eligible for IWC 
in order to benefit from the £2,080 maximum payment of IWC; this is known as 
an anticipation effect. There may also be ‘spillover’ effects; in the case of the LPPs, 
this would refer to a situation where the higher number of lone parents induced 
by the LPPs to look for work makes it harder for others – such as lone parents who 
have been on IS for less than 12 months – to find work, although these effects 
seem unlikely to be very important in a flexible labour market. If anticipation or 
spillover effects are present, and are leading to the apparent negative impacts on 
lone parents whose IS claim has lasted less than 12 months, then the headline 
estimates of the additional impact of the LPPs presented earlier are overstating 
the overall impact of the LPPs. However, qualitative research with IWC recipients 
(Ray et	al., 2007) found that the majority of those IWC recipients who had not 
received WSP or had a QWFI heard about IWC for the first time after they had 
found a job, suggesting anticipation effects are unlikely, although that research 
was based on a small sample. Furthermore, in a variant of the duration model that 
allowed for anticipation effects, these were found to be statistically insignificant 
and the overall impact of IWC was little different. However, anticipation effects 
were found to be present in a similar programme in Canada (Card and Hyslop, 
2005) and it is also plausible that there were spillover effects as described above 
in the Canadian programme.
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Second, the negative ‘impacts’ may be due to a general deterioration in the 
outcomes in the pilot districts that did not occur in the comparison districts and 
which cannot be explained by the explanatory factors included in the analysis (this 
would reflect a failure of the ‘common trends’ assumption). If such a deterioration 
had occurred, then the headline estimates of the impact of the LPPs presented 
above are understating the actual impact of the LPPs.
10.1.10 Deadweight
‘Deadweight’ reports what fraction of IWC recipients would have behaved in the 
same way in the absence of IWC. For the flow sample, the estimates of deadweight 
for benefit outcomes are grouped around 80 per cent in all phases; for the stock 
sample, estimated deadweight for benefit outcomes ends up at 85 per cent in 
Phases 1 and 2, 95 per cent in Phase 4 and 66 per cent in Phase 3 (the estimated 
deadweight for work outcomes is rather erratic). These results are broadly 
consistent with those from the duration model, which estimates deadweight to 
be around 73 per cent 12 months after IWC recipients first received IWC and 81 
per cent after 24 months. 
These figures suggest that, 12 months after first receiving IWC, the behaviour of 
around four out of every five (former) IWC recipients was unaffected by the LPPs, 
either because they had returned to claiming IS or because they would have left IS 
and stayed off it without the LPPs. This compares to an estimated deadweight of 
85 per cent for NDLP – implied by the headline estimates in Dolton et	al. (2006) 
reported in Cebulla et	al. (2008) – and one of 71 per cent for Working Families’ 
Tax Credit (WFTC) overall, implied by the estimates in Brewer et	al. (2006). 
10.1.11 How do the estimated impacts compare with those of  
 other Department for Work and Pensions programmes for 
 lone parents?
Cebulla et	al. (2008) sought to compare the findings of a number of evaluations 
and impact assessments of Government policies designed to encourage lone 
parents to work: see especially their Table 1 on pages 10–11. Below, we compare 
findings from Cebulla et	 al. with those in this report. Cebulla et	 al. discussed, 
extensively, the difficulties involved in making direct comparisons, given the different 
approaches taken by the original evaluations. One very important difference is 
that the most-cited result for NDLP refers to its impact on NDLP participants but 
the headline results for the evaluations of Work Focused Interviews (WFIs) and of 
the LPPs presented in this report, are for their impacts among lone parents who 
were potentially eligible for a WFI or for IWC, not all of whom actually had a WFI 
or received IWC.
The headline result in this report for the flow sample is that, after 12 months 
of being potentially eligible for IWC, the LPPs had led to an additional 1.6 ppts 
of potentially eligible lone parents being off benefit (i.e. not receiving IS, JSA 
or Incapacity Benefit (IB)). After 24 months, the figure was 2.0 ppts. Cebulla et	
al. calculated the impact of NDLP amongst all lone parents on IS to be 1.7 ppts 
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after nine months and 1.4 percentage points after two years. They also reported 
that, after 12 months, the impact of WFIs was 0.8 per cent for lone parents with 
youngest children aged over 13 and 2.0 per cent for lone parents with youngest 
children aged 9–12. All three programmes, therefore, seem to have had impacts 
on the population of lone parents on IS that are similar in magnitude (however, 
the estimated impacts of the three programmes are all for slightly different 
populations: the LPP estimates are for all lone parents whose IS claim reaches 
12 months in the pilot districts, the NDLP estimate is for all lone parents on IS in 
Great Britain and the WFI estimates are for the stock of lone parents on IS with 
children of various ages).
The most cited result for NDLP is that it led to 14.24 per cent of NDLP participants 
being off benefit as a result. This report has estimated that the deadweight of 
IWC was around 80 per cent and this implies that the LPPs have led to 20 per cent 
of IWC recipients being off benefit as a result. Figure 9.1 showed such estimates 
from the duration model more precisely: the duration model implies that, at the 
time IWC recipients first claimed IWC, 40 per cent would not have left benefit 
without the LPPs, but this fraction falls to 28 per cent after 12 months and 19 per 
cent after two years (over the 24 months after first receiving IWC, the average 
impact on IWC recipients is 29 per cent). 
10.1.12 What has changed since DWP Research Report 415?
In general, the estimated impact of the LPPs in this report is higher than that in 
RR 415. It is not possible to isolate the reason for this, as there have been many 
changes to the data analysed and the empirical strategy, the most important of 
which are:
• this report had access to more recent data. The larger flow sample has made 
it easier to detect small impacts reliably and there is evidence that the impact 
of the LPPs on later cohorts of lone parents in the flow sample is greater than 
that on earlier cohorts, and that the impact on the stock sample seems to have 
grown over time (although this report did not test whether this growth was 
statistically significant or not); 
• this report uses data for Phase 4 districts and the LPP districts in Scotland and 
Wales. The sample of lone parents used before the LPPs began has also been 
extended back to cover all those whose claims exceeded 12 months’ duration 
on or after 1 April 2001;
• the measure of whether a lone parent is ‘off benefit’ has been improved to 
account for errors in the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) administrative 
data and the measure of work has been refined to account for errors in 
the WPLS;
• estimates of the number of IWC recipients provided by (DWP to the research team 
were lower than they were for RR 415; this has reduced the participation rates;
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• the implementation of the DiD estimator has been refined to correctly allow for 
the start dates of the LPPs to vary by phase and to allow for an arbitrary trend 
in outcomes. 
10.2 Implications for policy and research
10.2.1 What more can be learned about the impact of the LPPs  
 from a duration model?
There are two empirical methods used in this report to produce estimates of the 
impact of the LPPs: one is a DiD estimator and the other is based on a duration 
model (this is similar to what is known in the statistical literature as a ‘survivor 
model’, with repeated spells and competing risks). Both methods try to learn 
about the impact of the LPPs by, in essence, comparing the behaviour of lone 
parents who were potentially eligible for IWC with that of those who were not 
(the latter is known as a ‘comparison group’). 
A duration model typically involves making stronger assumptions than in 
a conventional DiD estimator but the stronger assumptions permit a richer 
understanding of the impact of the LPPs: for example, the duration model can 
provide internally consistent estimates of the overall impact of the LPPs on the 
potentially eligible population of lone parents and their impact on job retention for 
IWC recipients. A disadvantage is that it is computationally intensive to estimate 
such models. The model estimated for this report was, thus, based on a 5 per cent 
sample of lone parents and used a very small set of explanatory variables, so the 
results from this model should be regarded as tentative.
Generally, the results from the duration model are consistent with those based 
on the DiD approach. Given the theoretical advantage of such models when 
estimating the impact of DWP programmes on job retention or repeat claims 
of benefit, the authors recommend that they be pursued in future evaluations 
undertaken or commissioned by DWP, particularly if a more accurate measure of 
whether a lone parent is in work can be used, based on the estimated eligibility to 
Working Tax Credit (WTC) now in the WPLS. 
10.2.2 Implications for policy
The target population for the LPPs – lone parents who have been receiving out-
of-work benefits for at least one year – tend to stay on benefits and out of work 
for long periods of time. The results in this report imply that the overall impact 
of the LPPs is to lead to more potentially eligible lone parents being in work, and 
fewer receiving out of work benefits, and these impacts are statistically different 
from zero. Results also suggest that the main role of the LPPs is to encourage more 
lone parents to leave benefit and start work. There is little evidence that they are 
having any impact on job retention, although job retention amongst most IWC 
recipients is high. 
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This report has also examined impacts on specific groups of lone parents. There 
is little reliable evidence on whether the impact was stronger where ESQWFIs 
were in operation because too few lone parents were subject to ESQWFIs for 
any significant variation in the impact to be detected. This question, therefore, 
remains unanswered. There is also no robust evidence that the impact was greater 
in pilot districts operating ND+fLP. As a result, this research has not found any 
robust evidence that these additional policies have made the overall package of 
LPPs more effective at getting lone parents off benefit and into work, compared 
with IWC alone.
Finally, there is some evidence that the impact is greater for lone parents who 
have previously been on NDLP. It is not possible to tell whether this difference is 
genuinely caused by NDLP – which might happen if, for example, lone parents on 
NDLP were more likely to find out about IWC – or whether it is because the sort 
of lone parents who join NDLP are more work-ready and therefore, more likely to 
respond to an increased incentive to work, than those who do not, or whether 
there is some sort of beneficial interaction between the two policies (it was also 
the case that, between April 2004 and October 2004 in the Phase 1 districts, it 
was a requirement for lone parents who wanted to receive IWC to have been on 
NDLP when they left IS).
One potential drawback of limiting IWC payments to a maximum of 12 months 
is that any positive impact it had would cease immediately when the payments 
stopped. This report has rejected this concern, by showing that those lone parents 
who receive IWC for the full 12 months do not stop work or start a new IS claim 
when they pass the 12-month limit of IWC payments. 
A potential drawback of restricting eligibility for IWC to lone parents who have 
spent at least 12 months receiving out-of-work benefits is that it gives lone parents 
on out-of-work benefits a financial incentive to postpone starting work until they 
have been on out-of-work benefits for a year. This report cannot rule out the 
possibility that this is happening but if it is, then the impact is small. 
Ultimately, an impact assessment alone does not provide sufficient evidence to 
determine whether a policy is cost effective or should be continued: such decisions 
should be based on a full cost–benefit analysis, fully informed by the estimates in 
this impact assessment. 
Finally, it should be noted that this impact assessment covers the operation of the 
LPPs from 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2007. It is entirely possible that the impact of 
IWC and related policies during a recession is different from its impact when the 
economy is growing.
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Appendix A 
Details of the policies offered 
in the lone parent pilots
This appendix lists the policies that together formed the lone parent pilots (LPPs). 
It describes the situation that existed up until 31 March 2007. 
In-Work Credit
In-Work Credit (IWC) was available to lone parents who had:
• been receiving Income Support (IS) or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) income-
based or contributory) or a combination of the two for a continuous period of 
12 months or more; and
• who stopped claiming benefits and moved into work of at least 16 hours 
per week.
It was payable at a rate of £40 per week for up to 12 months. Payments stopped 
after 12 months or if the lone parent stopped working or if the lone parent claimed 
an out-of-work benefit. Lone parents had to provide evidence that they were still 
in work (or were self-employed) at four points: 10, 26, 38 and 52 weeks after 
taking a job. The bonus was paid weekly in arrears. IWC payments did not count 
as income for the purpose of other means-tested benefits or tax credits.
In April 2004 (Phase 1), IWC was introduced in the Jobcentre Plus districts of 
Bradford, North London and South-East London. In October 2004 (Phase 2), it 
became available in a further nine districts: Cardiff and Vale; Central London; 
Dudley and Sandwell; Edinburgh, Lothian and Borders; Lancashire West; Leeds; 
Leicestershire; Staffordshire; and West London. These districts were chosen 
because they had relatively poor outcomes for lone parents on benefit and 
relatively high proportions of lone parents in the population. In April 2005 
(Phase 3), IWC was rolled out across the remaining London districts (with the 
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exception of North-East London, in which the Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA) programme offered similar incentives). In October 2005 
(Phase 4), IWC was extended to a further six districts in the south-east of England: 
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire; Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire; 
Essex; Hampshire and the Isle of Wight; Kent: Surrey and Sussex. The expansion 
to Phases 3 and 4 was justified on the grounds that work incentives might be 
particularly poor for lone parents in London and the South-East, perhaps because 
of high transport costs, or high levels of rents and council tax, which weaken 
work incentives through the operation of Housing Benefit (HB) and Council Tax 
Benefit (CTB). After this expansion, around 45 per cent of lone parents on benefit 
for at least a year lived in districts offering IWC. In July 2007, IWC payments 
were increased to £60 a week in London; and in April 2008, IWC was rolled out 
to the whole of Great Britain. Both these changes happened outside the period 
examined by this report.
Work Search Premium
Lone parents who were on IS/JSA (or some combination) for 12 months or more, 
and who were willing to join the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and engage 
voluntarily in job-search activity, were eligible to claim a Work Search Premium 
(WSP) payment of £20 per week for a maximum of 26 weeks. 
The WSP was payable to lone parents who were participants on NDLP and who 
agreed an action plan with their Personal Adviser (PA). They were not tied into 
specific job-search activities but receipt of WSP was at the continual discretion of 
their PA, with whom they discussed job search on a fortnightly basis. 
WSP operated in a number of districts in tandem with IWC: Bradford and South-
East London (Phase 1); and Cardiff and Vale; Dudley and Sandwell; Edinburgh, 
Lothian and Borders; Lancashire West; Leicestershire; West London (Phase 2). The 
pilot ended in September 2006.
In the WSP pilot districts that were not also providing services as part of the New 
Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP) pilot (Lancashire West and West London), 
WSP stopped being available to new clients from the end of September 2006; 
however, lone parents who started receiving WSP before this date continued to 
receive it until they lost eligibility in the usual way (i.e. after six months or after 
leaving IS/JSA). Uptake of WSP was small. There were 1,640 lone parent starts in 
total within ND+fLP districts during the period April 2005 to October 2007.
Extended Schools Childcare and Childcare Tasters
The Extended Schools Childcare and Childcare Taster pilots (jointly referred to 
as ESC) were introduced in several Local Education Authorities (LEAs) in Great 
Britain, although the details vary slightly between England, Scotland and Wales 
as implementation was a devolved issue. In England, the pilots were managed 
by LEAs in order to best meet local needs, working in close cooperation with 
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Jobcentre Plus, schools and other stakeholders. This inevitably meant that there 
was variation in the effective treatment across locations. 
Extended Schools Childcare pilots aimed to improve the availability of affordable 
childcare for working parents. In England, each pilot had a Childcare Coordinator, 
employed by the LEA, who worked with schools to create new childcare places. 
Childcare Partnership Managers from Jobcentre Plus were to provide the strategic 
link between Jobcentre Plus and LEAs. Childcare Coordinators and Childcare 
Partnership Managers were to work with Children’s Information Services, 
providing up-to-date information on local childcare vacancies, including those in 
schools. The aims of the pilots were the same in Wales and Scotland, although the 
institutional arrangements were different.
The pilot was intended to primarily help parents of school-age children (i.e. children 
aged 5–14, 16 for children with special needs), but the LEAs’ remit also allowed 
them to provide childcare for younger or older children if that would help lone 
parents into work. In addition, although this pilot was mainly aimed at helping 
lone parents who were ready to move into employment, in practice the services 
were available to all parents. 
Extended Schools Childcare pilots ran from 1 April 2004 until 31 March 2006 in 
Bradford, Haringey and Lewisham LEAs in England, and from 1 October 2004 
to 31 March 2006 in Greenwich, Leicester, Leicestershire and Sandwell LEAs in 
England; Aberdeenshire and Fife in Scotland; and Torfaen in Wales. These LEAs 
also ran the ESC pilot, the aim of which was to help lone parents build trust and 
confidence in the use of formal childcare. Childcare Tasters also operated in some 
areas that did not operate an ESC pilot but this is ignored during the empirical 
work (in other words, it was assumed that the ESC pilot on its own had negligible 
impact on the likelihood that lone parents in that area left benefit or found work). 
The ESC pilots ended on 31 March 2006.
Extended Schools Quarterly Work Focused Interviews
In LEAs in which an ESC pilot was operating, there were mandatory Work Focused 
Interviews (WFIs) at quarterly intervals for lone parents whose youngest child was 
aged 12 or over, and who had been on IS/JSA for 12 months or more (Extended 
Schools Quarterly Work Focused Interviews (ESQWFIs)). Where Jobcentre Plus 
districts were larger than LEAs, ESQWFIs only applied to lone parents living 
within the LEA. ESQWFIs were introduced in Bradford, Lewisham and Haringey in 
September 2004; and Greenwich, Leicester, Leicestershire and Sandwell in October 
2004; they ended in all districts in April 2007. From October 2005, mandatory 
quarterly review meetings were required of lone parents claiming benefit for 
12 months or more and with a youngest child aged 14 or 15 years. Since April 
2007, Quarterly Work Focused Interviews (QWFIs) have been introduced in ND+fLP 
areas for lone parents with a youngest child aged 11–13.
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Lone parents claiming IS/JSA but not required to attend QWFIs were subject to 
the following WFI regime. For new or repeat claims, there was an initial interview, 
reviews at six and 12 months, followed by annual WFIs (i.e. at 24, 36, 48 months, 
etc.). For existing IS recipients, there was an initial interview, followed by annual 
WFIs. WFIs were gradually extended to the stock of lone parents in receipt of 
IS/JSA through a phased roll-out based on the age of the lone parent’s youngest 
child. In practice, this means that lone parents eligible for QWFIs should have 
received WFIs 6, 12, 15, 18, 21 (etc.) months after first claiming IS/JSA. Since 
October 2005, lone parents who have been claiming IS for 12 months or more 
with a youngest child aged 14 years or over have been required to attend an 
interview once every three months to help them prepare for the transition to 
work when their child reaches 16. This nationwide initiative is not the subject of 
this project.
New Deal Plus for Lone Parents
At the end of April 2005, five Jobcentre Plus districts started offering ND+fLP in 
addition to the other LPP programmes that they were operating. These Jobcentre 
Plus districts were: Bradford, North London and South-East London (Phase 1); and 
Dudley and Sandwell and Leicestershire (Phase 2). From October 2006, Cardiff 
and Vale and Edinburgh, Lothian and Borders also began to offer ND+fLP services 
(although these districts do not form part of this report).
The aim of ND+fLP was to offer a coherent package of support to lone parents, 
with the pilots bringing together the main themes of the Work Focus, Work 
Incentives and Childcare strategies, and building on the lessons learned from the 
Incapacity Benefit Pathway pilots. The range of services on offer included: WSP, 
IWC, QWFIs (for lone parents with children aged 12 or over), Childcare Tasters/
Childcare Chats, Extended Schools Childcare, Action Plans, Childcare Assist, 
Discovery Weeks, In-Work Emergencies Fund, Extra Administrative Support for 
PAs, Enhanced Training for Lone Parent PAs, More Voluntary Contact with Lone 
Parents between WFIs, Additional Childcare Partnership Manager, Jobpoints in 
Children’s Centres, Access to Flexible Provision, Marketing Package and In-Work 
Support. There is some variation in service provision between the districts offering 
ND+fLP: WSP is not being offered in North London; and there is not an ESC pilot, 
nor are there ESQWFIs, in Edinburgh, Lothian and Borders or Cardiff and Vale. 
Results from a qualitative evaluation of ND+fLP were published in 2007 (Hosain 
and Breen, 2007). 
Overlaps between the policies
Table A.1 summarises the programmes and defines the eligible population 
for each. 
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Table A.1 Summary of the programmes and the eligible  
 population
Who is potentially 
eligible? (the pilot group)
Under what conditions 
do they actually receive 
treatment?
Administered 
at what level?
In-Work 
Credit
Lone parents on IS or JSA for 
at least 12 months 
Move off benefits and into 
work of at least 16 hours per 
week (that is expected to last 
at least five weeks)
Jobcentre Plus 
district
Work Search 
Premium
Lone parents on IS or JSA for 
at least 12 months 
Join NDLP and agree to 
undertake job-search 
activities
Jobcentre Plus 
district
Extended 
Schools 
Childcare
Any parent in the area (lone 
parents are targeted but not 
singled out)
None LEA
Childcare 
Taster
Taster weeks: lone parents 
and partners on NDLP or 
ND+fLP  
Chats: any lone parents
Taster weeks: if PA 
recommends  
Chats: if PA recommends
LEA
ESQWFI Lone parents on IS for at 
least 12 months whose 
youngest child is aged 12 or 
more in ESC areas
Automatic Jobcentre Plus 
district
New Deal 
Plus for Lone 
Parents
Any lone parent meeting the 
conditions for joining NDLP
It is a voluntary programme Jobcentre Plus 
district
Table A.2 shows which Jobcentre Plus districts and LEAs operated which policies. 
The ‘Phase’ column of this table shows which phase each Jobcentre Plus district/
LEA has been allocated to for the purposes of this evaluation; this is defined 
according to the date on which IWC was introduced in each district. 
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Appendix B 
Constructing a dataset for 
analysis using the DWP and 
HMRC administrative data 
This appendix describes how the dataset used for the empirical work was created 
from the various administrative databases held by the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP). 
First, the Income Support (IS) History file and the National Benefits Database (NBD) 
were used to create a set of IS/Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claims that either 
started between 1 April 2001 and 31 March 2007 or were ongoing on 1 April 
2001, and where the claimant was a lone parent at some point during the claim. 
Consecutive or overlapping claims of IS and JSA by the same individual were 
merged – because the rules for In-Work Credit (IWC) eligibility treated the two 
benefits identically – but such claims were only retained in the sample if the last 
benefit to be claimed was IS and that was by a lone parent, as the data available 
did not identify whether JSA claimants were lone parents (this means that a small 
number of claims of JSA from potentially eligible lone parents are not included 
in the analysis). The use of the IS History database was crucial for this analysis as 
it allowed the authors to see when changes of circumstances occurred within an 
individual’s claim of IS. This required a lot of cleaning: see Appendix C. 
For the difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis, four main sub-samples were derived 
from the master sample, known as ‘the stock sample’ (one for each phase), ‘the 
flow sample’, ‘the variant flow sample’ (a variant sample for the flow) used to 
test for anticipation or substitution effects, and a sample of lone parents who left 
benefits for work. 
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• The stock sample for analysing Phase 1 of the lone parent pilots (LPPs) comprised 
the following: (a) all claims of IS live on 1 April 2001 in the comparison districts 
and the Phase 1 districts, where the claimant was a lone parent and the duration 
of the IS/JSA claim exceeded 12 months on that date; plus (b) all claims of IS 
live on 1 April 2004 in the comparison districts and the Phase 1 districts, where 
the claimant was a lone parent and the duration of the IS/JSA claim exceeded 
12 months on that date. The intention was to create a sample of IS claims that 
would be immediately eligible for IWC when the LPPs were introduced in the 
Phase 1 districts, plus their equivalents in the comparison districts, plus their 
equivalents in the Phase 1 pilot and comparison districts had the LPPs started 
on 1 April 2001. Stock samples for the other three phases were constructed 
similarly, always using 1 April 2001 for step (a) but using the actual start date 
for that phase in step (b).
• The flow sample comprised all claims of IS that reached 12 months’ duration 
between 1 April 2001 and 31 March 2007 and where the claimant was a lone 
parent on that date, plus other claims of IS whose duration exceeded 12 months 
where the claimant became a lone parent; these claims were followed from the 
earliest date meeting all these conditions.11
• The variant flow sample comprised all claims of IS made by lone parents between 
1 April 2001 and 31 March 2007.
• The sample used to examine the impact on job retention using the DiD method 
was of potentially eligible lone parents who were observed in the Work and 
Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) to start work within a month of leaving IS 
between 1 April 2001 and 31 March 2007. 
The analysis in Chapter 3 uses a number of different samples, documented in 
that chapter. 
11 The flow sample contained all lone parents who become potentially eligible 
for IWC at some point after IWC had been introduced in their area. In 
addition, it contains all lone parents for whom IWC was not in operation 
when they first became potentially eligible but was in operation on the date 
outcomes were measured. In DWP Research Report 415 (RR 415), these 
lone parents only featured in the stock sample (meaning that there was a 
‘window’ in the flow sample between lone parents who became potentially 
eligible before IWC was in operation and those who became eligible after 
it was in operation); in the interest of obtaining more precise estimates, 
these lone parents have been included in the flow sample in this report. Of 
course, this group has only been partially exposed to the policy at the time 
their outcome is measured; thus, the impact of the LPPs on these individuals 
would be expected to be smaller than the impact of the LPPs on the flow 
sample as a whole. The estimates for this group have been calculated but 
not shown here in full: the estimated impacts tend to be smaller than those 
for the rest of the flow sample.
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The duration model was estimated on a 5 per cent random sample of all lone 
parents who started an IS claim on or after 1 April 2001. 
Appendix H details the number of IS/JSA claims potentially eligible for the LPPs. 
The evaluation also had access to several other DWP databases which could 
be combined with the main data from the IS History database using encrypted 
National Insurance number (NINO), orcid. These:
• recorded who had received IWC and when;
• recorded participation in New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and Work Focused 
Interviews (WFIs);
• included information on all working-age benefits (from the NBD);
• informed the creation of a measure of work (from the WPLS).
For the DiD analysis in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8, a large set of background 
characteristics was added to provide explanatory factors (also see Appendix D). 
These are:
• a set of benefit (and work) history variables derived from the WPLS and NBD. 
Variables were created to describe individuals’ benefit-claiming and work history 
during the period 12–21 months (0–30 months for work history) before the 
individual first became potentially eligible for the LPPs (by definition, all lone 
parents were on benefit in the 12 months before first becoming potentially 
eligible for the LPPs). This method was used in Dolton et	al. (2006), although 
the periods are a different size in this analysis. The variables were constructed 
as follows: the relevant period was split into three (benefit) or six (work) equal-
sized periods; for each period, an indicator variable was calculated indicating 
whether the person was mainly in work or mainly on benefit; both sets of 
variables were independently combined to give two categorical variables, taking 
values 1 to 8 (benefit) or 64 (work) depending on the ordering of the history over 
these periods; these categorical variables were then used to generate indicator 
variables corresponding to each of the possible work and benefit histories;
• a set of background characteristics from the NBD/IS History database, recorded 
at the start of the claim or at the time at which the individual first became 
potentially eligible for IWC;
• a set of local-area variables derived from several sources (and described in 
Appendix C to RR 415, to which have been added the Scottish and Welsh 
equivalent of the Index of Multiple Deprivation; data on childcare availability 
was not available for lone parents in Scotland and Wales).
The outcome variables used in the DiD analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 were defined 
as whether an individual was on an out-of-work benefit (IS, JSA or Incapacity 
Benefit (IB))/in work X days after they first became eligible for the policies, where 
X is defined here as 91, 182, 273, 364, 455, 546, 637, 728, 819 and 910 days 
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(corresponding approximately to three-monthly intervals). In Chapter 8, these 
same outcome variables were constructed relative to when a lone parent left IS. 
For the duration model, the outcome measure was whether a lone parent was 
receiving IS in a given three-month period. 
It should be stressed that the authors consider there to be a degree of noise in 
the measure of work in the WPLS in both directions. The employment records in 
the WPLS are based on employers’ returns to Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC) for individuals they are employing who are earning enough to be 
liable for income tax or National Insurance. This means that it may not include 
individuals who are in work but earning below the personal allowance (although 
the perceived wisdom is that many, mainly large, employers do report such spells 
of work), nor other spells of work that have not been declared to HMRC. For this 
reason, the data may underestimate the amount of time spent in work. On the 
other hand, there is a general feeling that the way in which uncertain start and 
end dates are recorded may lead to an overestimate of the amount of time spent 
in work if all dates in the WPLS are taken at face value (adjustments made to the 
WPLS are discussed in Appendix C). The overall effect should be that differences 
(between groups or over time) in the measure of work in the WPLS underestimate 
actual changes. There is also no measure of how many hours a week were worked 
in this data.
The administrative data used in this evaluation limits the population whose 
outcomes can be measured to people who have claimed a DWP-administered 
benefit and this means that it cannot provide any information on the impact 
of the LPPs on measures such as the lone parent employment rate, nor on the 
proportion of lone parents claiming IS/JSA.
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Appendix C 
Cleaning the DWP and HMRC 
administrative data 
Cleaning and augmenting the IS History database
The Income Support (IS) History database is supposed to be constructed so that 
each line gives the dates within which a certain set of personal characteristics is 
applicable. But the file is not ‘cleaned’ before being released to users. Appendix 
A of Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) Research Report 415 (RR 415) 
described in full how it was cleaned by the authors. This ‘cleaning’ dealt with the 
following problems:
• Some lines were exact duplicates of other lines in the dataset (in terms of ccnino, 
pclmstdt, pefffmdt, pefftodt, pdob, psex, pcd, pptrflg, pnumchld, pdobchld, 
pbranoff, bdisdat, bdispre and cincapfg).
• For some consecutive lines in the dataset, none of the relevant variables were 
different from those in the line above. 
• There are gaps within a given IS claim where it is unclear which set of personal 
characteristics apply (i.e. the pefftodt is earlier than the following pefffmdt).
• There are overlaps within a given IS claim where it is unclear which set of personal 
characteristics apply (i.e. the pefftodt is later than the following pefffmdt).
• In some cases, the first peffmdt of an IS claim was later than the pclmstdt, and 
in these cases peffmdt was set to be equal to pclmstdt.
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• If a postcode was missing or incomplete, information on the postcode was 
imputed from elsewhere in an individual’s IS claim, but only where this would 
not compromise the integrity of the IS History database (where personal 
characteristics, including postcode, may change from line to line). In other 
words, missing and incorrect postcodes were replaced with the postcode from 
the neighbouring lines of a particular spell but only if one of the personal 
circumstances (pnumchld, pdobchld, bdisdat, bdispre, cincapfg or pptrflg) that 
was not postcoded had changed between the two lines. 
• To be eligible for the lone parent pilots (LPPs), an individual needs to have been 
claiming IS (or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and IS continuously) for at least 
12 months. Using the IS History database alone to select the sample for the 
empirical work would, therefore, miss any individuals who had, for example, 
been claiming JSA for six months and then moved onto IS (and been claiming 
IS for a period of less than 12 months). All JSA spells from the National Benefits 
Database (NBD) for individuals in the IS history file were, therefore, appended to 
the IS History database. The information about JSA claims is only available from 
the NBD and this restricts information to what is known at the start and end 
of an individual’s claim (and not, for example, at the point at which their claim 
duration hits 12 months, as for individuals in the IS History database). Lone 
parents who had been claiming JSA for a period of 12 months or more in the 
sample (either with or without a consecutive IS spell) were, therefore, omitted 
from the sample, as it is not known for certain whether they were a lone parent 
or whether they lived in a pilot district, at the point at which their claim hit 
12 months. However, individuals who had initially claimed JSA (but for less than 
12 months) and then moved onto IS, without a break in benefit receipt (and, of 
course, individuals who had been claiming IS alone for a period of 12 months or 
more) were included in the sample for the empirical work. Including these JSA 
claims sometimes led to overlapping IS/JSA claims and these were combined 
together. If there were discrepancies in the personal characteristics of the 
individual in the two overlapping claims, it was assumed that the information in 
the more recent claim was accurate. 
Further detail on the number of claims, spells or individuals affected by this 
cleaning is available from the authors on request. 
Cleaning the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
The Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) combines employment (or, 
more accurately, income tax) records from Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC) with a range of programme and benefit spells from the DWP. This section 
describes what was done to the data before it was used in the analysis. 
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Dropping ‘work’ spells from the WPLS
Upon receipt of the employment (income tax) records from HMRC, the DWP 
performs a number of ‘data-cleaning’ exercises. Based on recommendations from 
DWP and the authors’ own analysis, the following spells were dropped:
• spells where the individual appeared to be aged under 10 at the start 
of the spell;
• benefit and work spells that ended before 1 June 1999 or started after 1 April 
2007;
• work spells that had negative, zero or one-day length and benefit spells that 
had negative length;
• work spells flagged by the variable benflag;12
• work spells that had been poorly matched to an individual’s benefit records (i.e. 
those with match = AmbRe or RedAm);
• work spells where the start or end dates were genuinely missing (this does not 
mean spells where the start date has been set to 6 April or the end date has 
been set to 5 April or 31 December 9999).
Uncertain start and end dates in the WPLS and NBD
Having done this, the work spells in the WPLS still suffer from two major problems:
• duplicate records describing the same spell in work (or near-duplicate records 
that appear to describe the same spell in work but contain different information 
about start and end dates);
• uncertain start and end dates: where HMRC knows in which tax year a job 
started or finished but not the precise date, it uses 6 April to indicate start date 
and 5 April to indicate end date. 
Records of work spells that were exact duplicates (in terms of start and end date) 
were dropped. If this still left multiple work spells with the same start date, all were 
dropped except the most recently-added spell with a certain end date. If none of 
the spells with the same start date had a certain end date, all were dropped except 
the spell that indicated that the job was ongoing (if it existed). If all of the spells 
with the same start date had end dates of 5 April, no spells were dropped.
12 The variable benflag was created by DWP to identify employment spells 
that it believes are not really employment spells. This may arise because 
HMRC records relate to periods in which income tax has been paid (and not 
necessarily periods in which an individual has been employed), which means 
it is entirely possible that some of the ‘employment’ spells in the WPLS are 
actually periods in which income tax has been paid on the receipt of certain 
taxable benefits. The variable was augmented by the authors – so that it 
covered more ‘employment spells’ – as described in Appendix B of RR 415.
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RR 415 added a correction that amended uncertain start and end dates by using 
information from the NBD (essentially by assuming that the start and end dates 
of uncertain work spells are likely to have occurred at similar times to the end and 
start dates (respectively) of out-of-work benefit spells. This report went further 
by imputing an end date to all ongoing work spells on the day that a subsequent 
claim for IS was made. 
The end date of non-JSA benefit claims is also not known with certainty: the NBD 
and WPLS record the date of the last extract at which a claim was live (extract), 
and the date before the first extract where a claim did not appear (cdmaxclm). All 
that is known is that the claim ended at some point between those two dates. 
Usually, the gap between cdmaxclm and extract is 13 days for IS spells (because 
extracts are fortnightly) but the gap can be considerably longer.
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Appendix D 
Explanatory variables used in 
multivariate analysis 
This appendix presents the average (mean) values of the explanatory variables used 
in the difference-in-differences (DiD) regressions. For the flow sample, outcomes 
are shown for those lone parents for whom outcomes are available 12 months 
after first becoming potentially eligible for In-Work Credit (IWC).
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Table D.2 Sample who left IS for work
Variable Comparison 
districts
Phase 1  
pilot 
districts
Phase 2  
pilot 
districts
Phase 3  
pilot 
districts
Phase 4  
pilot 
districts
Area-based	variables
In Scotland 12.0 0.0 14.1 0.0 0.0
In Wales 7.8 0.0 8.1 0.0 0.0
Proportion of lone parents in SOA 
who owned their property in 2001 
and in England or Wales
27.4 26.5 26.6 22.0 33.2
Proportion of lone parents in SOA 
who owned their property in 2001 
and in Scotland
2.4 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0
Day care places per child under 8 in 
2003–04 (weighted average of OA, 
SOA and ward)
0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Other centre-based care places per 
child under 8 in 2003–04 (weighted 
average of OA, SOA and ward)
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Childminder places per child under 8 
in 2003–04 (weighted average of OA, 
SOA and ward)
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
SOA in 2nd quartile of IMD in 
England
6.1 4.4 4.9 7.5 17.7
SOA in 3rd quartile of IMD in England 10.8 11.1 9.3 13.0 22.9
SOA in 4th quartile of IMD in England 18.9 30.9 20.2 28.0 28.0
SOA in 5th quartile of IMD in England 41.4 51.9 40.8 48.1 16.8
SOA in 2nd quartile of IMD in Wales 0.8 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
SOA in 3rd quartile of IMD in Wales 1.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0
SOA in 4th quartile of IMD in Wales 2.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0
SOA in 5th quartile of IMD in Wales 3.2 0.0 4.1 0.0 0.0
SOA in 2nd quartile of IMD in 
Scotland
0.7 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0
SOA in 3rd quartile of IMD in 
Scotland
1.7 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0
SOA in 4th quartile of IMD in 
Scotland
3.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0
SOA in 5th quartile of IMD in 
Scotland
6.4 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0
Lone parent employment rate in SOA 
in 2001
67.0 63.8 66.8 63.1 73.5
Percentage of workless lone parents 
in SOA with level 4 or 5 qualifications 
in 2001
5.1 7.9 6.1 10.0 6.1
Percentage of workless lone parents 
in SOA with level 3 qualifications in 
2001
5.5 7.3 6.1 8.6 6.2
Continued
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Table D.2 Continued
Variable Comparison 
districts
Phase 1  
pilot 
districts
Phase 2  
pilot 
districts
Phase 3  
pilot 
districts
Phase 4  
pilot 
districts
Percentage of workless lone parents 
in SOA with level 2 qualifications in 
2001
21.9 21.7 20.7 22.7 25.5
Percentage of workless lone parents 
in SOA with level 1 qualifications in 
2001
20.6 19.4 19.7 19.1 22.8
Percentage of workless lone parents 
in SOA with unknown qualifications 
in 2001
4.2 4.6 4.4 4.8 3.8
Percentage of Jobcentre offices in 
Jobcentre Plus district that were 
integrated when left IS for work
4.3 0.0 3.2 5.3 6.0
Unemployment in 2000/01 3.4 3.5 3.0 3.2 2.0
Unemployment in 2001/02 3.1 3.2 2.8 3.0 1.8
Unemployment in 2002/03 2.9 3.3 2.8 3.2 1.9
Unemployment in 2003/04 2.8 3.3 2.7 3.2 1.9
Unemployment in 2004/05 2.5 3.0 2.5 3.1 1.8
Unemployment in 2005/06 2.7 3.2 2.7 3.2 1.9
Unemployment in 2006/07 2.9 3.2 2.9 3.1 2.1
Unemployment in 2007/08 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.6 1.8
Individual-level	variables
Receiving benefits continuously in 
months –21 to –12
10.9 9.4 10.8 8.7 9.3
Left IS for work in April–June 26.1 24.2 25.4 24.2 26.5
Left IS for work in July–September 24.7 22.8 24.7 24.4 22.5
Left IS for work in October–December 30.8 31.8 30.6 29.8 31.5
White 84.8 58.2 78.1 43.6 80.1
Black 1.2 16.7 4.3 28.3 1.4
Asian 0.9 2.6 2.4 4.2 0.9
Chinese 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1
Mixed 0.7 2.3 1.4 3.2 0.6
Other 0.4 3.2 1.1 2.9 0.6
White and left IS for work after  
1 April 20041
40.0 29.1 38.7 22.0 38.3
Black and left IS for work after 1 April 
2004
0.6 8.7 2.3 14.9 0.7
Asian and left IS for work after  
1 April 2004
0.5 1.3 1.3 2.3 0.5
Chinese and left IS for work after  
1 April 2004
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Mixed and left IS for work after  
1 April 2004
0.4 1.4 0.8 2.0 0.4
Continued
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Table D.2 Continued
Variable Comparison 
districts
Phase 1  
pilot 
districts
Phase 2  
pilot 
districts
Phase 3  
pilot 
districts
Phase 4  
pilot 
districts
Other and left IS for work after  
1 April 2004
0.2 1.7 0.5 1.4 0.2
Male 4.5 4.2 4.6 3.9 4.0
Number of children 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Age of youngest child (years) 7.2 7.4 7.2 7.1 7.5
Amount of IS received at start of 
claim (£/wk)
8.6 8.7 8.9 8.6 9.1
Age 32.5 33.6 32.7 33.9 33.5
Percentage of months –30 to 0 in 
work
11.5 12.4 11.9 12.6 13.0
Joined NDLP in months –6 to –12 8.0 8.3 7.9 8.6 7.2
Joined NDLP before month –12 8.4 9.2 8.2 12.7 8.5
Ever on JSA in months –18 to 0 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.6 6.0
Ever received a disability benefit in 
months –18 to 0
10.1 6.2 9.0 5.9 6.0
Receiving Bereavement Benefit 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Receiving Disability Living Allowance 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.3 1.3
Receiving Incapacity Benefit 2.9 2.4 2.7 1.9 1.9
Receiving Carer’s Allowance 3.1 2.6 3.1 2.0 2.7
Receiving JSA 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.9
Receiving Severe Disablement 
Allowance
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Receiving Widow’s Benefit 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Not present in NBD 83.2 84.4 83.2 85.2 84.2
Amount of IS at start of claim missing 83.2 84.4 83.2 85.2 84.2
Had a one-day work spell in WPLS 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.4 11.8
Sample size 101,145 5,821 20,576 8,702 24,826
Notes: If no date is specified, then characteristics are measured on first date became potentially 
eligible for IWC. Months are measured relative to first date became potentially eligible for IWC. 
Indicators for Jobcentre Plus district, detailed work history indicators, detailed benefit history 
indicators and indicators for quarter of time are not shown. Outcomes are shown for those lone 
parents for whom outcomes are available 12 months after leaving IS for work.
1 The omitted category is ‘ethnicity not recorded’. The proportion of lone parents who are 
recorded as ‘ethnicity not recorded’ declines over time, and so the impact of ethnicity on the 
outcomes has been allowed to vary over time in a simple manner. 
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Appendix E 
The difference-in-differences 
estimator of the additional 
impact of the lone parent 
pilots
Many of the estimated impacts of the additional impact of the lone parent pilots 
(LPPs) presented in this report were calculated using a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) estimator. In particular, a DiD estimator was used to estimate the additional 
impact of the LPPs on:
• the flow of potentially eligible lone parents;
• the stock of potentially eligible lone parents;
• potentially eligible lone parents who left Income Support (IS) for work.
This appendix gives the theoretical justification for a DiD estimator and more 
details on the specifications used.
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Background
Identifying the impact of the LPPs on those who were potentially eligible for In-
Work Credit (IWC) requires the following key question to be answered: what 
would the outcomes of lone parents living in the pilot districts have been if they 
had not had access to the pilots? This is called the ‘counterfactual’. Constructing 
the counterfactual is the central issue that most evaluations face.13
Constructing the counterfactual – i.e. estimating what would have happened in 
the absence of the LPPs – can, in principle, be addressed with an appropriate 
comparison (or control) group which was not affected by the pilots. Such a group 
needs to be as similar as possible to the pilot group (to those lone parents whose 
IS/Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claim made them potentially eligible for the pilots), 
as the purpose of the comparison group is to provide a guide to the outcomes that 
lone parents in the pilot group would have achieved had they not been affected by 
the pilots. Given a suitable comparison group, and some important assumptions, 
it is then possible to estimate reliably the impact of the pilots on these outcomes. 
RR 415 explained why the preferred comparison group is lone parents who have 
been claiming IS/JSA for at least 12 months living in districts that are not affected 
by the LPPs. But it concluded that simply comparing the labour market outcomes 
of lone parents living in the pilot and comparison districts is not sufficient to obtain 
an unbiased estimate of the impact of the LPPs, because there are unobserved 
differences in some labour market outcomes (evidence supporting this is provided 
in Section 4.2 of this report, as well as in RR 415, Appendix J). However, if one is 
prepared to assume that these unobserved differences are changing in the same 
way over time across all districts, then the impact of the LPPs can be estimated using 
a DiD estimator. This is otherwise known as the ‘common trends’ assumption; it 
might mean, for example, that the level (the local unemployment rate) is different, 
but that the trend (the change in unemployment over time) is the same. 
This is the path taken in this report. In the simplest implementation of DiD using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression – where there is only one pilot and two time 
periods (before and after the pilot begins) – three indicator variables are required: 
the first indicates whether the individual lives in a pilot or comparison district; the 
second indicates whether the outcome in question is observed before or after the 
pilot was introduced; the third is the interaction of the first two variables (taking 
value 1 if the individual lives in the pilot district and has an outcome observed 
after the pilot has started and 0 otherwise). It is the estimated coefficient on the 
third variable that provides the estimate of the impact of the LPPs (see Box E.1 for 
details).
13 Some of this is taken from Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) Research 
Report 415 (RR 415). See also Blundell and Costa Dias (2000, 2008).
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Box E.1: DiD estimators
An alternative way of describing the DiD estimator in the simplest context is 
as follows:
Before policy After policy
Comparison 
districts
Pilot districts Comparison 
districts
Pilot districts
Lone parents B0 A0 B1 A1
If the letters A and B refer to the mean (average) outcome for pilot and 
comparison groups respectively, 0 indicates outcomes measured before 
the introduction of the LPPs and 1 indicates outcomes measured after the 
introduction of the LPPs, then, having controlled for differences in observable 
characteristics, the DiD estimator is given by (A1 – A0) – (B1 – B0). This is the 
trend (or difference) in outcomes in the pilot districts minus the equivalent 
trend in the comparison districts. It is also equal to (A1 – B1) – (A0 – B0), 
the amount by which the difference between pilot and comparison area 
outcomes changes after the policy. This is the difference in the difference 
(hence the name).
 
With a DiD estimator, it is necessary to measure outcomes and background 
characteristics for individuals in both pilot and comparison districts both before 
and after the introduction of the LPPs. The pilot districts were listed in Table A.2; 
rather than choosing a set of Jobcentre Plus districts to form the comparison 
group, this report uses all districts in Great Britain that operated neither the LPPs 
nor the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration as the 
comparison group.14 Data was used on potentially eligible lone parents from 
1 April 2001 to 31 March 2007.15
The drawback of this comparison group is that it comprises lone parents who 
live in different parts of the country from the lone parents who were potentially 
eligible for IWC. If there are characteristics of the neighbourhoods in which 
lone parents live (or characteristics of the lone parents themselves that differ 
across districts) that are important determinants of labour market outcomes but 
that cannot be controlled for in our analysis (i.e. that are unobservable to the 
14 Birmingham & Solihull, Glasgow, Liverpool and Oldham & Rochdale have 
been included in the comparison districts for the purposes of this evaluation, 
because the impact of the Childcare Tasters pilot alone was judged to 
be minimal. Three districts that operated only Quarterly Work Focused 
Interviews (QWFIs) were excluded from the pilot and comparison districts. 
One difference with RR 415 is that districts from Scotland and Wales are 
now included in the set of comparison districts.
15 RR 415 used April 2002 as the start date; this could affect the estimates of 
the impact of the LPPs, particularly for the stock sample.
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researcher), then the evaluation may attribute an effect to the LPPs that is in 
reality due to unobserved differences between the pilot and comparison groups. 
This possibility is exacerbated by the fact that the pilot districts were chosen for 
having particularly high lone parent shares in the IS caseload and particularly low 
off-flow rates from IS. For these reasons, the estimates control for a large number 
of personal and neighbourhood characteristics that are relevant to the likelihood 
of working or claiming benefits, in order to substantially reduce the remaining 
unobserved neighbourhood characteristics that might influence labour market 
outcomes. (See Appendix D of this report and Appendix C of RR 415 for more 
details about the local-area characteristics that are controlled for.)
Estimates based on DiD are only ever valid if the assumption of ‘common trends’ 
is true in practice. Verbally, this requires that any unobserved influences on 
labour market outcomes do not change in different ways between the pilot and 
comparison groups during the period under consideration. A common informal 
test of the ‘common trends’ assumption is to test for a ‘placebo effect’ – in other 
words, to apply the DiD method to a period of time (or even a group of districts) 
where it is known that there was no policy change and then to test whether the 
DiD estimator correctly estimates there to be no effect. Section 4.2 reports the 
results of a similar test, which examines whether the differences in outcomes 
between each of the pilot phases and the set of comparison districts are constant 
over the period before the LPPs began. 
A final concern for any attempts to recover the true impact of the LPPs is that 
the situation in this case is more complicated than in Box E.1. First, there is not 
one single date for implementation of the policy but instead, four phases, each 
with its own start date. Second, this report has access to data covering six years 
of outcomes and so a simple ‘before’ and ‘after’ split may be an inadequate 
specification of the underlying trends in outcomes. The analysis that looks at the 
flow sample therefore uses a generalisation of the simplest DiD model to allow 
for multiple time periods, multiple areas and multiple start dates; however, the 
principle is identical.
A DiD estimator can be implemented using either linear methods (OLS or fully 
interacted linear matching (FILM)) or propensity score matching (PSM) techniques. 
In previous work by the authors, estimates based on PSM took prohibitively long 
to calculate, and estimates using FILM were little different from those using OLS, 
and so all regressions were carried out using OLS with robust estimates of variance. 
Estimating the impact of the LPPs on work-contingent 
outcomes: dynamic selection bias 
The DiD methodology is an appropriate method for estimating the overall effect 
of the LPPs on the population of interest: lone parents who are potentially eligible 
for IWC. However, it is also interesting to estimate the impact of the LPPs for 
their recipients on outcomes such as job duration/retention or the time until 
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another IS claim (it is highly likely that these effects will be dominated by those 
of IWC). However, this is not entirely straightforward, because the change in the 
population of interest – from all potentially eligible lone parents to, for example, all 
lone parents who leave IS for work – introduces what economists call a ‘selection 
problem’, because the sub-group of interest is defined by the choices that the 
group made.
It is easiest to explain this by means of an example. Suppose one is interested in 
the effect of the LPPs on the duration of work spells. Further suppose that one 
could find a comparison group of lone parents that is, on average, just like the 
group who are potentially eligible for IWC (such as one that would have been 
achieved had lone parents been given eligibility for IWC through a randomised 
trial). This comparison group would allow us to estimate the effect of the LPPs 
on the transition into work by a straightforward comparison of group averages 
(means). However, such a comparison group would not allow us to estimate the 
effect of the LPPs on subsequent employment durations. The reason is as follows: 
if the original pilot districts and comparison group are, on average, the same but 
the LPPs lead to a larger fraction of the pilot districts gaining employment, the 
employed pilot districts members will not necessarily be the same, on average, as 
the employed comparison group members. Although some of these differences 
will be reflected in the data in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) 
(i.e. they are observable), some of them may not be (i.e. they are unobservable). 
To give an example, suppose that the key unobserved characteristic is intrinsic 
motivation: the most motivated find employment. Intrinsic motivation varies 
across individuals but is, on average, the same in the treatment and comparison 
groups of potentially eligible lone parents (that is the definition of a good 
comparison group). Suppose that the X per cent most motivated lone parents in 
the comparison group find work and the Y per cent most motivated individuals 
in the pilot districts find work; because the LPPs make it more likely that a lone 
parent will leave benefit for work, Y should be greater than X. But the average 
intrinsic motivation of employed members of the pilot districts will then not (in 
general) be equal to that of the employed members of the comparison group: if the 
treatment provides additional motivation to find work, then individuals in the pilot 
districts with lower intrinsic motivation will find work, and this in turn means that 
the average intrinsic motivation among employed members of the pilot districts 
will be lower than the average intrinsic motivation of employed members of the 
comparison group. A simple comparison of employment durations between the 
pilot districts and comparison group would then confound the true effect of the 
LPPs on employment durations with these differences in the intrinsic motivation 
of the employed members of the two groups (indeed, it would usually lead to an 
estimate of the treatment effect that is too small).
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This is an example of what economists call a ‘dynamic selection problem’. Initial 
randomisation – or the initial suitability of a DiD estimator – breaks down if we 
wish to study dynamic outcomes for a subset of the original population of interest, 
such as the duration of subsequent spells of employment and non-employment. 
Ham and Lalonde (1996) were the first to term this effect ‘dynamic selection bias’. 
Note that this argument does not mean that the DiD methodology cannot be 
used to examine the impact of the LPPs on employment outcomes: the problem 
of dynamic selection bias arises when an outcome of interest is only measurable 
for a subset of the population, and that subset is defined by choices they make. 
For example, Sections 4.1 and 4.3 report estimates of the impact of the LPPs 
on the likelihood that a potentially eligible lone parent is in work; because this 
outcome can be measured for all potentially eligible lone parents, there is no 
dynamic selection bias.
This report takes two approaches to the possible existence of dynamic selection 
bias when looking at outcomes for those potentially eligible lone parents who 
leave benefit for work:
• Estimates are presented from a DiD estimator that was implemented on 
potentially eligible lone parents who leave benefit for work, in order to estimate 
the impact of the LPPs on subsequent outcomes. As argued above, this will 
produce biased estimates of the true impact of the LPPs if there is dynamic 
selection bias. On the other hand, because the DiD estimators are able to control 
for a very wide range of characteristics of the lone parent and the area in which 
they live, including previous benefit and work histories, it is possible that the 
magnitude of any dynamic selection bias is small.
• Estimates are presented of the impact of the LPPs based on a duration model. 
These models explicitly account for the way that outcomes depend both on 
IWC and on the unobserved characteristics of treated and untreated individuals. 
Because the unobserved heterogeneity is explicitly modelled, there is no dynamic 
selection bias (provided that it is modelled correctly). 
Estimating the additional impact of the LPPs on the stock of 
potentially eligible lone parents 
For the stock sample, a relatively simple DiD estimator was implemented, as 
follows:16
y
igt
 = λ
t
 + α
g
 + xβ + z
igt
γ + u
igt
.
In this equation, i indexes individuals, g indexes whether in a pilot district or control 
district, and t is 0 or 1 (depending on whether the individual was observed before 
or after the LPPs began). The outcome of interest, λ
t
, depends on: γ, a set of time 
effects (i.e. in this case, an indicator for being observed after the LPPs began); 
16 The notation draws on Wooldridge (2007).
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α
g
, a constant; a set of individual-level characteristics, z
igt
; an individual-specific 
error term assumed to be independent and identically-distributed (iid) across 
individuals, u
igt
; and x, which is merely the interaction of an indicator for being in 
a pilot district with an indicator for being observed after the LPPs had begun. The 
coefficient β, therefore, gives the estimated impact of the LPPs.
This equation was estimated separately for each outcome γ (off benefit and 
in work) and separately for each duration d (the time between the actual or 
hypothetical pilot starting and the outcome being measured), and separately for 
each of the four pilot phases, making 36 regressions altogether, and with no 
constraints that any coefficients should be equal across any of the regressions. 
There would be an efficiency gain from estimating the set of regressions for each 
phase simultaneously, or in a panel data framework, but this has not been pursued. 
This DiD estimator does not make use of the fact that some individuals stop being 
eligible for the LPPs if they leave IS or if they remain on IS but move from a pilot 
into a comparison district, stop being responsible for a child or start to cohabit. 
Instead, the estimate of the impact of the LPPs should be thought of as estimating 
the ‘intention to treat’: the lone parents in the stock sample are those who were 
potentially eligible for the LPPs on their first day of operation, rather than those 
lone parents who were potentially eligible on any subsequent date.
Estimating the additional impact of the LPPs on the flow of 
potentially eligible lone parents, and the set of potentially 
eligible lone parents who left IS for work
For the flow sample, a more sophisticated approach was taken, which uses data 
on all pilot districts simultaneously and fully accounts for the different start dates 
of the LPPs in the four pilot phases. This leads to a generalisation of the simplest 
DiD estimator that allows for multiple time periods (in this case, 24 quarters), 
multiple areas of interest (in this case, four pilot phases and one set of comparison 
districts) and multiple implementation dates (in this case, four) of the policy. The 
main benefit of this method is that it uses more information: if the LPPs have 
a genuine effect, then we would expect to see that effect in the four different 
phases following the four different dates that the LPPs were introduced.
The equation estimated is therefore:17
y
igt
 = λ
t
 + α
g
 + x
gt
β + z
igt
γ + u
igt
.
The notation is as before, but this time λ
t
 is a full set of quarterly indicators or 
other ways of capturing changes over time, α
g
 is a full set of area effects (i.e. 
indicators for being in each of the four pilot phases or the comparison districts) 
and x
gt
 is a set of indicators that are 1 for being in a district that is operating the 
LPPs at that time. 
17 The following equation and notation are taken from Wooldridge (2007).
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Estimates of the impact of the LPPs were generated under a number of different 
ways of specifying the time effects, λ
t
, and the treatment effects, x
gt
. 
The time trend variants were:
1. a full set of quarterly indicators, common to all districts;
2. no time trend, but four indicators for whether the first date of potential 
eligibility occurred after the four start dates for the LPPs (irrespective of the 
district in which the lone parent was living);
3. separate quadratic time trends for each of the four phases plus the set of 
control districts, plus four indicators for whether the first date of potential 
eligibility occurred after the four start dates for the LPPs (irrespective of the 
district in which the lone parent was living);
4. separate linear time trends for each of the four phases and the set of control 
districts, plus a common quadratic time trend, plus four indicators for whether 
the first date of potential eligibility occurred after the four start dates for the 
LPPs (irrespective of the district in which the lone parent was living).
The treatment effect variants were:
1. x
gt
 constrained to be identical across all cohorts of lone parents and phases, i.e. x;
2. x
gt
 constrained to be identical across all cohorts of lone parents but different 
for each phase, i.e. x
g
;
3. x
gt
 different across cohorts of lone parents and for each phase, i.e. x
gt
.
In all cases, the time variables and the treatment impact variables were defined 
based on the first date of potential eligibility. In addition to this, an indicator 
variable was added for lone parents in the treatment districts if the first date of 
potential eligibility occurred before the start date of the LPPs but outcomes were 
measured after the start date of the LPPs; this ensures that these lone parents do 
not contribute to the estimate of the additional impact of the LPPs.
Separate estimates were then made of the impact of the LPPs on the two different 
outcomes (off benefit and in work), and the outcomes at different durations d 
(the time between first becoming potentially eligible for IWC and the outcome 
being measured). As with the stock sample, there would be an efficiency gain 
from estimating the combined set of regressions in a panel data framework, but 
this was not pursued. 
Like the DiD estimates for the stock samples, this estimator does not make use 
of the fact that some individuals stop being eligible for the LPPs if they leave IS or 
if they remain on IS but move from a pilot into a comparison district, stop being 
responsible for a child or start to cohabit. Instead, the estimate of the impact 
of the LPPs should be thought of as estimating the ‘intention to treat’: the lone 
parents in the flow sample are those who were potentially eligible for the LPPs 
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when their claim reached 12 months, rather than those lone parents who were 
potentially eligible on their first day of operation. 
The DiD estimator used on the set of potentially eligible lone parents who left IS 
for work was implemented in a very similar manner to this but with a different 
sample and measuring all dates relative to when the lone parent left IS for work.
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Appendix F 
Using a duration model to 
estimate the impact of the 
lone parent pilots
This report used a duration model to simulate how lone parents’ transitions onto 
and off benefit depend upon observable and unobservable characteristics, and 
potential eligibility for, or receipt of, In-Work Credit (IWC). This appendix provides 
details about this model.
The model has been designed as if the only part of the lone parent pilots (LPPs) 
were IWC, because it takes explicit account of which lone parents received IWC; 
however, it is possible that any effects attributed to IWC in the model were caused 
by other parts of the LPPs.
Given that this evaluation is seeking to understand the impact of IWC on whether 
lone parents are receiving out-of-work benefits or are in work, an ideal model 
would allow lone parents to be in one of three (exhaustive and mutually exclusive) 
states:
1. receiving an out-of-work benefit (for simplicity, the duration model defines ‘on 
benefit’ as being on Income Support (IS); this is different from the difference-
in-differences (DiD) analysis, where ‘off benefit’ is defined as ‘not receiving IS, 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) or Incapacity Benefit (IB)’).
2. not receiving an out-of-work benefit and in work for at least 16 hours per 
week;
3. not receiving an out-of-work benefit and working for fewer than 16 hours per 
week (including not working at all).
A duration model is based on data on transitions from one state to another: in 
this ideal model, there are six potential transitions (see Figure F.1). Although the 
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administrative data used in this project is in the form of spell data, it is often 
easier to work with discrete time data and to pretend that outcomes are observed 
only on specific dates and to ignore transitions between the states in the periods 
not observed. The transitions in Figure F.1 could be modelled as a function of 
observable and unobservable characteristics, as well as being potentially eligible 
for, or receiving, IWC; a simple way to do this is to express the probability of 
making each transition (sometimes known as ‘the hazard’) as a multinomial logit 
(one for each starting state). 
Figure F.1 Complete model of all work and benefit transitions
 
However, the data available to the authors was not sufficient to estimate this ideal 
model. As discussed in Section 3.1 (and in Department for Work and Pension 
(DWP) Research Report 415 (RR 415)), the employment data in the Work and 
Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) does not provide an accurate guide as to 
whether a lone parent is in work of 16 or more hours per week, with apparent 
errors in both directions: some lone parents are recorded as being in work when 
this seems to conflict with the out-of-work benefits that they are receiving, and 
some lone parents are not recorded in work when it seems highly likely that they 
are working for at least 16 hours a week (because they have recently left IS/JSA 
for IWC, for example; see Chapter 3). And, although some techniques based on 
linear regression can be adapted simply to deal with this sort of measurement 
error, adapting a duration model to account for measurement error is substantially 
more complicated. 
For this reason, the duration model estimated for this report does not use the 
employment data in the WPLS and that means that, for the vast majority of lone 
parents who stop receiving an out-of-work benefit, the model cannot tell whether 
they are working at least 16 hours a week or not. However, given the programme 
rules, lone parents receiving IWC are working 16 or more hours. 
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Given this problem with the data, the model estimated for this report takes full 
account of these data constraints in the following ways: 
• There are only two initial states – receiving an out-of-work benefit and not 
receiving an out-of-work benefit.
• The model uses data on only three transitions: 
i a transition from receiving an out-of-work benefit to work of 16 or more 
hours a week;
ii a transition from receiving an out-of-work benefit to work of 15 or fewer 
hours a week (including not working at all);
iii a transition from not receiving an out-of-work benefit to receiving an out-of-
work benefit. 
• It is only possible to distinguish between the first two transitions for lone parents 
who are potentially eligible for IWC and only if it is assumed that there is full 
take-up of IWC by those who are directly eligible. In particular, it has to be 
assumed that lone parents who are potentially eligible for IWC and then stop 
receiving IS move into work of 16 or more hours if and only if they then claim 
IWC (note that there is no way of reliably estimating the take-up rate of IWC 
amongst previously potentially eligible lone parents who stop receiving IS and 
move into work of 16 or more hours). This means that, for those lone parents 
who are not potentially eligible for IWC, the model simply examines transitions 
from receiving an out-of-work benefit to not receiving an out-of-work benefit, 
and it models this transition as the sum of the transition of leaving an out-of-
work benefit for work of 16 or more hours and the probability of leaving an 
out-of-work benefit for work of fewer than 16 hours.
• The transitions from receiving an out-of-work benefit are modelled using a 
multinomial logit model and the transition from not receiving an out-of-work 
benefit is modelled using a logit. 
To estimate the impact of IWC, the model allows the transition from receiving 
an out-of-work benefit to work of 16 or more hours a week to depend upon 
being potentially eligible for IWC and it allows the transition from not receiving an 
out-of-work benefit to receiving an out-of-work benefit to depend upon receipt of 
IWC. Since potential eligibility for IWC depends upon duration on IS, calendar time 
and whether a lone parent is in a pilot district or not, these variables themselves 
need to be included as explanatory factors so that our estimate of the impact of 
IWC identifies the genuine treatment effect rather than duration, time or area 
effects. In principle, then, the impact of being potentially eligible for IWC on the 
transitions into work of 16 or more hours can be identified in three ways:
i. from variation in the transition rates between lone parents in pilot and 
comparison districts observed at the same time and with the same duration on 
benefit;
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ii. from variation in the transition rates between lone parents in the same 
Jobcentre Plus district and with the same duration on benefit but before and 
after the introduction of IWC;
iii. from variation in the transition rates among lone parents in the same Jobcentre 
Plus district observed after the introduction of IWC but with different durations 
on benefit. 
Finally, the transitions are allowed to depend upon unobservable characteristics. 
Two versions of the model were estimated with different approaches to specifying 
the nature of this dependence:
1. The unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be uncorrelated across individuals 
and uncorrelated across time periods for a given individual. This is effectively 
assuming that there is no dynamic selection bias. 
2. The unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be uncorrelated across individuals 
but correlated for a given individual over time and between transitions. This 
models, explicitly, the process that gives rise to dynamic selection bias and 
therefore, allows its effect to be distinguished from that of a genuine impact 
of IWC. 
The WPLS does now contain tax credit information for lone parents who have at 
some point received a DWP benefit, but this was not available to the authors in 
time for this report. The authors hope that, if the tax credit data provides a more 
reliable guide as to who is in work of 16 or more hours, the duration model could 
be expanded so it is more like the ideal model.
Specifying the likelihood
The model is based on a standard utility-maximising framework in a discrete time 
setting where lone parents move from one state to another at time t if the utility 
gained from doing so is greater than the utility of remaining in the same state. 
Let the additional utility gained from moving from benefit to work of 16 or more 
hours at time t be:
 
, , , , ,(1) ( | )
t t
b w b w b w b w b wz t xθ β θ ε= + +
and the additional utility from moving from benefit to work of fewer than 16 
hours (including zero) at time t be: 
 
, , , , ,(2) ( | )
t t
b nw b nw b nw b nw b nwz t xθ β θ ε= + +
where x is a vector of observable characteristics such as number of children and 
age of youngest child (which affect the cost of working and the amount of benefit 
received out of work), θ is an individual random effect and ε is an error term. 
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If the error terms take independent and identically-distributed (iid) type 1 extreme 
value distributions, we can model the transitions using a multinomial logit model; 
this means that the probability of moving from benefit to work of 16 or more 
hours is modelled as:
 , ,
, ,
, , , ,
exp( ( | ))
(3) ( | )
1 exp( ( | )) exp( ( | ))
b w b w
b w b w
b w b w b nw b nw
z t
t
z t z t
θ
λ θ
θ θ
=
+ +
and the probability of a lone parent moving from benefit to work of fewer than 
16 hours (including zero) is:
, ,
, ,
, , , ,
exp( ( | ))
(4) ( | )
1 exp( ( | )) exp( ( | ))
b nw b nw
b nw b nw
b w b w b nw b nw
z t
t
z t z t
θ
λ θ
θ θ
=
+ +
while the probability of remaining on benefit is:
 
, , , ,
, , , ,
1
(5) 1 ( | ) ( | ) .
1 exp( ( | )) exp( ( | ))b w b w b nw b nw b w b w b nw b nw
t t
z t z t
λ θ λ θ
θ θ
− − =
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For those not potentially eligible for IWC, since we cannot observe their destination 
as discussed above, we model the probability of them leaving benefit as:
 
, , , ,
, , , ,
, , , ,
exp( ( | )) exp( ( | ))
(6) ( | ) ( | ) .
1 exp( ( | )) exp( ( | ))
b w b w b nw b nw
b w b w b nw b nw
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θ θ
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+ =
+ +
 
A similar reasoning can be used to model the probability of a lone parent starting 
a benefit claim as:
 
and the probability of them remaining off benefit as:
 
In the more general specification, we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity 
terms in the three equations follow the one factor structure:
 *
, , ,(9) i j i j i jcθ α θ= +
where θ* takes a two mass point discrete distribution and α
b,w
 = 0 and c
b,w
 = 1. 
While the fact that we only allow for two types of unobserved heterogeneity 
might seem limiting, increasing the number of points of support in these types of 
model usually has little impact on the results.
We take as our sample all IS and JSA claims starting later than 1 April 2001 
where the claimant is a lone parent at some point during that claim. We then 
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take quarterly observations on them from that point until the end of our data on 
31 March 2007. This gives us a very large sample size of over 1.4 million lone 
parents, from which, given the computational intensity of the model, we take a 
5 per cent sample, giving us a sample of over 70,000 lone parents and 1.1 million 
person-quarter observation points. A small set of the explanatory variables was 
used: number of children, age of youngest child, calendar time, duration in current 
state and indicators for living in each of the pilot phases. The model assumed that 
there were no effects of IWC on lone parents who were not potentially eligible for 
it (i.e. that there were no substitution or anticipation effects). The whole model is 
estimated using maximum likelihood.
Table F.1 shows the distribution of the number of transitions onto and off benefit 
made by lone parents during the period we observe them (this relates to the full 
population in the WPLS, rather than the 5 per cent sample used for estimating 
the model). Only a quarter of the sample have more than one transition, and 
this will limit the ability of the model to identify accurately the extent to which 
the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated across spells. All of the sample start 
on benefit, so an odd number of transitions (1, 3, 5, … ) means that they are 
off benefit at the end of the sample window, and zero or an even number of 
transitions (2, 4, 6, …) means that they are on benefit at the end of the sample 
window.
Table F.1 Transitions onto and off IS by lone parents
Number	of	transitions Number Proportion
Zero 151,061 10.4
One 929,339 64.1
Two 29,892 2.1
Three 257,549 17.8
Four 5,026 0.3
Five 61,350 4.2
Six or more (even) 857 0.1
Seven or more (odd) 15,221 1.0
All 1,450,295 100.0%
Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100 per cent due to rounding. Base is all IS claims starting 
on or after 1 April 2001 where the claimant was a lone parent at some point during the claim. 
Coefficient estimates
Tables F.2–F.7 show the estimated coefficients, including the impact of being 
potentially eligible for IWC on the transitions from receiving IS to work of 16 
or more hours, from receiving IS to work of fewer than 16 hours and from 
not receiving IS to receiving IS, both with and without controls for correlated 
unobserved heterogeneity. Three different models are estimated: a baseline model 
(Tables F.2 and F.3), which does not account for anticipation effects or breakdown 
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in the ‘common trends’ assumption after IWC is introduced; a model that allows 
for anticipation effects for those who are soon to become eligible to IWC (Tables 
F.4 and F.5); and a model where the probability of leaving benefit changes in the 
pilot areas after IWC is introduced (we refer to this as ‘time-varying area effects’) 
(Tables F.6 and F.7). 
Table F.2 Coefficient estimates for the transition from receiving  
 IS to work of 16 or more hours and the transition  
 from receiving IS to work of fewer than 16 hours: 
 baseline model
No	unobserved	heterogeneity Correlated	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
Constant –4.327 –2.624 N/A –0.009
(32.48)*** (103.40)*** (0.02)
Potentially eligible for IWC 0.490 N/A 0.528 N/A
(4.74)*** (4.49)***
Number of children –0.110 0.008 –0.121 0.003
(5.00)*** (1.28) (4.86)*** (0.41)
Youngest child aged < 1 –0.920 –0.500 –1.048 –0.507
(5.70)*** (20.84)*** (5.93)*** (21.77)***
Youngest child aged 1–3 –0.219 –0.407 –0.262 –0.429
(2.97)*** (19.67)*** (3.30)*** (20.46)***
Youngest child aged 3–5 –0.137 –0.253 –0.197 –0.272
(1.72)* (11.31)*** (2.24)** (12.16)***
Youngest child aged 5–11 –0.036 –0.293 –0.052 –0.301
(0.52) (15.19)*** (0.70) (15.16)***
Time trend –0.183 0.058 –0.186 0.045
(9.12)*** (6.20)*** (8.24)*** (4.05)***
Time2 0.461 –0.161 0.467 –0.135
(7.02)*** (6.58)*** (6.54)*** (4.91)***
Duration 0.044 –0.159 0.076 –0.137
(2.32)** (32.47)*** (3.69)*** (22.80)***
Duration2 –0.222 0.397 –0.277 0.347
(3.07)*** (18.72)*** (3.73)*** (14.31)***
In Phase 1 pilot area –0.191 –0.434 –0.152 –0.447
(1.54) (12.79)*** (0.87) (12.38)***
In Phase 2 pilot area 0.078 –0.178 0.138 –0.189
(0.73) (7.49)*** (0.86) (7.23)***
Continued
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Table F.2 Continued
No	unobserved	heterogeneity Correlated	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
In Phase 3 pilot area –0.336 –0.418 –0.305 –0.430
(2.88)*** (14.42)*** (1.88)* (13.73)***
In Phase 4 pilot area 0.069 –0.113 0.119 –0.116
(0.67) (5.05)*** (0.79) (4.82)***
Quarter 2 dummy 0.194 –0.110 0.153 –0.097
(2.16)** (4.45)*** (1.40) (3.69)***
Quarter 3 dummy 0.317 0.124 0.331 0.125
(4.51)*** (7.10)*** (4.52)*** (7.14)***
Quarter 4 dummy 0.208 –0.164 0.180 –0.152
(2.53)** (6.80)*** (1.80)* (5.68)***
Unobserved heterogeneity 
mass points:
Type 1 N/A –4.807
(20.24)***
Type 2 N/A –3.573
(20.91)***
Loading factor on 
unobserved heterogeneity 
component
N/A 1 
(fixed)
0.577 
(5.55)***
Proportion of lone parents 
of type 1
N/A 0.769
Log likelihood –283,820.62 –283,431.22
Sample size 72,439 72,439
Controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity
No Yes
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are based on equations 
(1) and (2) in the text. Estimates in ‘Correlated unobserved heterogeneity’ columns include 
unobserved heterogeneity terms as depicted in equation (9).
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Table F.3 Coefficient estimates for the transition from not  
 receiving IS to receiving IS: baseline model
No	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Correlated	
unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Not	receiving	IS	to	receiving	IS
Constant –3.004 0.066
(347.38)*** (0.14)
Receiving IWC –0.222 –0.160
(3.08)*** (2.11)**
Number of children –0.128 –0.133
(18.16)*** (17.88)***
Youngest child aged < 1 0.785 0.769
(21.55)*** (20.31)***
Youngest child aged 1–3 0.582 0.574
(25.25)*** (23.68)***
Youngest child aged 3–5 0.470 0.470
(19.60)*** (18.83)***
Youngest child aged 5–11 0.486 0.480
(24.55)*** (23.26)***
Time trend –0.017 –0.014
(3.00)*** (2.40)**
Time2 0.062 0.051
(3.48)*** (2.79)***
Duration –0.227 –0.211
(46.21)*** (39.80)***
Duration2 0.611 0.567
(21.96)*** (19.90)***
In Phase 1 pilot area –0.076 –0.092
(1.93)* (2.23)**
In Phase 2 pilot area –0.020 –0.034
(0.89) (1.45)
In Phase 3 pilot area –0.102 –0.123
(3.22)*** (3.67)***
In Phase 4 pilot area –0.087 –0.092
(4.25)*** (4.25)***
Quarter 2 dummy 0.100 0.103
(5.09)*** (5.18)***
Quarter 3 dummy 0.018 0.022
(0.93) (1.09)
Quarter 4 dummy –0.079 –0.078
(3.97)*** (3.90)***
Continued
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Table F.3 Continued
No	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Correlated	
unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Not	receiving	IS	to	receiving	IS
Loading factor on unobserved heterogeneity 
component
N/A 0.705
(5.93)***
Log likelihood –283,820.62 –283,431.22
Sample size 72,439
Controls for unobserved heterogeneity No Yes
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are based on equations 
(1) and (2) in the text. Estimates in ‘Correlated unobserved heterogeneity’ columns include 
unobserved heterogeneity terms as depicted in equation (9). 
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Table F.4  Coefficient estimates for the transition from receiving  
 IS to work of 16 or more hours and the transition  
 from receiving IS to work of fewer than 16 hours:  
 model with anticipation effects
No	unobserved	heterogeneity Correlated	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
Constant –4.313 –2.626 N/A –0.205
(30.15)*** (96.11)*** (.)
Potentially eligible for IWC 0.484 N/A 0.563 N/A
(4.61)*** (5.27)***
Will soon become eligible 
for IWC (anticipation effect)
–0.110 N/A 0.294 N/A
(0.25) (0.95)
Number of children –0.110 0.008 –0.125 0.000
(5.00)*** (1.31) (5.08)*** (0.07)
Youngest child aged < 1 –0.916 –0.500 –1.090 –0.511
(5.65)*** (20.73)*** (6.63)*** (22.66)***
Youngest child aged 1–3 –0.219 –0.408 –0.271 –0.424
(2.99)*** (19.53)*** (3.26)*** (20.56)***
Youngest child aged 3–5 –0.135 –0.254 –0.221 –0.267
(1.69)* (11.19)*** (2.54)** (12.89)***
Youngest child aged 5–11 –0.035 –0.294 –0.059 –0.295
(0.51) (14.86)*** (0.76) (16.46)***
Time trend –0.182 0.059 –0.188 0.039
(8.81)*** (6.09)*** (6.66)*** (5.64)***
Time2 0.455 –0.162 0.489 –0.123
(6.66)*** (6.54)*** (6.66)*** (6.33)***
Duration 0.043 –0.160 0.084 –0.134
(2.24)** (30.16)*** (4.19)*** (34.29)***
Duration2 –0.219 0.398 –0.293 0.336
(3.00)*** (17.98)*** (3.86)*** (18.33)***
In Phase 1 pilot area –0.200 –0.431 –0.046 –0.462
(1.58) (12.08)*** (0.33) (14.08)***
In Phase 2 pilot area 0.069 –0.176 0.244 –0.201
(0.61) (6.76)*** (1.89)* (8.68)***
In Phase 3 pilot area –0.346 –0.415 –0.206 –0.444
(2.87)*** (13.57)*** (1.47) (15.95)***
In Phase 4 pilot area 0.061 –0.111 0.211 –0.127
(0.57) (4.70)*** (1.62) (5.80)***
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Table F.4  Continued
No	unobserved	heterogeneity Correlated	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
Quarter 2 dummy 0.198 –0.111 0.102 –0.086
(2.19)** (4.34)*** (1.09) (4.61)***
Quarter 3 dummy 0.319 0.124 0.323 0.129
(4.53)*** (6.97)*** (4.33)*** (8.18)***
Quarter 4 dummy 0.211 –0.165 0.138 –0.140
(2.56)** (6.66)*** (1.55) (7.54)***
Unobserved heterogeneity 
mass points:
Type 1 N/A –4.999
(.)
Type 2 N/A –3.628
(85.40)***
Loading factor on 
unobserved heterogeneity 
mass point
N/A 1 
(fixed)
0.510 
(110.13)***
Proportion of lone parents 
of type 1
N/A 0.772
Log likelihood –283,820.27 –283,427.34
Sample size 72,439 72,439
Controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity
No Yes
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are based on equations 
(1) and (2) in the text. Estimates in ‘Correlated unobserved heterogeneity’ columns include 
unobserved heterogeneity terms as depicted in equation (9).
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Table F.5 Coefficient estimates for the transition from not  
 receiving IS to receiving IS: model with anticipation  
 effects
No	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Correlated	
unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Not	receiving	IS	to	receiving	IS
Constant –3.004 –0.137
(347.38)*** (.)
Receiving IWC –0.222 –0.281
(3.08)*** (3.79)***
Number of children –0.128 –0.133
(18.16)*** (17.89)***
Youngest child aged < 1 0.785 0.769
(21.55)*** (20.37)***
Youngest child aged 1–3 0.582 0.574
(25.25)*** (23.86)***
Youngest child aged 3–5 0.470 0.471
(19.60)*** (18.93)***
Youngest child aged 5–11 0.486 0.480
(24.55)*** (23.29)***
Time trend –0.017 –0.014
(3.00)*** (2.40)**
Time2 0.062 0.051
(3.48)*** (2.82)***
Duration –0.227 –0.211
(46.21)*** (42.13)***
Duration2 0.611 0.568
(21.96)*** (20.11)***
In Phase 1 pilot area –0.076 –0.090
(1.93)* (2.18)**
In Phase 2 pilot area –0.020 –0.032
(0.89) (1.38)
In Phase 3 pilot area –0.102 –0.122
(3.22)*** (3.62)***
In Phase 4 pilot area –0.087 –0.091
(4.25)*** (4.21)***
Quarter 2 dummy 0.100 0.103
(5.09)*** (5.18)***
Quarter 3 dummy 0.018 0.022
(0.93) (1.08)
Quarter 4 dummy –0.079 –0.078
(3.97)*** (3.91)***
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Table F.5 Continued
No	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Correlated	
unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Not	receiving	IS	to	receiving	IS
Loading factor on unobserved heterogeneity 
component
N/A 0.637
(101.99)***
Log likelihood –283,820.27 –283,427.34
Sample size: 72,439
Controls for unobserved heterogeneity No Yes
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are based on equations 
(1) and (2) in the text. Estimates in ‘Correlated unobserved heterogeneity’ columns include 
unobserved heterogeneity terms as depicted in equation (9).
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Table F.6 Coefficient estimates for the transition from receiving  
 IS to work of 16 or more hours and the transition from  
 receiving IS to work of fewer than 16 hours: model  
 with time-varying area effects
No	unobserved	heterogeneity Correlated	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
Constant –4.366 –2.603 N/A –2.295
(20.49)*** (67.59)*** (6.36)***
Potentially eligible for IWC 0.885 N/A 0.601 N/A
(4.45)*** (2.74)***
After IWC and in pilot area 
(failure of ‘common trends’ 
assumption)
–0.322 –0.044 –0.507 0.039
(1.35) (1.15) (2.76)*** (0.93)
Number of children –0.120 0.007 –0.130 0.008
(5.14)*** (1.12) (3.54)*** (1.14)
Youngest child aged < 1 –0.970 –0.500 –1.023 –0.484
(5.64)*** (21.06)*** (5.86)*** (16.91)***
Youngest child aged 1–3 –0.216 –0.405 –0.379 –0.412
(2.81)*** (20.00)*** (4.09)*** (16.66)***
Youngest child aged 3–5 –0.134 –0.253 –0.266 –0.262
(1.65)* (11.47)*** (2.60)*** (9.84)***
Youngest child aged 5–11 –0.018 –0.292 –0.007 –0.326
(0.25) (15.04)*** (0.08) (8.53)***
Time trend –0.184 0.054 –0.060 0.027
(7.06)*** (5.37)*** (1.84)* (4.26)***
Time2 0.468 –0.147 0.132 –0.084
(5.73)*** (5.66)*** (1.39) (4.57)***
Duration 0.049 –0.158 0.021 –0.146
(2.42)** (26.44)*** (0.35) (29.95)***
Duration2 –0.237 0.393 0.038 0.366
(3.13)*** (16.46)*** (0.20) (16.58)***
In Phase 1 pilot area –0.223 –0.399 –0.357 –0.385
(1.59) (10.26)*** (1.62) (6.96)***
In Phase 2 pilot area 0.043 –0.146 –0.064 –0.133
(0.34) (4.89)*** (0.28) (2.77)***
In Phase 3 pilot area –0.374 –0.393 –0.530 –0.372
(2.83)*** (12.35)*** (2.47)** (6.85)***
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Table F.6 Continued
No	unobserved	heterogeneity Correlated	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	16	or	
more	hours
Stops	
receiving	IS	for	
work	of	fewer	
than	16	hours	
(including	not	
working)
In Phase 4 pilot area 0.033 –0.091 –0.099 –0.067
(0.27) (3.44)*** (0.45) (1.39)
Quarter 2 dummy 0.177 –0.104 0.076 –0.096
(1.79)* (3.97)*** (0.88) (3.48)***
Quarter 3 dummy 0.327 0.125 0.407 0.092
(4.48)*** (6.89)*** (6.17)*** (3.57)***
Quarter 4 dummy 0.193 –0.158 0.128 –0.161
(2.11)** (5.93)*** (1.61) (5.48)***
Unobserved heterogeneity 
mass points:
Type 1 N/A –5.228
(.)
Type 2 N/A –2.586
(.)
Loading factor on 
unobserved heterogeneity 
component
N/A 1 
(fixed)
0.085 
(1.38)
Proportion of lone parents 
of type 1
N/A 0.746
Log likelihood –283,815.62 –283,495.14
Sample size 72,439 72,439
Controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity
No Yes
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are based on equations 
(1) and (2) in the text. Estimates in ‘Correlated unobserved heterogeneity’ columns include 
unobserved heterogeneity terms as depicted in equation (9).
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Table F.7 Coefficient estimates for the transition from not  
 receiving IS to receiving IS: model with time-varying  
 area effects
No	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Correlated	
unobserved	
heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Not	receiving	IS	to	receiving	IS
Constant –3.004 –1.535
(347.38)*** (16.21)***
Receiving IWC –0.222 –0.531
(3.08)*** (6.66)***
Number of children –0.128 –0.129
(18.16)*** (16.82)***
Youngest child aged < 1 0.785 0.797
(21.55)*** (20.47)***
Youngest child aged 1–3 0.582 0.588
(25.25)*** (23.39)***
Youngest child aged 3–5 0.470 0.474
(19.60)*** (18.74)***
Youngest child aged 5–11 0.486 0.474
(24.55)*** (22.26)***
Time trend –0.017 –0.016
(3.00)*** (2.58)***
Time2 0.062 0.056
(3.48)*** (3.03)***
Duration –0.227 –0.209
(46.21)*** (39.28)***
Duration2 0.611 0.568
(21.96)*** (19.96)***
In Phase 1 pilot area –0.076 –0.067
(1.93)* (1.50)
In Phase 2 pilot area –0.020 –0.013
(0.89) (0.47)
In Phase 3 pilot area –0.102 –0.098
(3.22)*** (2.62)***
In Phase 4 pilot area –0.087 –0.080
(4.25)*** (3.28)***
Quarter 2 dummy 0.100 0.105
(5.09)*** (5.31)***
Quarter 3 dummy 0.018 0.024
(0.93) (1.20)
Quarter 4 dummy –0.079 –0.078
(3.97)*** (3.90)***
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Table F.7 Continued
No	unobserved	
heterogeneity
Correlated	
unobserved	
heterogeneity
Loading factor on unobserved heterogeneity 
component
N/A 0.348
(20.09)***
Log likelihood –283,815.62 –283,495.15
Sample size: 72,439
Controls for unobserved heterogeneity No Yes
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Estimated coefficients are based on equations 
(1) and (2) in the text. Estimates in ‘Correlated unobserved heterogeneity’ columns include 
unobserved heterogeneity terms as depicted in equation (9).
A positive coefficient on a variable means that a higher value of that variable 
makes a transition more likely but the scale of the coefficients has no immediate 
interpretation. The following variables are associated with more frequent transitions 
from IS to work of 16 or more hours:
• having fewer dependent children;
• having older children;
• being in one of the comparison districts rather than one of the Phase 3 districts.
The following variables are associated with more frequent transitions from IS to 
work of fewer than 16 hours:
• having older children;
• being in one of the comparison districts rather than a pilot district.
The following variables are associated with less frequent transitions onto IS 
(conditional on having previously stopped an IS claim):
• having more dependent children;
• having older children;
• being in one of the Phase 3 or 4 districts rather than one of the comparison 
districts.
There are also statistically significant seasonal effects, time trends and duration 
impacts in all three transitions but these are harder to characterise. 
Anticipation effects are statistically insignificant in both the models with and 
without unobserved heterogeneity, although time-varying area effects are 
statistically significant in the model with unobserved heterogeneity. 
None of these results varies dramatically according to whether unobserved 
heterogeneity across individuals is accounted for or whether we allow for 
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anticipation or time-varying area effects, although there are small changes in the 
pure ‘duration dependence’ when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced. 
Finally, being potentially eligible for IWC is estimated to increase transitions into 
work of 16 or more hours, and receiving IWC is estimated to reduce transitions 
onto IS, in all the models. These effects are of similar magnitude in the baseline 
model and the model with anticipation effects but are much larger in the model 
with time-varying area effects. Introducing unobserved heterogeneity into the 
baseline model makes little difference to the size of these effects. The differences 
between the models with and without unobserved heterogeneity are greater in 
the models with anticipation effects and time-varying area effects. In the case of 
the model with anticipation effects, the impact of IWC is larger when unobserved 
heterogeneity is introduced. In the model with time-varying area effects, IWC has 
a smaller impact on transitions into work but a larger impact on transitions onto 
IS when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced. 
Simulating outcomes in the absence of IWC using calibrated 
random terms
The duration model can be used to estimate the impact of IWC by simulating 
how outcomes would change in the absence of IWC. This is done by using the 
estimated coefficients to simulate the probability of each transition occurring and 
then using a set of random numbers (corresponding to the error terms in the logit 
or multinomial logit) to decide whether each transition actually did occur at each 
point in time. By doing this successively over time, a simulated on- and off-benefit 
and on- and off-IWC profile is produced for each lone parent. 
For example, suppose that for a particular lone parent, there are predicted 
probabilities of 20 per cent, 15 per cent, 10 per cent and 5 per cent that there is 
a transition from receiving an out-of-work benefit to not receiving an out-of-work 
benefit in four successive quarters. A random number between 0 and 1 is then 
produced for each quarter. The rule used is that, if the random number is less than 
the predicted probability, the transition occurs. For example, if the four random 
numbers were 0.34, 0.87, 0.16 and 0.45, the simulated lone parent would remain 
on IS for all four quarters. If the four random numbers were 0.34, 0.87, 0.09 and 
0.45, the simulated lone parent would leave IS in the third quarter.
However, when using this method to simulate the impact of a policy, it is convenient 
to choose the random numbers so that the simulated outcomes are identical to 
the actual outcomes when the policy is in effect. This is known as calibrating the 
errors. For example, suppose a lone parent who is potentially eligible for IWC 
leaves IS for a job of 16 or more hours (and IWC) in the sixth quarter, and suppose 
that the predicted probability of leaving IS for a job of 16 or more hours in each 
quarter were given by 20 per cent, 15 per cent, 10 per cent, 5 per cent, 25 per 
cent and 20 per cent, with the rise in probability in the fifth quarter due to the 
lone parent becoming potentially eligible for IWC at that time. To be consistent 
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with the actual outcomes, the calibrated random terms for each quarter would 
have to lie between 0.20 and 1, 0.15 and 1, 0.10 and 1, 0.05 and 1, 0.25 and 1, 
and 0 and 0.2 respectively. 
Finally, suppose that the actual calibrated random numbers were 0.24, 0.78, 0.56, 
0.09, 0.36 and 0.18 and suppose that, in the absence of IWC, the predicted 
probabilities of leaving IS for a job of 16 or more hours in each quarter were given 
by 20 per cent, 15 per cent, 10 per cent, 5 per cent, 4 per cent and 3 per cent; 
note that the predicted probabilities in quarters 1–4 have not changed as the 
lone parent is not potentially eligible for IWC in those periods, but they are much 
lower in quarters 5 and 6. If the calibrated random terms are compared with these 
predicted probabilities in order to simulate outcomes in the absence of IWC, it can 
be seen that the simulation would suggest that this lone parent would not have 
left IS in the sixth quarter in the absence of IWC, as the calibrated random term of 
0.18 is higher than the predicted probability of 3 per cent. 
Figure F.2 shows the result of such a simulation for all IWC recipients in the sample. 
It shows the percentage who are simulated to receive IS and IWC in each quarter 
relative to when they actually received IWC. Outcomes are simulated with and 
without the existence of IWC: by construction, simulated outcomes with IWC are 
identical to the lone parents’ actual outcomes at this time. The figure is based on 
the model where there are no anticipation effects or time-varying area effects. 
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Figure F.2 Simulated outcomes for IWC recipients in the absence  
 of the LPPs 
 
Figure F.3 shows the result of a simulation for all those who start a benefit claim 
after IWC is introduced in their area and includes results from the model variants 
where we allow for anticipation effects and time-varying area effects. We see that 
any anticipation effects are very small; however, the effect of IWC increases if we 
allow for time-varying area effects. 
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Figure F.3 Impact of IWC on proportion of potentially eligible lone 
 parents off benefit in different models
 
Figure F.2 confirms analysis in Chapter 3 of this report that:
• around seven out of ten IWC recipients remain on IWC for the full 12 months;
• there is no evidence that substantial numbers of IWC recipients go on to claim 
IS when their IWC payments stop after 12 months. 
What the duration model adds are the grey lines, which simulate what fraction of 
IWC recipients would have left IS anyway without IWC: the difference between 
this and the fraction who in reality left IS gives the net impact of IWC (expressed 
as a fraction of its recipients). Figure F.2 shows that: 
• around 40 per cent of IWC recipients would not have left benefit when they did 
in the absence of the LPPs. This is, therefore, the initial impact of the LPPs, so 
the initial level of deadweight is around 60 per cent;
• the impact falls over time and two years later it is only half its initial magnitude. 
The decline is gradual, though, and there is no evidence that the impact of IWC 
ceases once payments of it stop after 12 months. 
A comparison of the models with and without unobserved heterogeneity suggests 
that:
Appendices – Using a duration model to estimate the impact of the lone  
parent pilots
195
• models with no unobserved heterogeneity are clearly rejected in favour of 
models with correlated unobserved heterogeneity (the likelihood ratio test for 
the baseline model has a value of 778.8, which is highly statistically significant);
• the specification of the unobserved heterogeneity allowed there to be two types 
of lone parents, with different propensities to leave benefit for work of 16 or 
more hours, to leave benefit for work of less than 16 hours and to start a benefit 
claim. In all three models, the fact that the loading factors on the unobserved 
heterogeneity components are positive in all equations imply that, rather than 
one of these types being unambiguously more likely to be off benefit at any 
point in time, instead, one of these types is more likely to make a transition at 
any point in time; this is the same as was found by similar studies (e.g. Ham and 
Lalonde, 1996; Zabel et	al., 2004, 2006). This means that failing to account for 
selection effects when comparing the length of time off benefit for lone parents 
leaving benefit in the pilot and control areas will bias the estimate of the effect 
of the LPPs upwards. This is because, according to the duration model, the LPPs 
induce more lone parents who are both less likely to leave benefit and less likely 
to leave work to leave benefit than would otherwise have done so. Despite this, 
however, comparing Figure F.3 and Table 4.1 shows that the duration model’s 
estimates of the effect of the LPPs on the length of time spent off benefit are 
slightly larger than those from the DiD model, considerably so in the case of the 
duration model with time-varying area effects;
• allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity does change some of the 
important coefficients in the model. In the baseline model, although there are 
some changes to the duration dependence when unobserved heterogeneity is 
added, the simulation of the effect of the LPPs on the proportion of lone parents 
off benefit is virtually unaffected. However, the effect of the LPPs is slightly larger 
when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for in the model with anticipation 
effects. In the model with time-varying area effects, the estimated impact of 
IWC is smaller when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. 
Comparing the results from the baseline model with the models with anticipation 
effects and time-varying area effects (Figure F.3) suggests that: 
• allowing for anticipation effects makes very little difference to the overall 
results – the anticipation effects are small and statistically insignificant in both 
the models with and without unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, in the model 
without unobserved heterogeneity, the results suggest that lone parents are 
more likely to leave benefit in the first 12 months after the introduction of IWC, 
which is contrary to what we would expect from economic theory;
• allowing for time-varying area effects increases the effect of IWC on the 
proportion of lone parents off benefit by up to 1 percentage point in the model 
where unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for, although the coefficient 
is statistically insignificant. In the model with unobserved heterogeneity, the 
time-varying area effect is statistically significant but the estimated impact of 
IWC is smaller. 
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Appendix G 
Supplementary analysis of 
IWC recipients
Table G.1 shows the number of starts of In-Work Credit (IWC) by phase and by 
month (up to 31 March 2007). This data is used in the estimates of take-up shown 
in Chapter 3. It shows that:
• there is considerable variation across the year in IWC starts, with September 
being the month with the highest number of IWC starts, and smaller peaks 
in January and May (disregarding the initial surges in Phases 2 and 4, which 
happen in November);
• in Phases 2 and 4, there is evidence of a surge of claims in the first full month that 
the IWC was operating (November 2004 and 2005 respectively). This suggests 
either that lone parents were delaying leaving Income Support (IS) and starting 
work until the IWC began or that some lone parents were making retrospective 
IWC claims as soon as the policy began for jobs that they had recently started;
• the administrative data suggests a very small number of IWC claims started 
before the policy became available.
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Table G.1 IWC starts, by phase and month 
Month Year Not	an	
IWC	
district
Phase	1 Phase	2 Phase	3 Phase	4 Unknown Total
1 2004 1 1
2 2004 2 1 3
3 2004 19 19
4 2004 94 3 1 98
5 2004 103 3 3 2 111
6 2004 1 122 3 126
7 2004 85 5 2 92
8 2004 99 2 3 2 106
9 2004 1 234 4 3 242
10 2004 1 191 181 3 3 1 380
11 2004 4 263 745 8 2 1,022
12 2004 2 88 243 4 337
1 2005 1 170 450 6 3 2 632
2 2005 4 192 498 12 4 2 712
3 2005 2 171 549 37 3 1 763
4 2005 6 210 583 193 5 2 999
5 2005 2 178 669 228 2 4 1,083
6 2005 3 178 502 180 2 4 869
7 2005 4 147 462 177 2 1 793
8 2005 5 165 528 204 3 4 909
9 2005 2 295 833 386 7 6 1,529
10 2005 3 227 764 300 22 2 1,318
11 2005 11 303 904 359 1,054 5 2,636
12 2005 5 129 358 166 373 3 1,034
1 2006 3 243 568 350 791 4 1,959
2 2006 7 184 547 281 684 13 1,716
3 2006 7 195 550 245 663 7 1,667
4 2006 10 192 535 284 666 6 1,693
5 2006 10 195 618 275 836 13 1,947
6 2006 7 149 496 244 681 12 1,589
7 2006 8 146 454 210 592 8 1,418
8 2006 4 131 508 250 682 9 1,584
9 2006 10 263 826 435 1,262 18 2,814
10 2006 13 270 822 405 1,026 16 2,552
11 2006 10 209 642 375 822 12 2,070
12 2006 8 110 358 195 434 10 1,115
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Table G.1 Continued
Month Year Not	an	
IWC	
district
Phase	1 Phase	2 Phase	3 Phase	4 Unknown Total
1 2007 10 211 557 371 700 18 1,867
2 2007 6 193 494 314 650 10 1,667
3 2007 6 201 528 310 673 17 1,735
All 176 6,558 16,778 6,828 12,653 214 43,207
Monthly 
average
5 182 559 285 703 6 1,200
Base is all IWC claims that started on or before 31 March 2007. 
Source: Individual-level data on IWC payment dates and amounts. 
Notes: The relevant phase is imputed by merging in Jobcentre Plus district based on postcode 
(using encrypted National Insurance number (NINO)) from the IS History database. ‘Unknown’ 
represents IWC claims for which a relevant IS claim from a lone parent could not be found; 
these may therefore be IWC claims from eligible partners. ‘Not an IWC district’ indicates that 
the postcode held in the IS History database around the time that the IWC claim started is not 
in a lone parent pilot (LPP) district. ‘Monthly average’ is defined over 36 months for Phase 1, 
30 months for Phase 2, 24 months for Phase 3, 18 months for Phase 4 and 36 months for the 
remaining averages.
Figures G.1 and G.2 split the sample of potentially eligible lone parents into the 
stock and flow respectively, and show the take-up rate of IWC. For both figures, 
the variations by district and over time are extremely similar to those in Figure 3.1. 
Note that for Figure G.2, the horizontal axis no longer measures time since the LPPs 
began but measures the time that the lone parents have been potentially eligible 
for IWC. This means that the denominator is not constant across the horizontal 
axis: almost all lone parents in the flow sample have been potentially eligible for 
a month and so contribute to the first data point but very few lone parents have 
been potentially eligible for over 30 months. The surge in month 1 reflects those 
lone parents in the flow sample who, according to the administrative data, first 
received IWC before becoming potentially eligible for it; this could reflect errors 
in the administrative data over the start dates of IWC, or errors in the IS History 
database from which the authors estimated the first date on which lone parents 
were potentially eligible for IWC. The downturn for Phase 3 towards the end of 
the series may reflect the very small sample or delays in IWC awards that genuinely 
began towards the end of the sample window appearing in the administrative data.
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Figure G.1 Take-up measure (i): recipients of IWC as percentage  
 of all lone parents in stock sample, by phase and month 
 since LPPs started (up to 31 March 2007)
This analysis is based on individual-level data on IWC payment dates and amounts; 
the relevant phase is imputed by merging in (using encrypted NINO) a postcode 
variable (and hence, Jobcentre Plus district) from the IS History database. The 
data on payments of IWC included some partners who are also eligible for IWC. 
However, the overwhelming majority of IWC recipients are lone parents and those 
who are not lone parents will not have been matched to a district, and so will not 
have been used in the analysis in this appendix.
Table G.2 is designed to highlight the relationship between some of the sources 
of administrative data that are used for this project. Specifically, it is designed 
to show how many lone parents who leave IS (according to the IS History file) 
have an employment spell (recorded in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
(WPLS)) starting within a certain amount of time of their IS spell ending.
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Figure G.2 Take-up measure (i): recipients of IWC as a percentage  
  of all lone parents in flow sample, by phase and month  
 since first eligible for IWC (up to 31 March 2007)
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Table G.2 Percentage of IS claims with an employment spell  
 starting within some period of the end date
Percentage	
of	IS	claims	
with	an	
employment	
spell	starting	
within	some	
period	of	the	
end	date,	
where	the	
period	is:
All Leave	
IS	for	
IWC	and	
claim	
IWC	
for	at	
least	11	
months
Leave	
IS	for	
IWC	and	
claim	
IWC	for	
between	
6	and	11	
months
Leave	
IS	for	
IWC	and	
claim	
IWC	for	
less	than	
6	months
Leave	IS	
after	12	
months	
in	the	
pilot	
areas	but	
not	for	
IWC
Leave	IS	
after	less	
than	12	
months	
in	the	
pilot	
areas
Leave	IS	
after	12	
months	
in	the	
comparison	
areas
2 weeks or 
less
14.2 32.5 30.9 30.1 5.0 12.9 13.4
2 weeks to  
1 month
11.0 20.3 20.1 18.4 4.7 9.8 11.6
1 to 3 
months
9.3 6.9 8.4 9.7 7.8 11.2 8.5
3 to 6 
months
6.2 3.5 5.4 3.7 5.8 7.8 5.3
6 to 12 
months
8.8 5.4 6.7 5.3 8.1 10.4 7.6
Over 12 
months
29.1 20.9 19.4 23.2 33.4 31.3 28.9
No 
employment 
spell
21.5 10.5 9.1 9.6 35.3 16.7 24.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sample size 417,770 12,625 2,894 2,765 48,239 30,903 201,761
Notes: Based on DWP administrative data described in Appendix B. 
Sample is all lone parents in pilot districts who leave IS between the introduction of the pilots 
and 31 March 2006, and all lone parents in comparison districts who leave IS having claimed for 
at least 12 months between the introduction of the pilots and 31 March 2006. IWC claim length 
is defined using spell start and end dates.
As a condition of receipt, IWC recipients should have stopped claiming benefit 
and started working within a relatively short space of time. However, Table G.2 
highlights the limitations of the employment data in the WPLS, as only around 
half of known IWC recipients are recorded as having an employment spell starting 
within a month of their IS spell ending.
Figures G.3 to G.8 compare the benefit and work outcomes of various groups 
of lone parent IS leavers whose IS claim was less than 12 months old when the 
pilots were introduced. This can be thought of as the ‘flow’ sample of IS leavers. 
These figures are equivalent to those in Section 3.2 except the latter document 
the benefit and work outcomes of all lone parent IS leavers (i.e. including those 
whose claim was already at least 12 months old when the pilots were introduced).
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Figures G.3 and G.4 compare the benefit and work profiles of all lone parents in 
the flow sample who leave IS after claiming for at least 12 months in pilot districts 
(including IWC recipients), all lone parents in the flow sample who leave IS after 
claiming for at least 12 months in comparison districts and all lone parents in the 
flow sample who leave IS after claiming for less than 12 months in pilot districts. 
Figure G.3 Benefit outcomes for lone parent IS leavers whose  
 IS claim was less than 12 months old on the day the  
 pilots were introduced
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Figure G.4 Work outcomes for lone parent IS leavers whose IS  
 claim was less than 12 months old on the day the pilots  
 were introduced
 
Figures G.5 and G.6 split the group of lone parents in the flow sample who have 
been claiming IS for at least 12 months in pilot districts into two groups: those 
who leave IS for IWC and those who do not. The work and benefit outcomes 
of these two groups are then compared with those of lone parents in the flow 
sample in comparison districts who have claimed IS for at least 12 months. 
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Figure G.5 Benefit outcomes for lone parent IS leavers whose IS  
 claim lasts at least 12 months, but was less than 12  
 months old on the day the pilots were introduced
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Figure G.6 Work outcomes for lone parent IS leavers whose IS  
 claim lasts at least 12 months, but was less than 12  
 months old on the day the pilots were introduced
Figures G.7 and G.8 illustrate the benefit and work profiles for IWC recipients 
from the flow sample split according to length of IWC claim.
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Figure G.7 Benefit outcomes for IWC recipients whose IS claim was 
 less than 12 months old on the day the pilots were  
 introduced
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Figure G.8 Work outcomes for IWC recipients whose IS claim was  
 less than 12 months old on the day the pilots were  
 introduced
In all cases, the main difference between the patterns of work and benefit receipt 
for all lone parent IS leavers (shown in Chapter 3) and those of lone parent IS 
leavers in the flow sample (shown here) is that lone parent IS leavers in the flow 
sample are more likely to have been in work and less likely to have been on benefit 
between 12 and 24 months prior to leaving IS than all lone parent IS leavers. After 
leaving IS, the patterns are virtually identical for both groups of lone parents.
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Appendix H 
Average (mean) outcomes 
and sample sizes for 
difference-in-differences 
analysis 
Tables H.1 to H.10 show mean work and benefit outcomes and sample sizes for 
the pilot and comparison groups by phase, before and after the introduction of 
the pilots, and for the stock and flow samples separately. These figures relate to 
the main difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis described in Chapter 4.
Table H.1 Average level of benefit outcomes pre-policy:  
 flow sample
Percentage 
off benefit 
after X 
months
Level for 
comparison 
group (%)
Pilot group 
(all phases) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 1) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 2) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 3) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 4) 
(%)
6 12.6 11.4 9.4 11.4 8.8 13.1
12 20.1 18.3 15.2 18.2 14.5 20.9
18 25.5 23.5 19.7 23.4 19.0 26.6
24 29.5 27.2 23.2 27.2 22.5 30.6
30 33.1 30.6 26.6 30.7 25.6 34.2
36 35.9 33.1 29.3 33.0 27.9 37.0
Base: All lone parents in flow sample (see Appendix B). Sample sizes given in Table H.5. 
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Table H.2 Average level of benefit outcomes post-policy:  
 flow sample
Percentage 
off benefit 
after X 
months
Level for 
comparison 
group (%)
Pilot group 
(all phases) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 1) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 2) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 3) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 4) 
(%)
6 13.2 11.8 9.6 12.9 9.5 13.8
12 20.5 18.2 15.5 19.8 15.3 21.8
18 26.0 22.5 20.6 24.6 20.6 N/A
24 29.7 25.9 23.9 27.9 N/A N/A
30 33.9 27.3 27.3 N/A N/A N/A
36 34.5 31.2 31.2 N/A N/A N/A
Base: All lone parents in flow sample (see Appendix B). Sample sizes given in Table H.6.
Table H.3 Average level of work outcomes pre-policy:  
 flow sample
Percentage 
in work 
after X 
months
Level for 
comparison 
group (%)
Pilot group 
(all phases) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 1) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 2) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 3) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 4) 
(%)
6 18.5 17.8 16.4 17.6 16.7 18.7
12 20.8 19.6 17.6 19.7 18.0 20.7
18 22.6 20.8 18.9 21.2 18.5 22.0
24 24.0 21.8 19.9 21.9 19.2 23.6
30 25.2 23.1 21.0 23.1 20.4 25.1
36 25.9 24.1 21.4 24.4 21.5 26.2
Base: All lone parents in flow sample (see Appendix B). Sample sizes given in Table H.5. 
Table H.4 Average level of work outcomes post-policy:  
 flow sample
Percentage 
in work 
after X 
months
Level for 
comparison 
group (%)
Pilot group 
(all phases) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 1) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 2) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 3) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 4) 
(%)
6 14.3 12.0 11.9 12.8 10.8 11.6
12 17.0 14.3 14.3 15.3 12.5 14.3
18 18.5 15.6 15.4 16.1 14.6 N/A
24 19.3 16.7 15.7 17.6 N/A N/A
30 21.1 16.6 16.6 N/A N/A N/A
36 22.3 22.0 22.0 N/A N/A N/A
Base: All lone parents in flow sample (see Appendix B). Sample sizes given in Table H.6. 
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Table H.5 Sample sizes, flow sample (benefit and work  
 outcomes), pre-policy
Comparison 
group
Pilot group 
(all phases) 
Pilot group 
(Phase 1)
Pilot group 
(Phase 2)
Pilot group 
(Phase 3)
Pilot group 
(Phase 4)
6 301,586 289,278 26,801 81,450 57,450 123,577
12 301,586 289,278 26,801 81,450 57,450 123,577
18 301,586 287,472 26,801 81,450 57,450 121,771
24 301,586 275,571 26,801 81,450 57,446 109,874
30 301,586 255,381 26,801 80,383 50,820 97,377
36 301,586 224,959 26,801 69,787 43,981 84,390
Base: All lone parents in flow sample (see Appendix B). 
Table H.6 Sample sizes, flow sample (benefit and work  
 outcomes), post-policy
Comparison 
group
Pilot group 
(all phases) 
Pilot group 
(Phase 1)
Pilot group 
(Phase 2)
Pilot group 
(Phase 3)
Pilot group 
(Phase 4)
6 212,406 102,433 21,079 38,175 19,808 23,371
12 168,763 68,140 16,862 28,026 12,915 10,337
18 128,546 37,835 12,841 18,335 6,659 N/A
24 89,275 17,407 8,635 8,772 N/A N/A
30 46,858 4,509 4,509 N/A N/A N/A
36 1,824 141 141 N/A N/A N/A
Base: All lone parents in flow sample (see Appendix B). 
Table H.7 Average level of benefit outcomes pre-policy:  
 stock sample
Percentage 
off benefit 
after X 
months
Control 
group, 
Phase 1 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 2 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 3 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 4 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 1 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 2 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 3 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 4 
(%)
6 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 6.0 7.1 5.7 9.2
12 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 11.5 13.0 10.6 16.6
18 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 14.7 16.8 13.9 21.1
24 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 18.6 21.1 17.6 25.9
30 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8 21.2 23.7 20.0 28.9
36 29.2 29.2 29.2 29.2 24.3 26.7 22.9 32.3
Sample 
size
410,528 410,528 410,528 410,528 42,863 100,224 74,524 107,660
Base: All lone parents in stock sample (see Appendix B). 
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Table H.8 Average level of benefit outcomes post-policy:  
 stock sample
Percentage 
off benefit 
after X 
months
Control 
group, 
Phase 1 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 2 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 3 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 4 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 1 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 2 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 3 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 4 
(%)
6 7.8 8.3 7.7 7.3 5.0 7.3 5.2 8.6
12 14.3 14.0 13.2 12.5 10.6 12.5 9.6 14.7
18 18.4 18.2 16.9 16.2 13.9 16.8 12.8 19.0
24 22.3 21.4 20.9 N/A 17.7 19.9 16.8 N/A
30 24.7 24.6 N/A N/A 20.0 23.0 N/A N/A
36 27.7 N/A N/A N/A 23.1 N/A N/A N/A
Sample 
size
383,423 372,180 361,484 348,069 43,204 95,613 72,910 99,883
Base: All lone parents in stock sample (see Appendix B). 
Table H.9 Average level of work outcomes pre-policy:  
 stock sample
Percentage 
in work 
after X 
months
Control 
group, 
Phase 1 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 2 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 3 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 4 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 1 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 2 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 3 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 4 
(%)
6 17.2 17.2 17.2 17.2 16.4 16.9 17.3 19.8
12 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4 17.9 18.8 18.5 22.2
18 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 18.6 20.2 18.8 23.5
24 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 17.7 19.0 18.1 22.8
30 23.4 23.4 23.4 23.4 19.3 21.4 19.3 25.2
36 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 20.8 23.0 20.5 26.8
Sample 
size
410,528 410,528 410,528 410,528 42,863 100,224 74,524 107,660
Base: All lone parents in stock sample (see Appendix B). 
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Table H.10 Average level of work outcomes post-policy:  
 stock sample
Percentage 
in work 
after X 
months
Control 
group, 
Phase 1 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 2 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 3 
(%)
Control 
group, 
Phase 4 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 1 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 2 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 3 
(%)
Pilot 
group, 
Phase 4 
(%)
6 13.7 13.4 12.8 10.8 11.6 12.6 11.6 12.3
12 16.1 15.8 13.9 12.7 13.7 14.8 12.6 14.4
18 18.3 15.9 14.8 13.3 15.1 15.1 13.2 15.3
24 18.6 17.1 15.6 N/A 15.7 16.1 14.0 N/A
30 19.1 17.5 N/A N/A 15.7 16.6 N/A N/A
36 19.6 N/A N/A N/A 16.4 N/A N/A N/A
Sample 
size
383,423 372,180 361,484 348,069 43,204 95,613 72,910 99,883
Base: All lone parents in stock sample (see Appendix B). 
Tables H.11 to H.14 show mean work and benefit outcomes and sample sizes 
for the pilot and comparison groups by phase, before and after the introduction 
of the pilots. These figures relate to the Income Support (IS) leavers DiD analysis 
described in Chapter 8.
Table H.11 Average level of benefit outcomes for IS leavers  
 pre-policy: flow sample
Percentage 
off benefit 
after X 
months
Level for 
comparison 
group (%)
Pilot group 
(all phases) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 1) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 2) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 3) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 4) 
(%)
6 76.3 78.6 79.3 76.7 79.3 79.7
12 72.1 73.5 73.4 72.3 73.8 74.4
18 70.9 71.9 72.2 71.1 71.4 72.6
24 70.4 71.3 72.2 70.4 71.2 71.8
30 70.3 70.4 71.1 69.8 69.7 71.0
36 70.3 70.0 70.6 69.4 68.6 70.7
Sample 
size
55,858 32,110 2,997 10,871 4,475 13,767
Base: All potentially eligible lone parents who left IS for work (see Box 8.1). 
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Table H.12 Average level of work outcomes for IS leavers  
 pre-policy: flow sample
Percentage 
off benefit 
after X 
months
Level for 
comparison 
group (%)
Pilot group 
(all phases) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 1) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 2) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 3) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 4) 
(%)
6 71.7 73.9 76.1 72.6 77.0 73.5
12 67.4 68.9 71.2 68.3 71.0 68.1
18 64.8 65.9 68.1 65.7 67.5 65.0
24 64.1 64.6 66.7 64.6 65.6 63.8
30 61.1 61.9 62.9 61.8 62.9 61.5
36 58.9 59.7 61.1 59.8 60.1 59.2
Sample 
size
55,858 32,110 2,997 10,871 4,475 13,767
Base: All potentially eligible lone parents who left IS for work (see Box 8.1). 
Table H.13 Average level of benefit outcomes for IS leavers  
 post-policy: flow sample
Percentage 
off benefit 
after X 
months
Level for 
comparison 
group (%)
Pilot group 
(all phases) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 1) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 2) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 3) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 4) 
(%)
6 75.3 79.2 80.2 77.9 80.6 79.5
12 70.6 73.6 75.2 71.9 75.1 74.1
18 69.3 71.7 72.9 70.2 72.6 72.2
24 68.3 70.2 72.0 68.9 70.2 70.8
30 68.8 71.4 74.2 69.9 71.3 72.0
36 69.9 73.3 67.6 71.7 82.3 72.5
Sample 
size
61,554 39,632 4,017 13,477 6,175 15,963
Base: All potentially eligible lone parents who left IS for work (see Box 8.1). 
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Table H.14 Average level of work outcomes for IS leavers  
 post-policy: flow sample
Percentage 
off benefit 
after X 
months
Level for 
comparison 
group (%)
Pilot group 
(all phases) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 1) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 2) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 3) 
(%)
Pilot group 
(Phase 4) 
(%)
6 75.1 78.3 78.4 77.8 80.9 77.7
12 66.2 68.7 69.5 68.0 70.9 68.3
18 60.4 62.7 63.7 61.6 64.8 62.6
24 56.9 59.8 62.6 58.5 60.3 60.0
30 55.5 57.8 60.1 56.2 58.7 58.1
36 51.3 56.4 55.9 51.3 62.9 58.2
Sample 
size
61,554 39,632 4,017 13,477 6,175 15,963
Base: All potentially eligible lone parents who left IS for work (see Box 8.1). 
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Appendix I 
Testing for pre-programme 
‘common trends’
As explained in Appendix E, the essence of the difference-in-differences (DiD) 
approach is to attribute any change over time in the difference in outcomes 
between the pilot districts and the comparison districts to the impact of the lone 
parent pilots (LPPs), having controlled for a range of explanatory factors that are 
changing over time. It is, therefore, very important to understand the underlying 
trends in outcomes in the pilot and comparison districts. 
Of course, what one would ideally want to know is whether, in the absence of the 
LPPs, the trends in the pilot and comparison districts would have been identical 
– but this is unobservable. As a substitute, though, it is possible to test whether 
there were ‘common trends’ in the pilot and comparison districts in the period 
before the introduction of the LPPs – first over the whole period (from April 2001 
onwards) and then over six-monthly periods immediately before the LPPs were 
introduced (from April 2003 onwards). 
Testing for constant differences between treatment and 
comparison districts
Figures I.1 to I.4 illustrate the underlying trend in outcomes in the set of comparison 
districts, and the trend in outcomes in the four pilot phases relative to that, having 
controlled for a set of explanatory variables (see Appendix D) over the whole 
pre-LPPs period (equivalently, they show estimates of the difference in outcomes 
between each of the four phases and the set of comparison districts, and how 
these differences change over time). 
The figures do not plot the mean outcome in the set of comparison districts; 
they plot the mean outcome having controlled for other variables: each figure 
reports the coefficients from a regression that included a set of indicators for each 
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quarter interacted with a set of indicators for being in each of the four pilot areas 
and the set of comparison districts; this allows each pilot phase and the set of 
comparison districts to have their own (unrestricted) trend in outcomes. Because 
the other explanatory variables had non-zero mean, the coefficients plotted for 
the comparison districts are not identical to the mean outcome in the comparison 
districts.
Figures I.1 and I.2 suggest the following about the underlying trends in benefit 
outcomes at 12 and 24 months: 
• There is no dramatic trend in benefit outcomes for the set of comparison 
districts, although there is a peak in outcomes in 2004Q2. 
• Phases 1 and 3 (dominated by London districts) have a slight downward trend 
(relative to the set of comparison districts) until 2004, followed by an upward 
trend. 
• Phase 2 has a slight upward trend in outcomes relative to the comparison 
districts, which accelerates at some point in 2004.
• There is no obvious trend in Phase 4, relative to the comparison districts, 
although there is an upturn at the very end of the period.
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Figure I.1 Trend in comparison districts, and differences between  
 that and pilot phases: benefit outcomes 12 months  
 after becoming potentially eligible 
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Figure I.2 Trend in comparison districts, and differences between  
 that and pilot phases: benefit outcomes 24 months  
 after becoming potentially eligible 
However, formal statistical tests – comparing outcomes between pilot and control 
districts across the entire pre-programme period – reveal two important points 
(what follows is true for benefit outcomes at 12 and 24 months and for outcomes 
at six and 18 months, but these are not shown). First, for each phase, the set of 
differences with the comparison districts are significantly different from zero. This 
means that even in the absence of the LPPs, outcomes were different in the pilot 
and comparison districts and this is why the estimates of the impact of the LPPs 
have to use a DiD estimator (rather than simply comparing outcomes after the 
LPPs were introduced). 
Second, for each phase, the set of differences with the comparison districts before 
the LPPs start is not significantly different from a constant. Formally, therefore, the 
hypothesis of common pre-programme trends cannot be rejected for any phase 
and for any benefit outcome. (Note that it is not possible to carry out this test 
once the LPPs have started, because if the LPPs have an effect, it will have changed 
the trend in the pilot districts.)
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Figures I.3 and I.4 suggest the following about the underlying trends in work 
outcomes: 
• The trends for the set of comparison districts show a decline over time. Although 
it has been argued that the measure of work in the Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Study (WPLS) contains errors in both directions (see Appendix B), 
it is not clear why there should be a downward trend nor why the trends are 
different for work and benefit outcomes observed at the same time nor why the 
trends are so different for outcomes after 12 and 24 months.
• Phases 1 and 3 (dominated by London districts) appear to have a downward 
trend (relative to the set of comparison districts) until around 2004 for outcomes 
at 12 months, and until 2003 for outcomes at 24 months, followed by an 
upward trend (the horizontal axis refers to the date when the lone parent 
became potentially eligible for In-Work Credit (IWC), so the same date on 
different figures refers to the same cohort of lone parents). 
Figure I.3 Trend in comparison districts, and differences between  
 that and pilot phases: work outcomes 12 months after  
 becoming potentially eligible 
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Figure I.4 Trend in comparison districts, and differences between  
 that and pilot phases: work outcomes 24 months after  
 becoming potentially eligible
 
However, formal statistical tests reveal two important points (what follows is 
true for work outcomes at 12 and 24 months). First, for all phases, the set of 
differences with the comparison districts are significantly different from zero. This 
means that even in the absence of the LPPs, outcomes were different in the pilot 
and comparison districts, and this is why the estimates of the impact of the LPPs 
have to use a DiD estimator. 
Second, for Phases 1, 2 and 4, the set of differences with the comparison districts 
before the LPPs start is not significantly different from a constant; for Phase 3, 
there is evidence of a diverging trend for outcomes at 12 months, but not at 24 
months. Formally, therefore, the hypothesis of common pre-programme trends 
cannot be rejected for Phases 1, 2 and 4 for any work outcome and for Phase 3 
for outcomes at 24 months.
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Testing for placebo effects
The tests carried out so far in this appendix have checked the validity of the ‘common 
trends’ assumption across the whole of the pre-LPPs period, i.e. between April 
2001 and the date on which the LPPs were introduced in each of the pilot phases. 
The following tests check this assumption over six-monthly periods immediately 
before the introduction of the LPPs – that is, from April 2003 onwards – by testing 
for placebo ‘treatment’ effects amongst potentially eligible lone parents before 
the policy was introduced. 
To give an example: lone parents living in Phase 2 districts who first became 
potentially eligible for IWC between April 2003 and October 2003 would have 
their 12-month labour market outcomes recorded between April 2004 and 
October 2004, before the LPPs were introduced in Phase 2. Thus, their 12-month 
outcome would be unaffected by the LPPs – assuming there are no anticipation 
effects – and can be used to test for unexplainable differences between pilot and 
control districts prior to the introduction of the LPPs (in Phase 1 districts, only 
the six-month labour market outcomes of a lone parent who became potentially 
eligible during the same period would be unaffected by IWC; being very short-
term outcomes, they are not discussed here). This is also true for lone parents who 
first become potentially eligible for IWC between April 2003 and April 2004 in 
Phase 3 districts, and April 2003 and October 2004 in Phase 4 districts.
Clearly, the estimated treatment effects for cohorts of lone parents unaffected by 
the LPPs should ideally be close to zero and statistically insignificant. If they are 
not, they may be indicative of a violation of the ‘common trends’ assumption; 
equally, they may be indicative of anticipation effects (see Section 2.2 for more 
discussion of this issue) or the confounding effects of other labour market policies 
that may have been in place at the time.
Table I.1 presents the estimated placebo effects of the LPPs on the work and benefit 
outcomes of lone parents 12 months after they became potentially eligible. These 
estimates suggest that lone parents in Phase 2 districts who became potentially 
eligible between April 2003 and October 2003 are 0.5 percentage points (ppts) 
less likely to be off benefit and 0.048 ppts (0.0 ppts to 1 decimal place) more 
likely to be in work than otherwise identical lone parents in the control districts; 
reassuringly, however, neither coefficient is significantly different from zero.
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Table I.1 Impacts on unaffected lone parents, flow sample,  
 by phase and cohort, 12 months after becoming  
 potentially eligible, common unrestricted trend (ppts)
Period in which lone 
parents became 
potentially eligible
Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Off 
benefit
In work Off 
benefit
In work Off 
benefit
In work
Apr 2003–Oct 2003 –0.5 0.0 –0.4 –0.2 –0.9 0.3
(0.425) (0.411) (0.481) (0.481) (0.409)** (0.391)
Oct 2003–Apr 2004 –0.8 –0.6 0.1 0.4
(0.499) (0.481) (0.431) (0.401)
Apr 2004–Oct 2004 –0.1 –0.0
(0.407) (0.376)
Base: All lone parents in flow sample (see Appendix B for detail and Appendix H for sample sizes 
and mean outcomes).
In Phase 3 districts, the LPPs were not introduced until April 2005, so the first two 
cohorts of lone parents would have been unaffected by it up to 12 months after 
they became potentially eligible. Both cohorts of lone parents were less likely to 
be off benefit and in work than lone parents in the comparison group but again, 
the point estimates are not statistically significant.
The first three cohorts of lone parents in Phase 4 districts would have been 
unaffected by the LPPs up to 12 months after they became potentially eligible. Of 
these, the first cohort was 0.9 ppts less likely to be off benefit than lone parents 
in the comparison group and this coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level. This may call into question the ‘common trends’ assumption. However, 
for the remaining two cohorts, the impacts on benefit are small and significant; 
furthermore, none of the impacts on work for any of the first three cohorts is 
statistically significant.
Table I.2 repeats the exercise for 18-month labour market outcomes. Given the 
data cut-off at 31 March 2007, lone parents in the flow sample would have had 
to become potentially eligible before October 2005 in order to be followed in the 
data for 18 months thereafter. This restricts attention to lone parents who first 
became potentially eligible for IWC in Phase 3 districts between April 2003 and 
October 2003 or in Phase 4 districts between April 2003 and April 2004.
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Table I.2 Impacts on unaffected lone parents, flow sample, by  
 phase and cohort, 18 months after becoming  
 potentially eligible, common unrestricted trend (ppts)
Period in which lone 
parents became 
potentially eligible
Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Off 
benefit
In work Off 
benefit
In work Off 
benefit
In work
Apr 2003–Oct 2003 0.0 0.3 –0.5 –0.3
(0.539) (0.512) (0.446) (0.412)
Oct 2003–Apr 2004 0.2 –0.3
(0.464) (0.423)
Base: All lone parents in flow sample (see Appendix B for detail and Appendix H for sample sizes 
and mean outcomes).
The first cohort of lone parents in Phase 3 districts was slightly more likely to be 
off benefit and in work than lone parents in the comparison group but the point 
estimates are not statistically significant so there is no evidence against ‘common 
trends’ in this phase. In Phase 4 districts, the first cohort was 0.5 ppts less likely to 
be off benefit and 0.3 ppts less likely to be in work but neither of these effects is 
significant. The second cohort was more likely to be off benefit and less likely to 
be in work but again, neither of these estimates is significantly different from zero.
This analysis has shown three things:
• First, before the LPPs began, average outcomes controlling for a range of 
explanatory factors were significantly different between each of the four phases 
and the set of comparison districts and that justifies the use of DiD (rather than 
a straightforward comparison of outcomes after the LPPs started) to estimate 
the impact of the LPPs. 
• Second, the underlying trend in outcomes before the LPPs is generally found 
to be common across the pilot and comparison districts (the only exceptions 
are for 12-month work outcomes in Phase 3 districts in the first test, and 
12-month benefit outcomes for lone parents who became potentially eligible 
between April 2003 and October 2003 in Phase 4 districts in the second test). 
On the basis of this, the main results in Chapter 4 assume that the underlying 
difference between each phase and the comparison districts can be represented 
adequately by a constant and the underlying time trend is represented by a full 
set of quarterly indicators, common to all districts (these assumptions will be 
tested by carrying out robustness checks in Appendix K).
• Third, there is some visual evidence, especially for Phases 1 and 3, that outcomes 
improved relative to the comparison districts around the time that the LPPs were 
introduced (see Figures I.1 and I.3). This should give readers who feel that a DiD 
regression is a black box some reassurance that the estimated impacts are based 
on genuine changes in outcomes.
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Appendix J 
Difference-in-differences 
estimates of the impact of the 
lone parent pilots by phase 
and by cohort, flow sample
This report has examined different estimates of the impact effect of the lone 
parent pilots (LPPs) on the flow sample:
a the average impact across all lone parents and all phases (i.e. one estimated 
impact);
b the average impact across all lone parents but separately for all four phases 
(i.e. four estimated impacts);
c the average impact estimated separately for different cohorts of lone parents 
(defined) and separately for all four phases (i.e. ten estimated impacts).
In general, each successive variant gives more detail than its predecessor but 
at the cost of reduced precision; which of these variants should be preferred 
depends upon the use being made of the estimates. Chapters 4 and 6 presented 
results based on variant (a) and this appendix presents results based on variants (b) 
and (c).
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Impacts by phase
Table J.1 shows the estimated impacts separately for each phase (i.e. treatment 
effect variant (b)). The point estimates are almost all positive, and almost all 
significantly different from zero (none is negative and significantly different from 
zero). Apart from the last outcome measure in each phase, the point estimates 
tend to increase over time and this is a more reliable estimate of the time profile 
of the impact of the LPPs than that shown in Section 4.1. Except in Phase 3, the 
point estimates of the work outcomes are generally a little smaller than benefit 
outcomes at the same point in time. 
It is possible to test whether the impacts in each phase are the same and it was 
not possible to reject this hypothesis for the following impacts: benefit outcomes 
at 15, 18, 21 and 24 months; work outcomes at six, 24 and 27 months. This could 
arise either because the impacts were genuinely the same or because the sample 
sizes are not large enough to detect differences sufficiently precisely. The inability 
to reject the hypothesis of the same impact in all phases suggests that the extra 
detail provided in Table J.1 compared with Table 4.1 may not be needed. However, 
a problem with Table 4.1 is that the importance of Phase 1 increases as more 
longer-term outcomes are examined.
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Impact estimate by phase and cohort 
This section investigates whether the estimated impact of the LPPs varies across 
cohorts of lone parents within a particular phase. 
Tables J.2 and J.3 reveal how the impacts of the LPPs on outcomes measured 12 
and 24 months after becoming potentially eligible for In-Work Credit (IWC) vary 
by period of eligibility (the impacts on outcomes measured six and 18 months 
after becoming potentially eligible for IWC are not shown).
The first two columns of Table J.2 show that, in Phase 1 districts, the impact of 
the LPPs 12 months after becoming potentially eligible was initially very small and 
statistically insignificant. Over time, however, the point estimates become more 
positive and more likely to be statistically significant. For example, lone parents 
in Phase 1 districts who became potentially eligible after the LPPs had been in 
operation for about a year (i.e. between April 2005 and October 2005) were 
1.1 percentage points (ppts) more likely to be off benefit and 2.6 ppts more likely 
to be in work than otherwise identical lone parents in the comparison districts a 
year later; for lone parents who became potentially eligible after October 2005, 
the impacts on benefit and work outcomes were 2.0 ppts and 2.7 ppts respectively, 
both of which are highly statistically significant. Testing to see whether these 
effects are significantly different from one another, however, reveals that only the 
impact of the LPPs on work outcomes significantly changes over time; this is partly 
because the impacts on benefit outcomes in Phase 1 increase by a smaller amount 
than the work outcomes do and partly because the impacts on benefit outcomes 
are less precisely measured.
For Phase 2 districts, the first rows of the table are blank: the LPPs did not exist in 
these areas until October 2004, so no estimated impact is reported. Lone parents 
who became potentially eligible for the LPPs shortly after they were rolled out in 
these areas were 1.9 ppts more likely to be off benefit a year later and 0.9 ppts 
more likely to be in work. The impacts on benefit and work are similar for the lone 
parents who became potentially eligible during the next six-month period (slightly 
higher for benefit and slightly lower for work). As in Phase 1 districts, the impacts 
are highest among lone parents who became potentially eligible recently (after 
October 2005): these individuals were 2.4 ppts more likely to be off benefit and 
1.1 ppts more likely to be in work a year later. As in the Phase 1 districts, however, 
there is only significant evidence that the work impacts change as additional 
cohorts of lone parents became potentially eligible.
The LPPs in Phase 3 districts increased the proportions off benefit and in work by 
1.1 ppts and 1.7 ppts respectively among lone parents who became potentially 
eligible within the first six months of the pilots. Lone parents who became 
potentially eligible after this period experienced similar impacts a year later – 
higher for benefit and slightly lower for work but neither coefficient changes 
significantly over time.
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The LPPs were not introduced in Phase 4 districts until October 2005, so there is 
only one post-policy period in the table that applies to these districts. Note that 
the coefficients for Phase 4 in Table J.2 will not necessarily be identical to those 
presented in Table J.1 for Phase 4 at 12 months, despite the fact that they apply 
to the same individuals. This is because the model used to produce the figures in 
Table J.2 specifies the impacts for Phases 1 to 3 in a more flexible manner; since all 
four phases are analysed jointly in the model, this can alter the estimated impact 
for Phase 4 districts.
Table J.3 repeats the exercise above for outcomes measured two years after lone 
parents first became potentially eligible for IWC. Given that this report uses data 
that tracks lone parents until 31 March 2007, only lone parents who became 
potentially eligible for IWC before 31 March 2005 would have such outcomes 
recorded, limiting the analysis to Phases 1 and 2.
Table J.3 Estimated impact of the LPPs, flow sample, by phase  
 and cohort, 24 months after becoming potentially  
 eligible, common unrestricted trend (ppts)
Period in which lone parents 
became potentially eligible
Phase 1 Phase 2
Off benefit In work Off benefit In work
April 2004–October 2004 1.4 0.6
(0.686)** (0.591)
October 2004–April 2005 2.7 2.6 2.1 1.4
(0.784)*** (0.669)*** (0.530)*** (0.461)***
Base: All lone parents in flow sample (see Appendix B for detail and Appendix H for sample sizes 
and mean outcomes).
In Phase 1 districts, lone parents who became potentially eligible for IWC within 
six months of its introduction were 1.4 ppts more likely to be off benefit and 
0.6 ppts more likely to be in work two years later – the latter impact, however, is 
not statistically different from zero. For the cohort of lone parents who became 
potentially eligible during the next six-month period, from October 2004 to 
April 2005, the impacts are considerably larger: these individuals were 2.7 ppts 
more likely to be off benefit and 2.6 ppts more likely to be in work two years 
after becoming potentially eligible for IWC. However, only the impact on work 
outcomes is significantly different for the second cohort from the first.
For Phase 2, only one point estimate is reported – for lone parents who became 
potentially eligible for IWC between October 2004 and April 2005. The table 
indicates that the LPPs made these lone parents 2.1 ppts more likely to be off 
benefit and 1.4 ppts more likely to be in work 24 months after first becoming 
potentially eligible. Both of these point estimates are significantly different from 
zero (the impacts for Phase 2 are similar but not identical to the corresponding 
estimates in Table J.1, for the same reasons outlined above for the Phase 4 impacts 
at 12 months).
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This analysis provides some indication of how the impact of the LPPs has changed 
over time. The point estimates on both benefit and work outcomes appear to 
increase as additional cohorts became potentially eligible for IWC but only for 
work outcomes is the growth in the impacts statistically significant. The increasing 
impact of the LPPs may be consistent with the idea of information effects, whereby 
awareness of the policy among potentially eligible lone parents is low to begin 
with but gradually increases as the initial cohorts are exposed to it, leading to 
higher take-up rates. Alternatively, it could reflect an increase in the effectiveness 
of Jobcentre Plus advisers (and other practitioners) in the pilot districts as they gain 
experience of the policy. Finally, a third possible interpretation is that the more 
recent cohorts of potentially eligible lone parents are somehow different from 
previous cohorts in ways that are not captured by the data. If such differences also 
affect their chances of leaving benefit for work, they would lead to increases in 
the estimated impact of the LPPs.
Impact of the LPPs on encouraging job retention in  
each phase
Table J.4 presents estimates of the impact of the LPPs on lone parents who leave 
Income Support (IS) for work separately for each phase.
In terms of benefit outcomes, the point estimates are all positive and, for Phases 
1, 2 and 3, they are almost always significantly different from zero. The impact of 
the LPPs peaks between about nine and 18 months after potentially eligible lone 
parents leave IS for work, at 4 ppts in Phases 1 and 3 and 2.6 ppts in Phase 2.
The impact of the LPPs on work outcomes is more varied: the point estimates are 
greatest in Phase 3, with IWC recipients 4.6 ppts more likely to be in work than 
potentially eligible lone parents in the control districts 18 months after leaving IS 
for work, while receipt of IWC appears to have little effect on the work outcomes 
of potentially eligible lone parents who leave IS for work in Phase 1 or Phase 4.
Comparing these results with the findings reported in Table J.1 suggests that much 
of the impact of the LPPs in Phases 1 and 4 – on work outcomes in particular – 
arises because it encourages more potentially eligible lone parents to enter work. 
This is because the estimates that condition on having left IS and being in work 
(reported in this section) suggest that IWC recipients are not significantly more 
likely to be in work than potentially eligible lone parents in control districts. On the 
other hand, in Phases 2 and 3, the LPPs appear to have both initial and retention 
effects: that is to say, they encourage more potentially eligible lone parents to 
stop claiming benefits and start working and, conditional on having done so, also 
encourage more lone parents to stay off benefits and in work.
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Appendix K 
Robustness checks: trend 
variants
Section 4.2 investigated the underlying trend in outcomes in the comparison 
districts and how the difference between each of the phases and the comparison 
districts changed over time before the introduction of the lone parent pilots 
(LPPs). It concluded that the underlying difference between each phase and the 
comparison districts could be represented adequately by a constant and that the 
underlying time trend should be represented by a full set of quarterly indicators, 
common to all districts. 
To obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of the LPPs, one must assume 
that these pre-programme trends continue after the introduction of the LPPs (an 
assumption which cannot be tested). However, the finding of negative ‘treatment’ 
effects amongst lone parents before they are potentially eligible for In-Work 
Credit (IWC), but after the LPPs were introduced (described in Section 4.2.3 
and Appendix L), suggests that this may not be an adequate representation of the 
time trend after the LPPs were introduced. 
This appendix considers three alternative estimates of the impact of the LPPs using 
different assumptions about the underlying trend in outcomes:
a no time trend, but seasonal indicators;
b separate quadratic and linear time trends for each of the four phases and the 
set of comparison districts, and seasonal indicators common to all districts;
c separate linear time trends for each of the four phases and the set of comparison 
districts, a common quadratic time trend, and seasonal indicators common to 
all districts.
In specifications b) and c), outcomes for lone parents observed before the LPPs 
began are used to estimate a time trend, which is then extrapolated into the period 
after the LPPs began; this is done separately for each of the four phases and the 
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combined set of comparison districts. The advantage of these specifications is that 
they allow the treatment and comparison districts to have different underlying 
trends in outcomes; the disadvantage is that the estimated treatment effect is 
then sensitive to the accuracy of the estimated underlying trend. In particular, in 
this case, the estimate of the underlying trend is based on data on outcomes of 
lone parents whose duration on Income Support (IS) reached 12 months between 
April 2001 and, at the latest, April 2004, and this trend is then extrapolated for 
at least three years. If that extrapolation is invalid, then the estimated treatment 
effect will be incorrect.
Table K.1 shows how the estimated treatment effects (averaged across all phases) 
vary as the assumptions about the underlying trend in outcomes is altered. Note 
that the first two columns – showing estimates using a common, unrestricted 
trend – replicate the headline results reported in Table 4.1. Compared with the 
headline set of results (which assumes that the underlying trend in outcomes is 
common to all phases but has an unrestricted form):
• Under the assumption of no trend in outcomes (columns 3 and 4), the point 
estimates for benefit outcomes are higher and for work outcomes are lower, 
particularly as time since becoming potentially eligible increases.
• Under the assumption of a differential quadratic trend in outcomes specific to 
each phase, the point estimates for benefit and work outcomes are lower (and 
the standard errors are substantially higher).
• Under the assumption of a differential linear trend in outcomes specific to each 
phase and a common quadratic trend, the point estimates for benefit and work 
outcomes are mostly higher except for outcomes at the longest durations (and 
the standard errors are substantially higher).
Tables K.2 to K.5 show how the estimated treatment effects for each phase vary 
as the assumptions about the underlying trend in outcomes are altered. 
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To understand why changing the assumption about underlying trends affects the 
estimates of the impact of the LPPs, it is useful to refer back to Appendix I. For 
example, the trend in many of the outcomes in Phases 1 and 3 is U-shaped. Under 
the assumption that each phase has its own quadratic trend in outcomes, the 
quadratic trend fits the data well, so there is much less evidence of a treatment 
effect after the LPPs started. But under the assumption that each phase has its 
own linear trend, the model assumes that the (slight) downward trend in outcomes 
that occurred before the LPPs began would continue afterwards, and this leads to 
a larger estimated impact of the LPPs. 
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Appendix L 
Robustness checks: 
anticipation effects
Chapters 4 and 6 presented the estimated impact of the lone parent pilots (LPPs) 
on lone parents in the flow sample who had been receiving out-of-work benefits 
for at least 12 months. One assumption underpinning the results was that the 
LPPs did not affect lone parents before this point in time. This assumption can be 
tested by estimating apparent treatment effects on lone parents who have been 
on Income Support (IS) for less than 12 months and who are, therefore, not yet 
eligible for In-Work Credit (IWC). This appendix reports such estimates. 
However, interpreting such treatment effects is not simple: there are two main 
causes, with very different implications, and no reliable way of distinguishing 
between them:
• First, any estimated ‘treatment effects’ may genuinely be caused by the LPPs. 
There are at least three ways this could occur:
– Chapter 2 discussed that one might expect that lone parents in pilot districts 
whose duration of IS is less than 12 months, and who are contemplating 
leaving IS for a job of 16 or more hours a week, might delay leaving IS until 
they become eligible for IWC. The benefits from doing this would be up to 
£2,080 in IWC payments; assuming it is costless to delay leaving IS for a job, 
the only cost would be the net earnings (i.e. net of taxes paid and benefits 
lost) forgone during the period of delay. These are known as anticipation 
effects and if present they would lead to an estimated negative ‘treatment 
effect’ on lone parents in pilot districts whose duration of IS is less than 12 
months; the implication would be that estimates of the net impact of the LPPs 
that ignored these would be overstating the genuine impact of the LPPs.
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– There may be ‘substitution effects’; in the case of the LPPs, this would refer 
to a situation where the higher number of lone parents whose duration on 
IS exceeds 12 months looking for work makes it harder for others – such 
as lone parents on IS for less than 12 months – to find work. Such effects 
would lead to a negative ‘treatment effect’ on lone parents in pilot districts 
whose duration of IS is less than 12 months and the implication would be 
that estimates of the net impact of the LPPs that ignored these would be 
overstating the genuine impact of the LPPs.
– Some of the IWC districts were also operating other LPPs, such as New Deal 
Plus for Lone Parents (NDfLP). If these programmes had a positive (negative) 
impact on lone parents’ outcomes, this could lead to estimated positive 
(negative) treatment effects on outcomes measured before the duration on IS 
reaches 12 months. The implication would be that estimates of the net impact 
of the LPPs that ignored these other programmes would correctly estimate 
the impact of the LPPs on potentially eligible lone parents but underestimate 
the impact of the LPPs as a whole.
• Second, any estimated treatment effects may be due to a failure of the 
‘common trends’ assumption after the LPPs started. This would happen if there 
were a deterioration or improvement in the outcomes in the pilot districts that 
did not occur in the comparison districts and which could not be explained 
by the explanatory factors included in the regression. If such a deterioration 
(improvement) had occurred, then it would lead to estimated treatment effects 
on outcomes measured before duration on IS reaches 12 months that were 
negative (positive), and it would imply that the conventional difference-in-
differences (DiD) estimates of the net impact of the LPPs were understating 
(overstating) the genuine impact of the LPPs.
Table L.1 estimates the impact of the LPPs on the ‘variant flow sample’ at various 
points during lone parents’ IS claim. The variant flow sample comprises all claims 
of IS made by lone parents between 1 April 2001 and 31 March 2007. The 
advantage of this sample is that it follows lone parents who made an IS claim 
from the first day of their claim and so one can test whether there appear to be 
treatment effects on lone parents before they became potentially eligible for IWC. 
Lone parents were classified as being in the treatment group if they started a claim 
of IS no earlier than 12 months before IWC started in their district; in other words, 
the treatment group comprises those claims of IS that, if they had lasted for at 
least 12 months and there had been no changes in personal circumstances from 
the initial claim, would have been potentially eligible for IWC.
Appendices – Robustness checks: anticipation effects
245
Table L.1 Estimated impact of the LPPs on lone parents who are  
 not yet potentially eligible, variant flow sample, all  
 phases, all cohorts, common unrestricted trend (ppts) 
Months before/since 
potentially eligible for 
IWC
Months since claim 
of IS
Off benefit In work
–9 3 –0.6 –0.3
(0.094)*** (0.134)**
–6 6 –0.4 –0.3
(0.147)*** (0.151)*
–3 9 –0.7 –0.6
(0.178)*** (0.168)***
0 12 –0.6 –0.7
(0.199)*** (0.184)***
3 15 –0.2 –0.6
(0.221) (0.203)***
6 18 0.3 –0.4
(0.244) (0.222)
9 21 0.2 –0.0
(0.274) (0.249)
12 24 0.9 0.6
(0.310)*** (0.285)**
15 27 0.8 0.2
(0.363)** (0.334)
18 30 1.2 0.8
(0.429)*** (0.398)**
21 33 0.4 0.2
(0.492) (0.458)
24 36 0.7 1.0
(0.579) (0.542)*
Base: All lone parents in variant flow sample (see Appendix B for detail).
For both benefit and work outcomes, the point estimates are negative in months 
–9 to 3 (measured relative to when the claimant would have actually become 
potentially eligible for IWC) and then rise (until month 18). 
The pattern of negative effects on benefit and work outcomes in months –9 to 3 
is consistent with:
• negative anticipation effects, with lone parents delaying exits from IS in the first 
12 months in order to benefit subsequently from the LPPs; 
• negative substitution effects, with lone parents on IS for less than 12 months 
finding it harder to find jobs as a direct result of lone parents on IS for more than 
12 months making more effort to leave benefit and start a job;
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• a failure of the ‘common trends’ assumption after the LPPs were introduced, 
whereby the pilot districts saw outcomes deteriorate relative to the comparison 
districts.
It is not possible to distinguish empirically between these explanations and so 
there can be no direct conclusion. All that can be said is that if the:
• ‘common trends’ assumption is true, the negative impacts must be due to the 
policy, perhaps through anticipation or substitution effects. This would mean 
that estimates that assume these effects do not exist (such as those in Table 
4.1) will overstate the genuine impact of the LPPs on the whole population of 
lone parents;
• policy has no impact on lone parents who are not directly eligible, the negative 
impacts must be due to a failure of the ‘common trends’ assumption. This 
would mean that estimates that ignore this (such as those in Table 4.1) would 
understate the genuine impact of the LPPs. 
Of course, both factors could be present in reality. 
Table L.2 shows how conclusions about the net impact of the LPPs are altered 
by the assumption that the negative apparent treatment effects in Table L.1 are 
due to the policy, perhaps through anticipation or substitution effects. Table L.2 
translates the estimates in Table L.1 (which allowed for anticipation effects) and 
an equivalent set, shown in Table L.3 (which assumed no anticipation effects) into 
the additional number of lone parents moved off benefit at different times due to 
the LPPs (this is calculated by multiplying the estimated treatment impact by the 
population of potentially eligible lone parents).
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As expected, allowing the LPPs to affect lone parents who are not directly eligible 
for IWC reduces the estimates of their overall impact, by around 19 per cent 
for work outcomes and 35 per cent for benefit outcomes after 12 months. The 
estimated impacts in Table L.1 are not comparable to those in Table 4.1; they 
are necessarily smaller, because around 30 per cent of the sample used for the 
estimates in Table L.1 were never eligible for IWC because the duration of their IS 
claim was less than 12 months. The estimated number of lone parents off benefit 
declines over time, not because the impact of IWC declines in percentage point 
terms but because fewer potentially eligible lone parents have been observed for 
these longer durations by 31 March 2007.
Table L.3 shows the estimated impact of the LPPs on those lone parents in the 
variant flow sample who remain on IS for at least 12 months. This is a similar, 
but not identical, sample to that used for the headline estimates in Table 4.1 
(which is repeated in Table L.3). Both the main flow sample and that used in 
Table L.3 comprise individuals whose IS claims lasted at least 12 months. However, 
claims initially made by non-lone parents who later became lone parents will never 
appear in Table L.3 but will appear in Table 4.1; conversely, claims initially made 
by lone parents who were no longer lone parents after 12 months will appear 
in Table L.3 but will never appear in Table 4.1. Finally, Table 4.1 comprises lone 
parents who first became potentially eligible for IWC between 1 April 2001 and 
31 March 2007 but Table L.3 comprises lone parents who first claimed IS between 
1 April 2001 and 31 March 2007, and so the range of dates in which they will 
become potentially eligible for IWC, taking account of the cut-off point for the 
data used in this report, is 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2007. It is not possible to 
test whether the estimated impacts on the two different samples are equal for a 
given outcome, as they are based on samples that are not strict subsets of each 
other. The similarity between the results in Table L.3 and Table 4.1 provides some 
reassurance that the results in this appendix about the apparent treatment effects 
are unlikely to be driven by the use of the variant flow sample rather than the flow 
sample used in Chapter 4.
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Table L.3 Estimated impact of the LPPs, variant flow sample but  
 conditional on being on IS for at least 12 months (with  
 no changes in circumstances), all phases, all cohorts,  
 common unrestricted trend (ppts) 
Months since 
potentially 
eligible for IWC
Off benefit In work Memo: benefit 
main results 
(from Table 4.1)
Memo: work 
main results 
(from Table 4.1)
3 0.6 –0.2 0.5 0.3
(0.163)*** (0.208) (0.112)*** (0.129)**
6 1.1 0.0 1.0 0.7
(0.221)*** (0.234) (0.154)*** (0.151)***
9 1.4 0.5 1.3 0.9
(0.271)*** (0.268)** (0.187)*** (0.174)***
12 2.0 1.0 1.6 1.0
(0.324)*** (0.310)*** (0.220)*** (0.199)***
15 1.8 1.0 1.7 1.1
(0.391)*** (0.368)*** (0.260)*** (0.230)***
18 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.3
(0.472)*** (0.440)*** (0.301)*** (0.265)***
21 0.9 0.6 1.8 1.3
(0.552)* (0.510) (0.348)*** (0.306)***
24 1.2 1.2 2.0 1.4
(0.660)* (0.606)* (0.419)*** (0.366)***
Base: All lone parents in variant flow sample who are on IS after 12 months (see Appendix B for 
detail).
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